Opinion
Civil Action No. 12-1420 (ABJ)
07-24-2015
THEODORE BERRY Plaintiff, v. COASTAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INC. Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Theodore Berry has filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in this employment discrimination case. Mot. for Leave to File an Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 42] ("Mot. to Am."). The Court will grant the motion in part, and deny it in part. The Court finds that while it is not yet known whether the claim will survive summary judgment, adding the claim that plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his national origin when he was disciplined for "taking home a key" in June 2013 would not be futile at this time. But all of plaintiff's other proposed amendments to the existing complaint would be futile or superfluous.
BACKGROUND
On July 13, 2012, plaintiff brought an employment discrimination suit against defendant Coastal International Security, Inc. in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Compl., Ex. A to Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1-2], and on August 27, 2012, defendant removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1]. The amended complaint, which currently governs the case, alleges discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and retaliation in violation of the ADEA and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 14-201.01 et seq. Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 16] ¶¶ 88-113.
The Court entered a scheduling order on February 3, 2014, Scheduling Order [Dkt. # 21], and the parties embarked on discovery. Then, on July 23, 2014, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case. Att'y's Mot. to Withdraw/Strike Appearance [Dkt. # 30]. Plaintiff notified the Court that he intended to pursue his claims pro se on July 25, 2014, Pl.'s Notice of Filing [Dkt. # 31], and the Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw on July 29, 2014. Minute Order (July 29, 2014).
On October 21, 2014, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to compel defendant to produce "1103 forms" during the ongoing discovery process. Mot. to Compel [Dkt. # 33] at 1; see also Minute Order (Oct. 24, 2014) (extending the time to complete discovery until November 17, 2014). Plaintiff contended that these documents related to a 37-day suspension he received in June 2013 "for taking home a key from the call box." Ex. 3 to Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Opp. to Pl.'s Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 48-1] ("Dec. 2013 Charge") at 1; see also Mot. to Compel. The Court held a teleconference with the parties about the discovery dispute on November 14, 2014, and later that day, it issued an order denying plaintiff's motion to compel on the grounds that there was no allegation about a June 2013 disciplinary action in the amended complaint. Minute Order (Nov. 14, 2014).
The date on the reproduction of the administrative charge provided by plaintiff is difficult to decipher, and in the Court's Order of January 5, 2015, the Court indicated that the charge had been filed on October 31, 2013. See Order (Jan. 5, 2015) [Dkt. # 41] at 2. But defendant has clarified that the charge was filed on December 31, 2015, Def.'s Opp. to Mot. to Am. [Dkt. # 45] at 11, and plaintiff - now represented by counsel - has not disputed that point.
On November 28, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of his discovery request. Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. [Dkt. # 35]. In that motion, plaintiff notified the Court for the first time that he had filed a separate administrative charge relating to the June 2013 disciplinary action, and that the charge had been dismissed by the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights ("DCOHR") on October 10, 2014, on the grounds that the claim was already embodied in this pending lawsuit. Id. at 1, 3-4. The Court directed plaintiff to provide copies of his original and subsequent administrative complaints for review in connection with his motion for reconsideration, Minute Order (Dec. 3, 2014), and plaintiff complied. Resp. to Order of Ct. [Dkt. # 36].
While plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was pending, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2014, as required by the scheduling order in place at the time. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 38]; see also Minute Order (Oct. 24, 2014).
The Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on January 5, 2015, again on the grounds that the June 2013 disciplinary action was not fairly included in the amended complaint. See Order (Jan. 5, 2015) at 5-6. But the Court also recognized that plaintiff's amended complaint, which was filed on December 20, 2013, could not have included the June 2013 disciplinary incident, because at that point, plaintiff had not yet administratively exhausted that claim. Id. at 6. Therefore, "in an abundance of caution," the Court stated that it would permit plaintiff to file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint by January 23, 2015. Id. at 6. The Court further ordered that defendant's motion for summary judgment would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of any motion for leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff, still proceeding pro se, filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on January 23, 2015. Mot. to Am.; see also Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 42-1] ("Prop. 2d Am. Compl."). The proposed second amended complaint contained one reference to the June 2013 "key" incident, Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 101a, as well as a new "harassment" claim, id. ¶¶ 12a, 99a, along with numerous other additions and editorial changes. Compare, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 18, 49, 50, 52, 57, 59, 78a-e, with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 18, 49, 50, 52, 57, 59, 78. Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion on February 9, 2015. Def.'s Opp. to Mot. to Am. [Dkt. # 45] ("Def.'s Opp."). Plaintiff did not file a response to defendant's opposition, and the motion was taken under advisement.
On June 3, 2015, new counsel entered an appearance on behalf of plaintiff. Notice of Appearance [Dkt. # 46]. On June 15, 2015, the Court ordered plaintiff to file a reply to defendant's opposition to the motion to amend with counsel's assistance. Minute Order (June 15, 2015). Plaintiff complied on June 30, 2015. Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Opp. [Dkt. # 48] ("Pl.'s Reply").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party seeks to amend its pleading after a responsive pleading has been served, the Court should "freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996). "[A] district court should grant leave to amend a complaint '[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith[,] . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party[,] . . . [and] futility of amendment." Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1996), quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court may deny leave to amend based on futility "if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss." Rumber v. District of Columbia, 598 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2009), citing James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Ross v. DynCorp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 364 n.11 (D.D.C. 2005) ("While a court is instructed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to grant leave to amend a complaint 'freely,' it need not do so where the only result would be to waste time and judicial resources. Such is the case where the Court determines, in advance, that the claim that a plaintiff plans to add to his or her complaint must fail, as a matter of law. . . .").
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the 2013 key incident and his allegations are not futile.
On December 31, 2013, plaintiff filed an administrative charge alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Dec. 2013 Charge. Plaintiff stated:
I was hired by Respondent on 11/01/2003. My current tile is LT., but I have completing [sic] the duties of an Officer since December 2012. Since September 2012, Contract Manager Nkrumah Williams (African) has denied me the right to wear my insignia on my uniform. On 6/22/13, I was suspended for 37 days for taking home a key from the call box. The decision maker for the suspension was Mr. Williams. According to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), because I did not have any disciplinary action taken against me within the last 12 months of when I was issued the suspension, I should have received less severe discipline than a suspension. In addition to the suspension, I was issued a final warning; according to the CBA, I should have received less severe discipline than a final warning. Following my suspension, Respondent refused to allow me to view my employee file. In addition to national origin discrimination, I believe that Respondent is retaliating against me for previously filing discrimination complaints . . . .Id. On October 10, 2014, plaintiff and defendant were notified that the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights had dismissed the December 2013 administrative complaint. Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. at 3.
I believe that I have been discriminated against based on my national origin (American) and retaliated against, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Plaintiff now seeks to incorporate the allegations of the December 2013 charge into the complaint. Defendant contends that these claims should not be added because they have not been properly administratively exhausted, and because they would be futile. Def.'s Opp. at 8-11. The Court finds, however, that plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the December 2013 charge, and that the allegations related to the June 2013 disciplinary actions for failure to return a key are not futile.
The Court notes that plaintiff's attempts to add the December 2013 Title VII allegations to the complaint are indirect at best; for instance, the only mention of the key incident is found in paragraph 101a, which is housed under the count that alleges retaliation in violation of the ADEA. See Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 101a ("The Defendant in retaliation for his opposition to and reversal of the prior promotion failed to provide the Plaintiff due process in accusations related to Sgt. Dade, taking home a key, and disrespect towards an employee of the building."). But because plaintiff was proceeding pro se when he moved to amend, "the Court must take particular care to construe [his] filings liberally, for such complaints are held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Cheeks v. Fort Myers Constr. Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 107 (D.D.C. 2010), quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Therefore, based upon the representations made in connection with the motion to compel and the background leading up to the instant motion, the Court proceeds with the understanding that plaintiff now seeks leave to incorporate the allegations of the December 2013 charge into the complaint.
A. Plaintiff administratively exhausted the December 2013 charge.
Title VII requires a plaintiff who complains of unlawful discrimination to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge."). Although defendant concedes that the DCOHR administratively closed its investigation of the charge in October 2014, it contends that the claims are not exhausted because they are "currently pending before the EEOC." Def.'s Opp. at 11 n.4. But even if the DCOHR's dismissal of the charge were not enough to satisfy the exhaustion requirement - which the Court does not hold - it is well established in this Circuit that "[o]nce a complainant files a complaint or appeal and cooperates with the agency or EEOC for 180 days, he is not required to take any further action to exhaust his administrative remedies." Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1996), first citing Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1975), then citing Clark v. Chasen, 619 F.2d 1330, 1332-37 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ramsey v. Moniz, No. 12-cv-1035 (BAH), 2014 WL 5778251, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014). Given that far more than 180 days had elapsed when plaintiff moved to amend the complaint, the Court finds that the allegations of the December 2013 charge have been administratively exhausted.
The Court notes, however, that since the administrative complaint alleged only discrimination and retaliation based on national origin, any claim that the events described in the December 2013 charge also violated the ADEA or DCHRA does not appear to have been exhausted.
B. The allegations related to the June 2013 key incident are not futile , but the other allegations of the December 2013 charge are futile.
Defendant contends that even if plaintiff's December 2013 allegations are exhausted, they are futile because they do not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Def.'s Opp. at 8-11. A court may deny leave to amend a complaint based on futility "if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss." Rumber, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
To state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he "suffered an adverse employment action . . . because of" the protected characteristic. Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1196. An adverse employment action is one that causes "materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm." Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002), citing Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Adverse actions arise from "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2013), quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that he or she "suffered (i) a materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had brought or threatened to bring a discrimination claim," Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198, and that the adverse action would not have occurred "but for" the decision to engage in protected activity. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). In the retaliation context, an adverse action is one that "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that an adverse action can be short of a "personnel action," such as discharge or denial of promotion, but must result in "significant harm or hardship, such as affecting the plaintiff's 'position, grade level, salary, or promotion opportunities'"), quoting Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
The December 2013 charge alleges several discrete acts of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII:
1. That plaintiff's supervisor denied him "the right to wear [his] insignia on [his] uniform." Dec. 2013 Charge at 1.
2. That, on June 22, 2013, plaintiff was suspended for 37 days "for taking home a key from the call box," and that the suspension was a more severe penalty than was warranted under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Id.
3. That plaintiff was "issued a final warning" based on the key incident, which was a more severe penalty than was warranted under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Id.
4. That plaintiff was not permitted to view his employee file after the suspension. Id.
The Court finds that the first and fourth allegations - related to the insignia and the employee file - do not state a claim upon which relief could be granted because they do not allege any adverse employment actions under either the disparate treatment or retaliation standards. Plaintiff alleges nothing in the proposed second amended complaint, the December 2013 charge, the motion for reconsideration, or any other pleading that would plausibly indicate that either the denial of "the right to wear [his] insignia," or the inability to view his personnel file constituted "a significant change in employment status," Baird, 662 F.3d at 1248 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), a "tangible change in the duties or working conditions constituting a material employment disadvantage," Mack, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or "might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." White, 548 U.S. at 68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, any amendment to the amended complaint reflecting those allegations would be futile.
The allegations surrounding the key incident, however, would not be futile. Plaintiff claims that he received more severe punishment than was warranted for taking home a key, in the form of a 37-day suspension and a "final warning." Dec. 2013 Charge. The suspension allegation meets the requirements for an adverse employment action in both the disparate treatment and retaliation contexts, and a final warning, if retaliatory, "might well dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." White, 548 U.S. at 68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, plaintiff has alleged - albeit in somewhat conclusory fashion - that he was subjected to these adverse employment actions because his national origin differed from that of his supervisor, and in retaliation for his previous complaints. The allegations are thin and have yet to be established, but given plaintiff's pro se status at the time he submitted these amendments to the Court, the Court will permit plaintiff to amend the first amended complaint to reflect the following allegations: (1) that his June 2013 suspension for the key incident constituted discrimination based on national origin and retaliation under Title VII; and (2) that the "final warning" he received related to the key incident constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII.
In reaching this determination, the Court also considered the elements of undue delay, prejudice to the defendant, bad faith, and the previous amendments to the complaint. See Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 425. The Court recognizes that permitting plaintiff to amend the amended complaint will lead to additional discovery and further delay in this nearly three-year-old case, and that plaintiff amended the complaint once before. But the claims related to the 2013 suspension were not yet exhausted when the first amended complaint was filed, defendant has not argued that it would be prejudiced by further amendments, and there is no indication that plaintiff is acting in bad faith. In addition, plaintiff proceeded pro se for nearly a year, including much of the discovery period, which the Court finds warrants some leniency here.
II. Plaintiff's other proposed amendments to the complaint are futile.
The Court permitted plaintiff to move for leave to file a second amended complaint based on its understanding that plaintiff sought to add claims relating to the June 2013 key incident to his case. See Order (Jan. 5, 2015) at 6. But plaintiff has seized the opportunity to propose to add additional, unrelated allegations to the amended complaint, as well. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to add a claim of "harassment" or "hostile work environment," Reply at 3, to join a new defendant, Mot. to Am. at 1, and to make what appear to be largely editorial changes to the amended complaint. See, e.g., Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (adding plaintiff's middle initial); id. ¶ 34 (adding the parenthetical phrase "especially interim placement"). The Court finds that these proposed amendments are not justified.
First, plaintiff's attempt to state a claim for "harassment" or "hostile work environment" fails. Although it is not clear whether plaintiff contends that he was harassed based on his age, his national origin, or both, the Court has construed his filings liberally and analyzed them as though he pled both causes of action. But the proposed hostile work environment claims are futile because plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate that his "workplace [was] permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'" based on his age or national origin "that '[was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.'" See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986); see also Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[A] few isolated incidents of offensive conduct do not amount to actionable harassment.").
As several courts in this District have noted, "'[a]n ADEA cause of action for hostile work environment has not yet been recognized in this Circuit.'" Shipman v. Vilsack, 692 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 n.3 (D.D.C. 2010), quoting Sewell v. Chao, 532 F. Supp. 2d 126, 141 (D.D.C. 2008); accord Williams v. Chertoff, 495 F. Supp. 2d 17, 41 n.20 (D.D.C. 2007). But even if such a claim were available, plaintiff has failed to state an ADEA hostile work environment claim here. --------
A court assessing a hostile work environment claim must conduct both a subjective and an objective inquiry: no violation is present "if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive," or if the conduct "is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, courts look to "'all the circumstances,' including 'the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002), quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (same). "Severity and pervasiveness are complementary factors and often go hand-in-hand, but a hostile work environment claim could be satisfied with one or the other." Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has made clear that the conduct must be so extreme as "to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint, motion to amend the complaint, and reply in support of the motion are entirely devoid of allegations that would meet this standard. The proposed second amended complaint contains only one allegation that even relates to the "harassment" claim: "Defendant [sic] continued actions represent harassment, retaliation and discrimination under Title VII." Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 99a. In the motion, plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he has been subjected to "harassment," but alleges no facts in support of that claim. See Mot. to Am. at 1-2, 5. And in the reply brief, which was submitted by counsel, plaintiff continues to insist that "he was and still is working in a hostile working environment," without anything more. Reply at 2-3. Since these highly conclusory statements are insufficient, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a hostile work environment or "harassment" claim, and that any amendments reflecting that claim would be futile.
In addition, plaintiff seeks to add a new party, Akal Security, as a defendant because it "within the past few years purchased Coastal International Security." Mot. to Am. at 1. Defendant opposes this change, and notes that the deadline to join parties has long passed. Def.'s Opp. at 2 n.1. Plaintiff did not further address this issue in the reply brief he filed through counsel. Since plaintiff has not offered any support for his request to add an additional party at this late stage, this aspect of plaintiff's motion to amend will also be denied.
Finally, plaintiff made numerous alterations in the proposed second amended complaint that range from stylistic or technical edits, see, e.g., Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (adding plaintiff's middle initial), to statements reiterating or emphasizing plaintiff's allegations. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 78a-78e (adding details about plaintiff's June 2012 suspension, including that "[i]t was the duty of the roving supervisor, Johnny Dankwah, (a person of Ghanaian descent) not the shift supervisor (Plaintiff) to provide bathroom relief to the staff member," and the claim that "[t]here is not one occasions [sic] where such an investigation was withheld or a suspension was given to the person of Ghanaian descent . . . though he had the actual duty to provide bathroom beaks . . . and was later the subject of a much more serious allegation with regards to his treatment of another employee" ). But plaintiff has not shown, or even argued, that any of the amendments he proposes would have any effect on this case: at best, these additions would simply serve to add color to the claims of the first amended complaint, which have already been explored through discovery. For that reason, the Court will deny this aspect of plaintiff's motion to amend. See Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 364 n.11 (stating that a court need not "grant leave to amend a complaint . . . where the only result would be to waste time and judicial resources"). Plaintiff will have the opportunity to add additional detail to his claims at summary judgment.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Compliant [Dkt. # 42] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff may make the following amendments to the first amended complaint: (1) plaintiff may add to Count III the allegation that the June 2013 suspension resulting from the key incident constituted discrimination on the basis of national origin; and (2) plaintiff may add a new Count VI, retaliation in violation of Title VII, that alleges that defendant retaliated against him when, after the key incident, it suspended him in June 2013 and issued a final warning.
In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that, on or before August 3, 2015, plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint for the record that reflects only the changes outlined above.
Discovery in this case is closed. However, prior to the close of discovery, plaintiff moved to compel the production or the right to inspect claim materials related to the key incident that has now been incorporated into the complaint. Therefore, it is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff will be permitted to complete limited paper discovery with respect to those claims. On or before August 3, 2015, plaintiff shall file with the Court a narrowly tailored discovery plan that specifies exactly which documents he would seek from defendant with respect to the newly-added claims, identifying the records and the date range with particularity.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge DATE: July 24, 2015