Opinion
March 14, 1949.
1. Statutes — construction — intention of legislature.
In construing a statute the court must seek the intention of the legislature and knowing it must adopt that interpretation which will meet the real meaning of the legislature.
2. Statutes — in pari materia, construed together as a consistent whole.
Sec. 202, Code 1930, dealing with meetings of the board of supervisors for the transaction of business under the revenue laws and Secs. 3162, 3165, and 3167, Code 1930, dealing with assessments of property are in pari materia and must be construed together and, if possible, read into each other so as to make a consistent whole.
3. Statutes — intention and letter.
The rule for the construction of statutes is that what is within the intention is within the statute, although not within its letter.
4. Statutes — unjust or unwise purpose.
In construing a statute the court will not impute an unwise or unjust purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such imputation.
5. Statutes — taxation — session of board of supervisors in July for revenue business.
Under sec. 202, Code 1930, the board of supervisors could continue in session throughout the entire month of July for the transaction of revenue business, if necessary so to do, and its preliminary order equalizing assessment rolls and for giving notice thereof could be made at any time during said month, notwithstanding the provision of Sec. 3162, Code 1930, that "the board shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting".
6. Statutes — taxation — session of board of supervisors to hear objection to assessment roll.
The provision in 162, Code 1930, that the board of supervisors shall complete the equalization of the assessment rolls at least ten days before the August meeting is a dominant provision which expresses the fundamental and real intention of the legislature to require that at least a ten day period between the equalization of assessments and the session of the board to hear objections thereto, and when the equalization at the July term was not concluded until within ten days of the first Monday in August the provision of Sec. 3165, Code 1930, that the board shall meet on the first Monday of August to hear objections to the assessment must yield to the dominant provision as to the ten days interval, and thereupon the provision of Sec. 3167, Code 1930, that "if the board fails to perform any duty in reference to the assessment rolls at the time required by law such duty may be performed at a later date upon giving the proper notice to the persons affected", must be brought into control, wherefore when the board did not complete the equalization until July 27, it had the authority to give notice that the board would hear objections on August 6, and on that date, having given the required public notice, to proceed to hear objections although three days after the first Monday in August.
Headnotes as approved by Montgomery, J.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Wayne County, ARTHUR G. BUSBY, Chancellor.
Ben Stevens, L.B. Jones and John E. Stone, for appellants.
If the order in this case is void to the extent that it invalidates the rolls, then there is a serious hiatus in the law.
The revenue statutes require that the board at the July meeting equalize the rolls, and that it shall sit from day to day during July until that has been done if it takes the full month, and there will be years in some counties when it will take through the 27th day of the month, as it took the Wayne County Board in July, 1936, and, unless the board concludes its meetings somewhere between the 20th and the 25th day of the month, there will never be ten days elapsing between publication of the notice and the first Monday of August, and yet the statute is mandatory that the notice to the taxpayers shall be returnable to the August term and that at the August term the board shall proceed to hear all objections duly filed, and, if it cannot control its process so as to allow the ten days required and at the same time comply with the statute and hear the objections at the August meeting, convening the first Monday of the month, then the board would have to pass up hearing the objections, and, as we see the statutes, there is no authority to make the notice returnable to any other time than the August meeting except in the case where the August meeting is not held at all, in which event the board is required to proceed under the terms of Section 9791 of the Code of 1942, which was Section 3167, Code of 1930.
We also believe that the decision of the court in Rawlings v. Ladner, 174 Miss. 611, 165 So. 427, supports the validity of the proceedings here.
In the Rawlings case, the notice addressed to the public and taxpayers stated that all objections to the rolls as equalized must be filed on the first Monday of the following August. The statute, of course, does not so provide, and the court held that that language in the notice in the Rawlings case was mere surplusage which could not have deceived any taxpayer as to the time and place when and where the final judgment was to be entered. We say that that holding demonstrates that the board is at liberty during the August meeting, which is a revenue meeting, to commence the hearing of objections to assessments on any day it elects, provided it gives apt notice of the day it intends to start the hearings if it does not intend to start on the first Monday of August, and that was certainly done here, and the notice as given certainly could have misled no one.
In the Rawlings case, the court also pointed out that the statute did not require the board of supervisors to sit any particular number of days at the August meeting, and that, if the board could finish hearing all objections on the first Monday of the term, then it had a right to finally approve the rolls and adjourn.
In construing a statute, this court has said that it is the duty of the court to seek the intention of the legislature, and, knowing it, must adopt that interpretation which will meet the real meaning of the legislature. Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 30 L.R.A. (NS) 541.
What is the intention of the legislature with reference to the statutes under consideration? We submit that the real intention of the legislature was to require the board of supervisors to finish its equalization work in July, next to hear objections in August, and next, to require the board to give the ten days' notice before taking up the hearing of objections at the August term. Every one of those things was done in the instant case, and the contention of the appellee that the notice was void because it did not warn the public to appear before the board on the first Monday of August and because it was utterly impossible for ten days to elapse between the adjournment of the July meeting and the first Monday of August is both hypercritical and hypertechnical and is the very kind of a technicality and criticism which so often causes the general public to ridicule legislatures, lawyers, and courts. We submit that such a hypercritical and hypertechnical construction of the statute as contended for by appellee should not be indulged in in this case. There is certainly no mandate of the law that we can find that requires it to be.
W. Vol Jones, for appellee.
The appellee does not agree that the vital question to be decided here is whether the board of supervisors had power to make the notice to the taxpayers and public returnable to Thursday, August 6, 1936, instead of Monday, August 3, 1936, as contended by appellant, but we contend that the most vital question is: Whether the board of supervisors had the legal authority to continue the equalization of the rolls after at least ten days before the August meeting.
The appellant has cited the pertinent part of the law, being Section 3162, Code of 1930 (Section 9786, Code of 1942), wherein it will be noted that, although the board of supervisors are instructed that they shall immediately at the July meeting proceed to equalize such rolls . . ., and shall immediately by newspaper publication notify the public that such rolls so equalized are ready for inspection and examination . . ., but the other clause in this section reads as follows: ". . . and shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting . . .".
It will be noted that the legislature, in writing this law used the word "immediately" following the directions to the board of supervisors to begin the examination and the further direction to publish notice that the rolls are open for inspection, but following the mandate as to when the equalization should be completed, it used the phrase "at least ten days before the August meeting."
It is evident that the legislature had a purpose in making a distinction between these mandates, as to the difference in the times within which these acts may be performed.
In the case of Rawlings v. Ladner, 174 Miss. 611, 165 So. 427, cited by appellants, the court held: "The court, in construing a statute, must seek the intention of the legislature, and, knowing it, must adopt that interpretation which will meet the real meaning of the legislature."
In this case there are no ambiguities or uncertainties. It is plainly written that the board of supervisors shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting. As stated above the legislature had some purpose in using the phrase "at least ten days" instead of "immediately". An illustration of an injury that might occur to a taxpayer is found in a case where an out-of-state taxpayer was before the board of supervisors while it was equalizing the rolls and on the last day on which the board could lawfully sit, being at least ten days before the August meeting, he finds that no changes have been in his assessment and he returns to his home, thereafter and within the ten day limit, the board re-convenes and makes a change in his assessment.
Such an injury would force the taxpayer into the courts for redress.
In the case of Wiley v. Flournoy Rice, 30 Ark. 609, 151 A.L.R. 256, Anno., the statute required the county board of equalization to meet on the third Monday in September in each year and remain in session six days. It was held that any alteration made in the assessment after the six days was void, the court saying: "A statute is never to be regarded as directory merely, or any of its provisions dispensed with, `when the act required, or the omission of it can by any possibility work advantage or injury, however slight, to anyone affected by it'." See also Auditor General v. Chandler, 108 Mich. 569, 66 N.W. 482, and Biloxi v. Biloxi Real Estate Co., 94 Miss. 653, 48 So. 729, 141 A.L.R. 257, and Harris v. Stockett, 58 Miss. 825.
Lee Beard filed his original bill in the Chancery Court of Wayne County, Mississippi, making both the State of Mississippi and Mrs. Fannie Stanley parties defendant thereto, and seeking to confirm tax titles to 240 acres of land in Wayne County, Mississippi. Complainant purchased 80 acres of this land from the State, under a forfeited tax land patent, on March 23rd, 1943, and purchased the remaining 160 acres from the State in a similar manner on May 4, 1943. The lands had been sold to the State on the third Monday of September, 1938, for the taxes due thereon for the fiscal year 1937. The lands were assessed to the defendant, Mrs. Fannie Stanley, for 1937 and the taxes due thereon were not paid.
There was an answer by Mrs. Stanley setting up the alleged invalidity of the assessment. The State, in its answer, set up the provisions of Section 6026, Code of 1930, prohibiting the purchase of more than 160 acres of public lands by any one person in one year. There was a decree in the lower court holding the assessment of the properties void and, by reason thereof, the sale to the State to be void and from this decree both Lee Beard and the State of Mississippi appeal.
It is contended by appellee that the assessment for the fiscal year 1937 is invalid because the Board of Supervisors, in equalizing the assessment roll at its July 1936 term, continued to sit for that purpose until July 27, 1936, on which day it entered on its minutes, an order approving the roll, ordering the publishing and posting of a notice thereof to the taxpayers and giving notice that the board would hear objections to the assessments on August 6th, 1936. It is not necessary to here set out all of the terms of said order or of the notice, but only such parts, as above stated, as are material on the decision of the question here involved. The board convened its August, 1936, term on the first Monday of August, 1936, which was August 3rd, transacted other business and recessed until the fourth. It sat on the fourth and then recessed until Thursday, August 6th. On the 6th it entered an order adjudging the board would proceed to hear and determine objections and exceptions to the assessment roll. On the sixth it recessed to August 10th, and on that date entered an order finally approving the roll and ordering the final recapitulation of said assessment roll to be certified to the State Tax Commission. There is neither any dispute as to the foregoing facts nor is there any question raised here as to the sufficiency in form of any of said orders of proceedings.
Appellee contends the assessment is void because Section 3162, Code 1930, which was in effect at the time of this assessment, provides that the board "shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting" and this statute was violated when the board sat until July 27th, which was only seven days before the first Monday of August, which fell on August 3rd, instead of the requisite ten days.
Appellee contends further that the assessment is void for the reason that Section 3165 of the 1930 Code provides that the board of supervisors shall hold a meeting "on the first Monday of August, to hear objections to the assessment" and this section was violated when the board did not meet for hearing such objections until Thursday, August 6th.
Since the question is one of construction of the pertinent statutes, we here set out such portions of them as are pertinent on the questions presented:
Section 202, Code 1930, "Regular meetings — how long may last. — At the meetings for the transaction of business under the revenue law, the board of supervisors may continue in session as long as business may require, but at other regular meetings they may sit for a period of not longer than six days; provided, that in counties having a population of more than forty thousand, the board may continue in session at any other regular meetings than the revenue meeting of not longer than ten days."
Section 3162, Code 1930. "Supervisors to equalize rolls — notice to taxpayers. — The board of supervisors shall immediately at the July meeting proceed to equalize such rolls and shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting. . . . ."
Section 3165, Code 1930. "Objections to roll — supervisors to hear — when and how. — The board of supervisors of each county shall hold a meeting at the courthouse, or at the chancery clerk's office in counties where the chancery clerk's office is in a building separate from the courthouse, on the first Monday of August, to hear objections to the assessment."
Section 3167, Code 1930. "Meeting not held — objections to assessments — notice given of proper time. — If from any cause the meeting of the board of supervisors at which objections to assessments should be heard, be not held, then all such objections shall be continued and may be heard at the next meeting of the board, either regular, adjourned, or special; and if the board fails to give the proper notice to the taxpayers of the meeting at which objections are to be heard the board shall immediately proceed to give such notice and shall fix the time when it will hear and determine all objections to the assessments therein contained, and the board shall proceed and deal with the roll, or rolls, with all the powers and duties as are now provided by law, except as to the time. If the board fails to hold any meeting, or give any notice, or to perform any other duty in reference to the assessment roll, or rolls, at the time required by law, such duty shall be performed at a later date upon the giving of proper notice to persons affected."
(Hn 1) The court in construing a statute must seek the intention of the Legislature, and, knowing it, must adopt that interpretation which will meet the real meaning of the Legislature. Rawlings v. Ladner, 174 Miss. 611, 165 So. 427; Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 39 L.R.A., N.S., 541, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 392.
(Hn 2) Section 202, Code of 1930, dealing with meetings of a board of supervisors for the transaction of business under the Revenue Law and Sections 3162, 3165, and 3167 of the Code of 1930, dealing with the assessments of property for purposes of taxation and revenue are in pari materia and must be construed together and, if possible, read into each other, so as to make a consistent whole. Clarksdale Bldg. Loan Ass'n v. Board of Levee Commissioners for Yazoo-Mississippi Delta, 168 Miss. 326, 150 So. 783; Greaves v. Hinds County, 166 Miss. 89, 145 So. 900; State v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 157 Miss. 740, 128 So. 503; Life Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384, 177 So. 47; Board of Supervisors of Attala County v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 186 Miss. 294, 190 So. 241; Hendrix v. Foote, Miss., 38 So.2d 111, not yet reported in State Reports.
(Hn 3) It has long been a rule in this State, for the construction of statutes, that what is within the intention is within the meaning of a statute, although not within its letter. Gunter v. City of Jackson, 130 Miss. 637, 94 So. 844; Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 39 L.R.A., N.S., 541, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 392; Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687; Bonds v. Greer, 56 Miss. 710; Adams v. Yazoo M.V.R. Co., 75 Miss. 275, 22 So. 824; Hendrix v. Foote, supra. (Hn 4) Furthermore, the court, in construing a statute, will not impute an unjust or unwise purpose to the Legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such imputation. Dunn v. Clinghan, 93 Miss. 310, 47 So. 503; Gunter v. City of Jackson, supra; Hendrix v. Foote, supra.
With these long established rules of construction kept steadily in mind, let us look to these statutes, and, from them ascertain the real purpose and intention of the Legislature, in adopting the statutes, and then give effect to such intention even though the letter of the statute be thereby violated.
(Hn 5) It is the clear language of Section 202, Code 1930, that, at meetings for the transaction of business under the revenue laws, the board of supervisors may continue in session as long as business may require. So far as this record shows, the revenue business required this board to sit up to and including the 27th day of July, when it entered the order equalizing the roll. Under this statute it could have lawfully been in session up to its August meeting. Now if we should construe the provisions of Section 3162, Code of 1930, to the effect that the board, at its July meeting, shall complete such equalization "at least ten days before the August meeting" to mean that the board shall complete the equalization at least ten days before the first Monday of August, then we deprive the board of supervisors of the clear right given them by Section 202 to equalize right up to the August meeting, if the business may require. It is indispensable to the maintenance of the government of the state and its governmental subdivisions that they receive into their respective treasuries the revenue with which to bear their respective governmental expenses. This revenue comes from taxation. Taxes can be levied and collected only on valid assessments and Section 112 of the Constitution requires that taxation, including the assessment for taxation, be equal and uniform throughout the state. This equalization is a necessary constitutional requirement and the welfare of the state and its subdivisions require that it not only be performed but that the board of supervisors have sufficient time to perform it and may, as provided by Section 202, "continue in session as long as business may require". The provisions of Section 3162, Code of 1930, to the effect that the board "shall complete such equalization at least ten days before the August meeting" merely mean that the board shall complete such equalization at least ten days before it sits for the hearing of objections to the assessments at its August meeting.
But it may be said, what about the provisions of Section 3165, Code of 1930, to the effect that the board shall hold a meeting "on the first Monday of August, to hear objections to the assessment"? This, it is true, is fixed by the statute as the time of the meeting to hear objections to the assessment, but the legislative intent is clearly disclosed by the latter portion of Section 3167, Code of 1930, wherein it is provided that "If the board fails to hold any meeting . . . or to perform any other duty in reference to the assessment roll . . . at the time required by law, such duty shall be performed at a later date upon the giving of proper notice to persons affected." This was complied with by the board of supervisors. It was necessary for the board to continue in session in equalizing the assessments until July 27th because the business required it and they had the right to so sit. They completed the equalization on the 27th and gave notice to the taxpayers of this fact and the further fact that objections to the assessments would be heard by the board on August 6th and such objections as were filed were then heard. It is true the hearing was not on the first Monday of August, which was the third, and the duty to then hear was fixed by Section 3165 but when they failed to hear objections on August 3rd they were authorized to hear the objections on a later date, August 6th, upon the giving of proper notice, and there is no dispute that proper notice was given by the board at its July meeting of the hearing of objections on August 6th.
(Hn 6) The fundamental and real intention of the Legislature was to require the completion of the equalization of assessments at least ten days before the sitting of the board of supervisors to hear objections to the assessments. The purpose of this was to give the taxpayer a period of ten days in which he could examine the roll, see what assessments had been levied upon his properties and the party of others, determine whether his assessment was fair, equal and uniform, and make up his mind whether he desired to file any objection thereto. It was the further intention of the legislature, that subject to these rights of the taxpayers, the board should have full opportunity and full power to validly, equally and uniformly assess all property so as to constitute a valid assessment, to the end that revenue by taxation, vital to the support of the state and its governmental subdivisions, might be forthcoming to meet the necessary expenses of government. The construction of the pertinent statutes we have hereinabove set out gives full effect to this manifest intention of the Legislature and the assessment of the property involved in this suit, for the fiscal year 1937, was a valid and legal assessment and the taxes levied thereon for the year 1937 not having been paid the land was lawfully sold to the State and the State became the owner thereof after the expiration of the period of redemption.
We express no opinion on the question raised by the State of Mississippi in its answer, setting up the purchase by Lee Beard of more than 160 acres of public land in one year in alleged violation of Section 6026, Code of 1930. This question was not passed upon by the trial court and hence is not involved on this appeal.
The decree of the lower court will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.