Opinion
No. 4010455
July 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In the late 1980s, the town of Hamden decided to construct a memorial to veterans of World War II and subsequent wars. The town obtained a grant of $100,000 from the State of Connecticut, and the Hamden Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. ("the Fund") raised over $40,000 which it gave to the town for the project. The former seventh hole of the former Meadowbrook Golf Course on Dixwell Avenue, town property, was selected as the site for memorial ("the site"). The town applied for and was granted a special permit to construct the memorial by the Planning Zoning Commission of the town of Hamden. On July 4, 1989, groundbreaking ceremonies were held at the site. In 1993, the memorial was completed.
The Hamden town hall is itself a memorial to the veterans of World War I.
As constructed, the memorial is in the design of the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, D.C. The Hamden memorial consists of three connected monoliths of equal dimensions, consisting of a center flanked by two other monoliths facing Dixwell Avenue. The names of approximately 7,800 veterans who resided in Hamden and fought this nation's wars are inscribed into both sides of each monolith. There is a sidewalk along Dixwell Avenue at the site, and park benches off on each side of the monument. Behind the monument heretofore has been over two acres of open space.
In 2005, the town filed an application with the Planning Zoning Commission (commission) of the town of Hamden for a special permit and site plan to construct a new middle school at 2761 Dixwell Avenue, Hamden. In April 2005, the applications were approved. Three of the plaintiffs in this action took an appeal from the action of the Commission. That appeal is pending in this court.
Earlier, in 2003, the town filed and the commission granted the application of the town for a special permit to construct the middle school. However, an appeal taken by the Fund and the plaintiffs Bergami and Di Giovannantonio was sustained by the court earlier this year. See Bergami v. Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, No. 486187 (2005).
The approved site plan provides for a driveway to the new school commencing on Dixwell Avenue to the northwest of the monument and looping around to the southwest. The driveway would be about 20.5 feet from the monument at its closest point. As the driveway curls 180 degrees around the monument, it is about 42 feet from the monument to the northeast, 20.5 feet to the southeast and 60 feet to the southwest. Additional facts will be related as necessary.
This action is brought by the plaintiffs, Renato Bergami, Frederick McCarthy and John Di Giovannantonio, against the town of Hamden and its mayor, Carl Amento, and the commission seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the construction of the new middle school. The action was commenced on May 24, 2005. On June 3, 2005, the plaintiffs moved to amend to add the Fund as a plaintiff.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. In addition the defendants claim that the action should be dismissed under the prior action pending doctrine. The plaintiffs object to the motion. A hearing was held at which the parties were heard in oral argument and the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence of aggrievement. Also, at the hearing, the defendants objected to the motion to make the Fund a plaintiff.
I
Preliminarily, the court turns to the question of whether the Fund is a party to this action. It is true that "[o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case . . ." Figueroa v. CS Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996). The court does not undertake to exercise its discretion in determining whether the Fund should, in the exercise of the court's discretion, be a party, but, rather, whether, by operation of law, the Fund already is a party.
This action bears a return date of May 24, 2005. On June 3, 2005, the Fund moved to be made a plaintiff. The motion purports to be based on General Statutes § 52-101 which simply states the general rule that all persons claiming to have an interest of the subject of the civil action may be joined as plaintiffs. See Merwin v. Richardson, 52 Conn. 223, 235 (1884). The motion does not specify the procedural vehicle by which the Fund purports to become a plaintiff. It simply describes the Fund's claimed interest in the controversy.
General Statutes § 52-101 provides in full: "All persons having an interest in the subject of a civil action, and in obtaining the judgment demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise expressly provided; and, if one who ought to be joined as plaintiff declines to join, he may be made a defendant, the reason therefor being stated in the complaint."
At oral argument, the defendants objected to the Fund's becoming a party. The plaintiffs argued that the Fund became a party by virtue of Practice Book § 10-59, the provisions of which are mirrored in General Statutes § 52-128: "The plaintiff may amend any defect, mistake or informality in the writ, complaint or petition and insert new counts in the complaint, which might have been originally inserted therein, without costs, during the first thirty days after the return date." The terms writ, citation, summons and writ of summons are synonymous. Stoddard v. Couch, 23 Conn. 238, 240 (1854) ("The term writ, as used in our statutes, generally means process in a civil suit . . ."); Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 25 Conn.App. 543, 546, 596 A.2d 463 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 222 Conn. 541, 610 A.2d 1260 (1992).
The motion was made well within thirty days of the return date. The plaintiffs seek to remedy their failure to name the Fund in the summons. The complaint states that "[t]he applicants are now, and at all pertinent times have been taxpayers and residents of the Town of Hamden, Connecticut." It further alleges that the Fund, together with the plaintiffs Bergami and Di Giovannantonio appealed the action of the commission granting the town a special permit to construct the middle school, and that the appeal alleges various ways in which the action of the commission violated the plaintiff's rights, including that the action "violate[d] the rights of the plaintiff accruing from the passage of a resolution of the Legislative Council of the Town of Hamden accepting contributions from the Hamden Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. toward the construction of the memorial . . ." In essence, the plaintiffs incorporated much of the zoning appeal's allegations into this action. The court is convinced that the plaintiffs intended to include the Fund as a party but by mistake failed to list the Fund on the summons.
As observed supra, Practice Book § 10-59 and General Statutes § 52-128 allow a party to amend "any defect, mistake or informality in the writ" as of right within thirty days of the return date. "Although the word `any' sometimes may, because of its context, mean `some' or `one' rather than `all,' its meaning in a given statute depends on the context and subject matter of the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665, 707, 855 A.2d 212 (2004). Here the context and subject matter of the statutory provisions admit of no doubt that "any" means "any."
The court need not tarry further with this issue. For reasons discussed by Judge Corradino in Coburn v. Quaratella, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, No. 563074 (Jan. 27, 2003) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 32), modified sub nom Coburn v. Universal Foods Stores of Noank, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, No. 563074 (Feb. 13, 2003), the court holds that the omission in listing the Fund in the writ of summons was a circumstantial defect that the plaintiffs were entitled to correct and did correct as of right within thirty days of the return date. See also Laudette v. Town of Franklin, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex Complex Litigation Docket, No. X04-CV00-0103571 (June 4, 2004) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 192); Cordero v. American Medical Response, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, No. CV 02-0458609 (Oct. 14, 2003) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 645). Accordingly, the Fund is a plaintiff in these proceedings.
II
The court turns to the merits of the defendants' motion to dismiss. The motion is based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the prior action pending doctrine. "[T]he prior pending action doctrine does not truly implicate subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jessica M., 71 Conn.App. 417, 427 (2002). The court turns to the other two grounds, and first addresses whether the plaintiffs lack standing.
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 328-29, 852 A.2d 703 (2004). In part, standing "is founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society." Worth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.C. 2197, 45 LED.2d 343 (1975).
"It is axiomatic that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim . . . Our standing jurisprudence consistently has embodied the notion that there must be a colorable claim of a direct injury to the plaintiff, in an individual or representative capacity . . .
"The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue. In order for a plaintiff to have standing, it must be a proper party to request adjudication of the issues . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut State Medical Society v. Oxford Health Plans, 272 Conn. 469, 476, 863 A.2d 645 (2005).
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 308-09, 796 A.2d 516 (2002).
The court turns to the claims of standing of the respective plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs Bergami, McCarthy and Di Giovannantonio allege that they are taxpayers of the town of Hamden. In Sadloski v. Manchester, 235 Conn. 637, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic tenets of taxpayer standing. "The plaintiff's status as a taxpayer does not automatically give her standing to challenge alleged improprieties in the conduct of the defendant town . . . The plaintiff must also allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct cause[d] [her] to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury . . . It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that her tax dollars have contributed to the challenged project . . . the plaintiff must prove that the project has directly or indirectly increased her taxes . . . or, in some other fashion, caused her irreparable injury in her capacity as a taxpayer." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 235 Conn. 647. The court "then held, in effect, that, because standing is a practical concept, common sense suggests that a taxpayer who challenges a part of a particular governmental program must demonstrate his or her injury in the entire fiscal context of that program, taking into account both the burdens and benefits of the program, and not just by demonstrating that the presumably burdensome part of the program itself, divorced from the larger program of which it is a part, causes injury. Id., 648." Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 490, 803 A.2d 318 (2002). The plaintiffs did not attempt to prove such an injury. They do not have taxpayer standing.
The plaintiff Di Giovannantonio did not appear at the hearing . . . "[A]ggrievement must be established in the trial court." Parcesepe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 46, 47, 221 A.2d 270 (1966). There is no proof that Di Giovannantonio has standing.
The Fund was created in the 1980s to raise money for the building of the monument. It raised over $40,800 which it turned over to the town in the early 1990s, in accordance with a written agreement entered into between the town and the Fund in September 1990. Dennis Manguilli testified that there are currently seven active members of the Fund. The Fund's position is that the driveway being constructed to the new middle school will detract from the sanctity of the memorial.
"At common law, a donor who has made a completed charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or in trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of his or her gift or trust unless he or she had expressly reserved the right to do so." Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 243 Conn. 1, 5-6, 699 A.2d 995 (1997); see also Russell v. Yale University, 54 Conn.App. 573, 737 A.2d 94 (1999). Pursuant to the September 1990 agreement, the monies the Fund gave to the town were to be used for the construction of the memorial "in accordance with the plans and specifications provided by the Fund." However, the Fund did not expressly reserve the right to enforce the terms of the gift nor has the Fund proven that the construction of a driveway or school behind the memorial violates the terms of the gift. Therefore, the Fund does not have standing to challenge that construction.
The agreement provides in part:
"1. The Fund will give the sum of Forty Thousand Eight Hundred ($40,800) Dollars to the Town, consisting of Twenty Eight Thousand ($28,000) Dollars of the estimated construction cost of the Memorial and a contingency fund of twelve Thousand Eight Hundred ($12,800) Dollars.
"2. The Town will contract to construct the Memorial in accordance with the plans and specifications provided by the Fund, at a contract price of not in excess of One Hundred Twenty-Eight Thousand ($128,000) Dollars and will supervise the construction through its agents, servants or employees."
The plans and specifications referred to in the agreement are not in evidence.
The Fund made no showing of associational standing under the test therefor adopted in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 616, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). "[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. For the same reasons that the plaintiff Bergami lacks standing, as discussed infra, none of the Fund's seven members has standing, and the organization's stated purpose ceased when the monument was constructed and implaced in the 1990s. Indeed, the court is not persuaded that the Fund is truly a functioning corporation. Dennis Manguilli, who claimed to be the Fund's vice president admitted that he could not remember the last time the Fund had a meeting, but that it was more than two years ago.
The plaintiff Bergami is a veteran of World War II. His name appears on the monument. He has in the past visited the memorial. When he drove down Dixwell Avenue he would hope that the light at the intersection near the memorial would turn red for him so that he could see it. The setting of the memorial was important to him because he felt it gave veterans a place of honor. It was a tranquil area and provided a place to meditate. The existing and proposed construction, he testified, detracted from that tranquility and impairs accessibility for handicapped veterans.
The defendants argue that aggrievement requires that a plaintiff have some interest in the real property affected by the construction. It does not. The Supreme Court has "recognize[d] that the test for determining aggrievement is broader than injury to real property and that the `interest' which may be the subject of aggrievement need not be confined to an interest in real property." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). Although Connecticut courts are not "required to apply federal precedent in determining the issue of aggrievement," which "is a matter to be determined solely on the basis of Connecticut law"; id., 494; the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted with apparent approval that "the United States Supreme Court has said that the interest alleged by a complainant to have been injured may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well as economic values. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 90 S.C. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 492. "That court took care to say, however, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738, 92 S.C. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, that `broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.'" Id.
The defendants may take this position because they mistakenly assume, in this court's view, that the plaintiffs base their claims of standing on having some legally cognizable interest in the monument or memorial site.
This court finds that Bergami has satisfied the first tier of the test for aggrievement. Because he is a veteran and resident of Hamden whose name is inscribed on the monument and also because he has visited the monument, he has demonstrated a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the town's decision to construct a school and road behind the monument, an interest that is distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. The next question is whether that specific personal and legal interest has been injuriously affected by the town's action.
When the government does something allegedly illegal on public property that causes actual users of the property to be offended when using the property, or results in their deriving less enjoyment from the property, or causes them not to use the property at all, such persons have what has been characterized as "`use and enjoyment' standing." Books v. City of Elkhart, 79 F.Sup.2d 979, 987 (N.D.Ind. 1999); see Gonzalez v. North Tp. Of Lake County, Ind., 4 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs' discontinued use of area near crucifix in public park was sufficient to confer standing). Such standing typically arises in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 489-90, 489 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2004); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1292-93 (1st Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs who were offended by and those who avoided Ten Commandments on public property had standing); Alden v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs who frequently traveled to the State Capitol would endure direct and unwelcome contact with Ten Commandments monument sufficient to confer standing); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools, 33 F.3d 679, 682-83 (6th Cir. 1994) (alumnus who continued to visit school had standing to challenge school's hanging of a picture of Jesus in school's hallway because of plaintiff's "continuing direct contact" with picture); see also Buono v. Norton, 212 F.Sup.2d 1202, 1212 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has held repeatedly that plaintiffs who are prevented from freely using public land due to a religious symbol being located there have standing), aff'd 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he injury brought about by a violation of law . . . must affect one's possessions or bodily integrity or freedom of action . . . and not just one's opinions, aspirations or ideology." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is a cognizable interest but to have standing the plaintiffs had to prove not only that species was threatened but that one of the plaintiffs thereby was directly affected apart from their special interest in the subject matter). It must be acknowledged, however, that the Connecticut Supreme Court has never cited Allen v. Wright, supra.
Such standing may also arise in a non-constitutional context. See e.g., Hilland v. Ives, 28 Conn.Sup. 243, 246-47, 257 A.2d 822 (1966) (where state was destroying part of a public park for highway purposes, users of the park had standing to seek an injunction where destruction would impair substantially the use of the park).
Analogously, in Gay Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 673 A.2d 484 (1966), on which the plaintiffs singularly rely, the plaintiff association brought an action for injunction against, inter alias, the Board of Trustees of the University of Connecticut alleging that the University's allowing military recruitment on campus violated state law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. The court held that the plaintiff's members had standing sufficient to confer associational standing on the plaintiff. "The infringement of the rights of the plaintiff's members under the Gay Rights Law was concrete and particularized as well as actual and imminent. The members had been denied equal placement opportunities because the career services office had allocated resources to the military, which would not, regardless of their abilities and talents, hire them. The director of the office of career services . . . admitted that the office allocates resources to military employers and spends time accommodating the military, including arranging for and following up on on-campus interviews. That conduct has created a lack of equal access to the office of career services and has caused some of the plaintiff's members to reevaluate their approaches to the career services department. Moreover, by allowing the military to use the services of the placement office and to conduct on-campus interviews, the defendants sanctioned impermissible discrimination that caused the plaintiff's members to have feelings of shock, anger, humiliation, frustration and helplessness."(Footnote omitted.) Id., 466-67.
The court finds that Bergami cannot satisfy the second tier of the test for aggrievement. No injury so concrete and particularized as in Gay Lesbian Students can befall him. Tragically, he is suffering from macular degeneration and prostate cancer. There was no evidence that he intends to visit the memorial again or would not visit the memorial in the future because of the construction. While he feels that the construction has disrupted the tranquil environment of the memorial, "a grievance to his feelings of propriety or sense of justice is not such a grievance as gives him a right of appeal [to the courts]." Norton's Appeal, 46 Conn. 527, 528 (1879); accord, Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Malcolm-Smith, 129 Conn. 67, 69, 26 A.2d 234 (1942). This rule was echoed by the United States Supreme Court in Valley Forge College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982): "[T]he psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient to confer . . ." For this reason, Bergami has not established that his interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the defendants' actions. See also Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 51-52, 364 A.2d 194 (1975); Truesdale v. Greenwich, 116 Conn. 426, 431-32, 165 A. 201 (1933), and cases cited therein.
The final plaintiff is Frederick J. McCarthy. He is a veteran and his name is inscribed on the monument. McCarthy is also vice-chair of the Hamden Veterans Commission, a commission of the government of the town of Hamden, created by ordinance. It is the responsibility of the Veterans Commission to preserve all monuments, memorials and properties of veterans within the town of Hamden. Although the Veterans Commission has voted to support this lawsuit, McCarthy admitted that he was a plaintiff in his individual capacity and not as a representative of the Veterans Commission.
McCarthy testified that he visited the site of the memorial two to three times a week in his capacity as commissioner. He also testified that the number of names of veterans whose names must be inscribed on the monument is growing, necessitating the erection of another monolith to the monument. The encroachment created by the driveway being constructed around the monument would make it difficult to accomplish this. He also testified that the process of constructing the road and the school has created a state of turmoil, disturbing the area as a site of quiet contemplation.
The following exchange occurred between Mr. McCarthy and his attorney on direct examination:
Q. All right. And have you visited the place of the memorial?
A. Constantly.
Q. And when you say `constantly,' what do you mean?
A. At least two or three times a week
Q. All right. And would you describe the memorial before construction started?
A. It was a quiet, pristine area that was totally surrounded by woods and an open field in back. And the silhouette of the memorial stood out in — it's kind of hard for me to describe but it — it makes it go fast every time I look at it.
Q. Hm-hmm.
A. But it was a beautiful site.
Q. All right. And you indicated you visited there two or three times a week?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To what purpose?
A. Well, No. 1, I have to update names. We're trying to solicit more names that have to go on the monument, and there are problems with some names. So as a commissioner we have to go down and update things and also check on the progress of what's going on there as far as construction is concerned. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. McCarthy did not offer any other purpose for which he visited the memorial.
On direct examination, the following exchange occurred between Mr. McCarthy and his attorney:
Q. All right. And what will having a driveway to a busy middle school do to this site in your observation?
A. Well, it would lose its entire effect because, basically, as a commissioner we have to erect another monument because of the number of names that we're still getting and compiling. And the way they are situating the driveway it leaves us with very little room adjacent to the monument on either side. So the encroachment is really pronounced at this part. When thry come in from Dixwell Avenue all the ways around the back of the monument to put in a traffic circles [sic] that is roughly 175 feet by 280 feet long, it — it goes to within 50 feet of the existing sidewalk down there.
On direct examination, the following exchange occurred between Mr. McCarthy and his attorney:
Q. So what has this done to this site, in your observation, as a site of quiet contemplation and remembrance of those who have sacrificed for this country?
A. Right now it's just created a state of turmoil because of the construction and the constant — the constant movement of equipment and machinery in back of this thing it — it will not be as really pronounced until they start building the road and then it's going to really take effect as to exactly how much land is being taken and how far they're encroaching.
Even if the court assumes, without deciding that McCarthy satisfies the first tier of the test for aggrievement because he is a veteran whose name is inscribed on the monument, he has not proven the second tier of the test.
McCarthy's specific, personal and legal interest as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole, relates to the monument, because he is a veteran and life long resident of Hamden whose name is inscribed on that edifice. His interest does not relate to the memorial site generally, that is, to what had been the acres of open space behind the monument. "On a cold record"; State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 202, 749 A.2d 1192 (2002); there simply is no evidence that he had ever visited the site except in his official capacity. To hold that he has standing would be to read the word "personal" out of the phrase "specific, personal and legal interest" out of the test for standing. Cf. Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 221 Conn. 46, 53, 55, 602 A.2d 566 (1992) (individual commission member lacks standing to challenge commission decision). McCarthy, therefore, does not have standing to bring this action for injunctive relief, anymore than a police officer who must guard a religious display on public property with which he disagrees has standing to sue for its removal. Were that the rule the "chaos" with which the Munhall court was concerned; id., 53; would very likely result. The plaintiffs have not cited and the court has not unearthed authority for conferring standing in circumstances such as these on a person whose aggrievement derives from his duties as a public official.
The court finds that none of the plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. It is unnecessary to address the other grounds of the motion. The motion to dismiss is granted.
BY THE COURT
Bruce L. Levin Judge of the Superior Court