Opinion
No. HHD-CV-07-4033927S
May 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO DISMISS
I STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On November 11, 2007, the plaintiff, Nancy Batey, filed a six-count complaint against the defendant, Michael Starkowski, commissioner of the department of social services. In this complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff, a 76-year-old, disabled person, has been on the Connecticut Home Care Program for Elders (CHCPE) since October of 2006. This program, administered by the defendant, provides homemaker, companion and personal care attendant services under the CHCPE. The defendant, on July 11, 2007, sent the plaintiff notice regarding discontinuance of the benefits under the CHCPE. This notice indicated that the plaintiff may appeal this decision and that, while this appeal was pending, the plaintiff would continue to receive the benefits. In early November, however, the defendant issued a letter stating that the plaintiff's services would end on November 9, 2007, not because she was ineligible for the benefits program, but because the health care agency that works with the state cannot tend to the plaintiff's needs in exchange for the compensation allowed under this program. This lawsuit followed.
Count one of the complaint asserts that the defendant has violated the requirements of the Medicaid Act. Count two claims that the defendant has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. Count three claims that the defendant has violated the Rehabilitation Act. Count four claims that the defendant has violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Count five alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count six alleges violations of the CHCPE, General Statutes § 17b-342, et seq. The plaintiff seeks equitable remedies in the form of declaratory judgments and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
On February 7, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, along with a memorandum of law in support of the motion. In this motion, the defendant argues that the case is moot, that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this case, that the defendant cannot be sued pursuant to § 1983 for monetary damages in his official capacity, and that the defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity for violations of Connecticut law. In addition, the defendant provided an affidavit from Kathy Bruni, manager of the alternate care unit at the department of social services. On March 5, 2008, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. This matter was heard by the court at short calendar on March 10, 2008.
The defendant also argued in his memorandum that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. At oral argument, however, the defendant withdrew this argument.
II DISCUSSION
"Any defendant, wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction, may do so even after having entered a general appearance, but must do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance." Practice Book § 10-30. "Any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived; and whenever it is found after suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action." Practice Book § 10-33.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "[A] motion to dismiss is not designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint in terms of whether it states a cause of action. That should be done, instead, by a motion to strike . . ." Pratt v. Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 185, 621 A.2d 1322 (1993).
"When a court . . . decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. 211. "The motion to dismiss admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where, however . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346-47, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005).
A Justiciability
"Our Supreme Court has consistently held that our courts may not render advisory opinions . . . Such an opinion is one of advice and not of judgment as there are no parties whose rights are adjudicated, and it is not binding on anyone . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable . . . The general rule is that a case is justiciable if it is capable of resolution on the merits by judicial action . . . If an issue is not yet ripe for adjudication, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to afford it consideration." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell, 84 Conn.App. 648, 650, 854 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 940, 861 A.2d 515 (2004).
"Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction . . . it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings . . . [Courts] do not render advisory opinions . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires . . . that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute: Courts exist for determination of actual and existing controversies, and under the law of this state the courts may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions on points of law . . . A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Twichell v. Guite, 53 Conn.App. 42, 51-52, CT Page 7516 728 A.2d 1121 (1999).
In this case, both parties have submitted evidence along with their memoranda on this motion. The facts shown by these submissions may be helpful for the court's determination on the issue of mootness. In support of the motion to dismiss, the defendant has submitted the affidavit of Kathy Bruni. The plaintiff, meanwhile, has attached a series of letters between the counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff has also attached what appears to be an administrative hearing decision on the plaintiff's case dated December 17, 2007.
At first blush, this case appears to be either not ripe for adjudication or moot. It seems that, as a result of the fair hearing decision, the plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the CHCPE because the costs of the plaintiff's required care do not exceed the program cap. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B.) Furthermore, the defendant appears to acknowledge that it will continue to pay for benefits under this program. (Defendant's Exhibit A, ¶¶ 10-11.) These facts indicate that either the controversy between the parties has been resolved, rendering the matter moot, or that no controversy will arise unless the defendant receives a favorable decision on appeal, making the dispute not yet ripe.
The dispute, however, is not over the funding of benefits, but rather the provision of benefits. The defendant's evidence seems to show that the home health care provider contracting with the defendant under the CHCPE, Utopia Home Care (Utopia), "made an independent decision to no longer provide services" to the plaintiff. (Defendant's Exhibit A, ¶ 13.) Therefore, while the defendant is funding benefits, it would appear that none are actually being provided to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the plaintiff is bringing suit to require the defendant to provide benefits to the plaintiff. The defendant is responding by saying that, by law, he must only provide funding for benefits. This case turns on the interpretation of the federal and state statutes under Medicaid and the CHCPE. Since the court could determine that the defendant's responsibilities in this matter go beyond funding, the court could provide a remedy that would resolve this matter, which means this case is not moot. Furthermore, since an outcome favorable to the plaintiff on the pending appeal from the fair hearing would not change the defendant's behavior here, the matter is ripe for adjudication.
Since this matter is one for which the court could provide a remedy and a determination would not be merely advisory, the matter is not moot and is justiciable.
B Standing
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . [S]tanding does not hinge on whether the plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to obtain relief on the merits of an action, but on whether he is entitled to seek the relief."(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Hocap Corp., 71 Conn.App. 632, 637-38, 803 A.2d 402 (2002).
The defendant's argument here focuses on the lack of a private right of action in the Medicaid statutes. "The issue of whether the statutes in question give the plaintiff a private right of action is appropriately raised on a motion to strike." Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Association v. King, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X02 CV 03 0179515 (January 5, 2004, Schuman, J.), [36 Conn. L. Rptr. 422] aff'd, 277 Conn. 238, 890 A.2d 522 (2006). The doctrine of standing, however, goes to a court's jurisdiction, not to the merits of the case or to whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. The question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a private right of action under the statutes she cites is better determined on a motion to strike, where the court will determine whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Since standing goes to subject matter jurisdiction, however, the court will address this point.
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action] . . . Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . ." Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Hocap Corp., supra, 71 Conn.App. 638.
In the present action, the plaintiff fits within the test of classical aggrievement under the standing doctrine. The facts of the case show that the plaintiff is in need of home health care. The deprivation of these benefits, which had been provided to the plaintiff by a state agency pursuant to statute, gives the plaintiff a specific, personal and legal interest in this case. The plaintiff is challenging the defendant's failure to provide these benefits; if the defendant is, as the complaint alleges, wrongfully failing to provide these benefits, then the plaintiff is aggrieved under the two-part test of classical aggrievement.
Because the plaintiff has a stake in this action, she has standing to bring this action, regardless of whether the statutes involved allow for a private right of action.
C State's Immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The defendant next argues that, as a state official sued in his official capacity, the defendant is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
"A state, as an entity having immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution, is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983 and thus is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court . . . This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 311, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Courts have carved out exceptions for this immunity where either the legislature has created an exception or where the plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief for a violation of constitutional rights. See id., 314. No such exception exists, however, for monetary damages. See id., 317 ("Even where the monetary award is . . . minimal . . . [courts have] refused to sanction a monetary judgment against the state in the absence of explicit statutory authority." (Internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet, courts have made an exception from this immunity for prospective relief. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
The prayer for relief attached to the plaintiff's complaint requests a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Neither of these calls for monetary damages. Rather, these forms of relief only demand a clarification of the defendant's legal responsibilities, if any, toward the plaintiff. The one portion of the prayer for relief that does in fact ask for money is the demand for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that this provision does not fall under the normal bar to monetary damages under state sovereign immunity. "Congress has plenary power to set aside the States' immunity from retroactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. When it passed [§ 1988], Congress undoubtedly intended to exercise that power and to authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities." Hutto v. Finley, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Here, if the plaintiff succeeds on her § 1983 claim, she may be entitled to attorneys fees under § 1988, regardless of the state's immunity.
Since the plaintiff is seeking remedies that are permissible under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the defendant, acting in his official capacity, is a "person" under the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for this action.
D State Sovereign Immunity
Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims under state law are barred by sovereign immunity. "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 501, 876 A.2d 1148 (2005).
The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence . . .
CT Page 7520
[A] litigant that seeks to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity must show that (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute . . .
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711-12, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).
The defendant argues here again that there is no private right of action in the state statutes to which the plaintiff refers. Again, this is an issue for a motion to strike. The jurisdictional issue that the court must address regarding sovereign immunity depends on what form of relief the plaintiff seeks. As with the § 1983 claim, sovereign immunity regarding state statutes is abrogated if the action seeks injunctive relief to compel compliance with the law. See id. Here, the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to compel the defendant to provide benefits for the plaintiff. Such an action does not implicate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the court has jurisdiction to hear this claim. Questions as to whether these statutes have a private right of action or whether these statutes impose a duty upon the defendant to provide benefits to the plaintiff are best reserved for later stages of the proceeding addressing the merits of the case.
III CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied because the court has subject matter jurisdiction. The court finds that: the issues before the court are justiciable; the plaintiff has standing; and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, in the contexts of either § 1983 or the state statutes, does not prevent this action.