Opinion
No. 2014AP49.
2014-12-23
Chelsea L. BETZ, by her Guardian ad Litem, Joel LRIMORE, James Betz and Kelli Betz, Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross–Respondents, v. WEST BEND MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Respondent–Cross–Appellant.
Appeal and Cross–Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for St. Croix County: Scott R. Needham, Judge. Affirmed; Cross-appeal dismissed.
Before HOOVER, P.J., STARK and HRUZ, JJ. ¶ 1 PER CURIAM.
Chelsea Betz and her parents, James Betz and Kelli Betz (collectively the Betzes), appeal a judgment dismissing their negligence claims against West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (West Bend). The judgment was entered following a jury verdict finding that Hannah Nielsen did not cause injuries sustained by Chelsea when she fell from a tree in which the two girls were playing. We conclude the special verdict answer regarding causation was supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence at trial. In addition, we conclude the verdict answer was not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence so as to entitle the Betzes to a new trial in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 6 The Betzes then renewed their motion for a directed verdict under Wis. Stat. § 805.14(5)(d). The motion also invoked § 805.14(5)(c) and requested, as an alternative, that the court change the jury's answer to Question 2 of the special verdict, with respect to whether Hannah was causally negligent, from “no” to “yes.” Further, and again in the alternative, the Betzes requested a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1), asserting the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.
¶ 7 The court issued a written order denying the Betzes' motion. It concluded there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could base a conclusion that Hannah was not causally negligent, reasoning that there was no clear testimony attributing the fall to Hannah's conduct; Hannah was not reaching for the limb Chelsea was holding, but rather an offshoot; and the jury could have found Hannah's other conduct (such as climbing the tree in the first place) negligent but not causally so. Because there were numerous reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, the court also concluded the jury verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. The Betzes appeal, and West Bend cross-appeals.
The jury completed the special verdict's damages questions and awarded $800,000 in future medical expenses. West Bend cross-appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support this award. Because we conclude the trial court properly denied the Betzes' motion, thereby denying the Betzes any recovery, we need not determine whether the jury award was supported by sufficient evidence. See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis.2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (appellate courts should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds).
DISCUSSION
¶ 8 The Betzes must overcome a high burden to have the judgment reversed following a jury verdict. Their challenges to the judgment under Wis. Stat. § 805.14(5) are essentially challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶ 137, 357 Wis.2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837 (“A motion for a directed verdict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.”); Kovalic v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 161 Wis.2d 863, 873 n. 7, 469 N.W.2d 224 (Ct.App.1991) (motion to change the jury's answer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the answer). No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence can be granted unless, “considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light more favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence” to support the verdict. Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1).
¶ 9 The Betzes contend there was no credible evidence supporting the jury's causation finding. Causation is determined by assessing whether the negligence was a substantial factor in contributing to the result. Merco Distrib. Corp. v. Commercial Police Alarm Co., 84 Wis.2d 455, 458, 267 N.W.2d 652 (1978). “The phrase ‘substantial factor’ denotes that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead the trier of fact, as a reasonable person, to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense.” Id. at 458–59, 267 N.W.2d 652. Causation is often an inference the trier of fact is to draw from the circumstances. Id. at 459, 267 N.W.2d 652.
¶ 10 The Betzes argue the only reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence was that Hannah caused Chelsea's fall. The keystone of the Betzes' argument is the timing of the breakage. They note the limb Chelsea was holding broke only after Hannah made contact with its small offshoot. In the Betzes' view, the jury was required to infer the branches were hard to break; Hannah exerted significant effort in trying to break them; and Hannah's efforts produced a “leveraged pull that caused the breakage of the main limb.” The Betzes sum up their argument by stating “the jury was dead wrong on the causation answer based on the credible evidence, logic and the rules of gravity known to all laypersons.”
¶ 11 We conclude there were reasonable inferences from the credible evidence to support the jury's causation finding. There was scant direct evidence at trial regarding how the fall occurred. Chelsea could not remember the accident; Hannah simply testified that the limb Chelsea was holding broke. There was no expert testimony attempting to reconstruct the accident or opining about the cause of the main limb's breakage.
¶ 12 The case therefore turned on reasonable inferences from the evidence. The jury would have been entitled to accept the inferences the Betzes propose and find that Hannah's efforts to break the offshoot caused the main limb to break. However, the jury was equally entitled to infer the limb supporting Chelsea broke for some reason unrelated to Hannah's conduct. As just one example, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Hannah's efforts to break the offshoot played an insignificant role and Chelsea simply exerted too much force on the limb she was holding. “[I]t is for the jurors, not for us, to determine ‘what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference.’ ” State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 62, ¶ 71, 341 Wis.2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145 (quoted source omitted).
¶ 13 The Betzes contend that any alternative causation theory is entirely speculative and cannot form the basis for a jury verdict. See General Star Indem. Co. v. Bankruptcy Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar Shack, Inc., 215 Wis.2d 104, 122, 572 N.W.2d 881 (Ct.App.1997) (jury cannot base its findings on speculation or conjecture). We disagree because the evidence allowed fair-minded jurors to draw different, reasonable inferences. See Abbott Labs., 341 Wis.2d 510, ¶ 71, 816 N.W.2d 145. Again, there was no direct testimony about the cause of Chelsea's fall, so even the Betzes' causation theory required the jury to draw its own conclusions about what happened.
¶ 14 The Betzes' efforts to invoke logic and the law of gravity in support of their appellate argument are unavailing. It was not illogical for the jury to accept one of several competing inferences that could be reasonably drawn from the trial evidence. Further, gravitational forces have little to do with causation in this case. No one disputes Chelsea fell from the tree or that gravity brought her to the ground; the question is how and why the fall occurred in the first instance. Although it is largely undisputed that Hannah touched the offshoot, there was no evidence that Hannah's conduct caused the breakage of the main limb.
¶ 15 The Betzes also argue, largely for the same reasons as above, that they are entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice. They reason that even if the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of no causation, the jury's answer to the causation question was nonetheless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. “A trial court has wide discretion to order a new trial in the interest of justice if the verdict is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, although the evidence is not so insufficient as to justify changing the answers to the special verdict questions.” McPhillips v. Blomgren, 30 Wis.2d 134, 139, 140 N.W.2d 267 (1966); see also DeGroff v. Schmude, 71 Wis.2d 554, 563, 238 N.W.2d 730 (1976) (noting specifically that rule applies to causation questions).
¶ 16 We owe great deference to the court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1). See Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 180 Wis.2d 426, 431, 509 N.W.2d 75 (Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 190 Wis.2d 623, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995). The trial court is in the best position to observe and evaluate the evidence. Id. We look for reasons to sustain the trial court's determination, and we will not reverse it as long as the court set forth a reasonable basis for its decision. Id.
¶ 17 Here, the court properly concluded the jury verdict was not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The Betzes' causation case was based on inference; there was no direct evidence that Hannah caused the limb to break. Although that was one permissible inference from the testimony, we cannot say that inference was so compelling that the jury erred in reaching the opposite conclusion.
¶ 18 West Bend is allowed Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.25 costs on appeal. No costs are allowed with respect to West Bend's cross-appeal.
Judgment affirmed; Cross-appeal dismissed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.23(1)(b)5.