Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-1864 SECTION "G"(2).
April 12, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiffs, Andrinette Bass, Adrena B. Harrison and Tanya M. Robinson, sued LifeCare Holdings, Inc. ("Holdings"); LifeCare Management Services, L.L.C. ("Management Services"); and LifeCare Hospitals of New Orleans, L.L.C. ("LCHNO"), asserting claims of racial discrimination in employment under federal and state law and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. This matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon the written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 9.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed another defendant, LifeCare Hospitals, Inc., with prejudice. Record Doc. No. 71.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. Record Doc. No. 60. Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition memorandum. Record Doc. No. 68. Defendants and plaintiffs each received leave to file supplemental memoranda in support of their respective positions. Record Doc. Nos. 73, 74, 75, 76.
Having considered the complaint, the record, the summary judgment evidence, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant LCHNO is a long-term acute care organization that provides medical services and rehabilitation treatment to critically ill patients who require a hospital setting. LCHNO operates several such facilities at different hospitals in the New Orleans area. Plaintiffs are African-American nurses who formerly worked at LCHNO's Southern Baptist Hospital ("Baptist") campus. Plaintiff Robinson was the supervisor of the other two plaintiffs. Defendants concede that LCHNO was plaintiffs' employer, but argue that the other defendants are separate corporate entities who never employed any of the plaintiffs and therefore cannot be liable to them for employment discrimination.
All three plaintiffs resigned their employment in November 1998. They argue that they were constructively discharged because of their race or, alternatively, that they were subjected to a hostile environment of racial harassment during their employment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but it is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case. Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
When a moving party alleges that there is an absence of evidence necessary to prove a specific element of a case, the nonmoving party bears the burden of presenting evidence that provides a genuine issue for trial. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the action under governing law.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. No genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir, 1994).
To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must come forward with evidence to support the essential elements of her claim. Id. (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 321-23). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
"Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists."Edwards, 148 F.3d at 432; accord Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). "We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. (emphasis in original).
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Plaintiffs have failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact in dispute concerning their state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. They do not even respond in their memoranda to defendants' arguments and they point to no record evidence in support of these claims.
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "a plaintiff must establish (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct." White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991); accord Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 514 (5th Cir. 1994).
Under the first prong of the White test, the defendant's "conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized community. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." White, 585 So.2d at 1209. "Mere violation of laws regulating conduct in the workplace is not enough to establish intentional infliction."Skidmore v. Precision Printing Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999).
The second prong of the test requires that the "distress suffered must be such that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Liability arises only where the mental suffering or anguish is extreme." White, 585 So.2d at 1210.
As to the third prong of the White test, the acts must be intentional in the sense "that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that that result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result." Id. at 1208.
Defendants have demonstrated that plaintiffs lack evidence to establish any element of the White test. There is no evidence of outrageous, atrocious conduct by defendants, of extreme mental suffering by plaintiffs or of defendants' intent to cause such suffering. These are elements on which plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, and they have done nothing in response to the current motion to indicate that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial as to this claim. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
C. Management Services and Holdings Are Entitled to Summary Judgment
Defendant Holdings is the sole owner of defendants Management Services and LCHNO. Holdings is the manager of Management Services, which is a Louisiana limited liability company. LCHNO is also a limited liability company and Management Services is its manager, with responsibility for managing LCHNO and providing many of its administrative services. Despite these undisputed facts, plaintiffs have failed to establish that Holdings or Management Services should be regarded as plaintiffs' employer for purposes of their employment law claims.
Holdings and Management Services correctly assert that they cannot be liable to plaintiffs for employment discrimination under Title VII or Louisiana anti-discrimination law unless they were plaintiffs' "employer." Kormorowski v. Townline Mini-Mart Restaurant, 162 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998); Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1993); Triche v. Crescent Turnkey Eng'g. L.L.C., 744 So.2d 689, 692 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1999), writ denied, No. 1999-C-3100, 2000 WL 35265, at *1 (La. Jan. 7, 2000). These defendants contend that neither of them was ever plaintiffs' employer. They also maintain that they are wholly separate corporate entities from plaintiffs' actual employer, LCHNO, with no liability for LCHNO's actions.
In addition, Holdings argues that, as a holding company with no employees, it does not meet the statutory definitions of "employer" in either Title VII or Louisiana anti-discrimination law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (an "employer" is an entity with 15 or more employees); La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2232(4) (an "employer" is an entity with eight or more employees); Defendants' Exh. O, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Holdings at 10, 72; Defendants' Exh. P, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of LifeCare Hospitals, Inc. at 181, 194.
Finally, Management Services and Holdings argue that, in the absence of any employment relationship with plaintiffs, they had no contractual relationship with plaintiffs that could subject them to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. "By its terms, section 1981 governs contractual relationships." Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Plaintiffs respond that LCHNO, Management Services and Holdings constitute a "single employer" and that each of them can be held liable for LCHNO's discriminatory actions. To determine whether a parent corporation and its subsidiary may be regarded as a "single employer" in a discrimination case, the Court applies a four-part analysis.
The four factors to consider include: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor or employment decisions, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control. This analysis ultimately focuses on the question whether the parent corporation was a final decision-maker in connection with the employment matters underlying the litigation, and all four factors are examined only as they bear on this precise issue. . . .Lusk v. FoxMeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Recognizing "the important public policy considerations underlying the doctrine [of limited corporate liability], . . . before piercing the corporate veil in the employment discrimination context, we and other courts have focused on the core activities regulated by the anti-discrimination laws and, therefore, on whether the parent corporation was so involved in the daily employment decisions of the subsidiary as to justify treating the two corporations as a single employer." Id. at 777 n. 3.
Common management and ownership between a corporation and its subsidiaries "are ordinary aspects of a parent — subsidiary relationship" and are insufficient by themselves to establish single employer status.
The doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that a parent corporation is not the employer of its subsidiary's employees. Only evidence of control suggesting a significant departure from the ordinary relationship between a parent and its subsidiary — domination similar to that which justifies piercing the corporate veil — is sufficient to rebut this presumption, and to permit an inference that the parent corporation was a final decision-maker in its subsidiary's employment decisions.Id. (emphasis added).
"The interrelation of operations element of the single employer test ultimately focuses on whether the parent corporationexcessively influenced or interfered with the business operations of its subsidiary, that is, whether the parent actually exercised a degree of control beyond that found in the typical parent-subsidiary relationship." Id.
Along these lines, relevant factors suggesting the existence of interrelated operations include evidence that the parent: (1) was involved directly in the subsidiary's daily decisions relating to production, distribution, marketing, and advertising; (2) shared employees, services, records, and equipment with the subsidiary; (3) commingled bank accounts, accounts receivable, inventories, and credit lines; (4) maintained the subsidiary's books; (5) issued the subsidiary's paychecks; or (6) prepared and filed the subsidiary's tax returns.Id.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that LCHNO, Holdings and Management Services are so interrelated, without observing the ordinary corporate formalities, or that LCHNO is so dominated, particularly as to its employment decisions, as to justify considering either or both of Holdings or Management Services as a single employer with LCHNO.
Plaintiffs point out that Holdings filed a consolidated tax return and produced consolidated audited financial statements for itself and its subsidiaries. This does not demonstrate that Holdings exercises financial control over LCHNO beyond the ordinary perquisites of a holding company. On the contrary, this type of activity is a common purpose of a holding company. A holding company is defined as:
[a] company that usually confines its activities to owning stock in, and supervising management of, other companies. A holding company usually owns a controlling interest in the companies whose stock it holds. In order for a corporation to gain the benefits of tax consolidation, including tax free dividends and the ability to share operating losses, the holding company must own 80% or more of the voting stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 243.Black's Law Dictionary (available on Westlaw). LCHNO's corporate representative testified that one reason to have a holding company is that it would be too costly and burdensome to prepare audited financial statements for twelve separate entities. Plaintiffs' Exh. 3, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of LCHNO at 429-30.
Plaintiffs make much of the facts that LCHNO does not maintain its own checking account and that Management Services provides many administrative services for LCHNO and Holdings' other subsidiaries, including negotiating and administering health, welfare and 401(k) plans for employees of all the related companies, handling LCHNO's payroll function, keeping copies of LCHNO's corporate filings and finalizing its financial statements. These administrative duties do not evidence single-employer status by Management Services.
First, a limited liability company must act through its managers. As LCHNO's sole manager, Management Services has the authority to manage all aspects of LCHNO. Record Doc. No. 41, LCHNO Operating Agreement, Plaintiffs' Exh. Q to Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (filed under seal). There is nothing irregular about Management Services handling LCHNO's administrative duties, including its payroll and accounts payable functions.
Second, as explained by Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, the economics of a small business provide a justification for a parent company to furnish health, welfare and pension plans and other financial services to its subsidiaries.
Firms too tiny to achieve the realizable economies of scale or scope in their industry will go under unless they can integrate some of their operations with those of other companies, whether by contract or by ownership. . . . Take contractual integration first. A firm too small to have its own pension plan will join in a multiemployer pension plan or will in effect pool with other employers by buying an insurance policy. It will consult an outside law firm, representing many business firms, rather than having a staff of in-house lawyers. It will hire an accounting firm to do its payroll rather than having its own payroll department. . . . None of these forms of contractual integration would subject tiny employers to the antidiscrimination laws, because the integration is not of affiliated firms. Why should it make a difference if the integration takes the form instead of common ownership, so that the tiny employer gets his pension plan, his legal and financial advice, and his payroll function from his parent corporation without contractual formalities, rather than from independent contractors?Papa v. Katy Indus., 166 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999) (citing David L. Gregory, "Mandatory Arbitration and Wealth Distribution: The Policies and Politics of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act," 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195, 197 (1990); Alicia H. Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions 219 (1982)). LCHNO's corporate representative testified that the economies of scale are the reason that Management Services procures and administers insurance plans for all of Holdings' subsidiaries. Plaintiffs' Exh. 3, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of LCHNO at 200-01.
Finally, there is no evidence of commingling of funds between the related companies or of loans or other transactions between them that were not at arm's length. Although Aalborg testified that LCHNO had no checking account, Tracie Gravolet, LCHNO's human resources director, testified that LCHNO was the payor on payroll checks for LCHNO's employees. Plaintiffs' Exh. 3, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of LCHNO at 146. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, nothing in Holdings' consolidated financial statements or tax returns indicates that Holdings so dominated the other companies that loans or other transactions were undertaken without appropriate formalities or security.
Based on the current record, no genuine material fact issue exists that would qualify Holdings and Management Services as a "single employer" of plaintiffs with LCHNO or would establish that they had a contractual relationship with plaintiffs. All of the behavior of which plaintiffs complain was by LCHNO employees Holliday, Clarke and Aalborg. There is no evidence that the alleged decision to demote or fire Bass and Harrison for racial reasons was dictated by Management Services or Holdings. Accordingly, these defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' discrimination claims.
D. Material Fact Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Race Discrimination Claims
Summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims of race discrimination in employment is not appropriate because genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, which, viewed in plaintiffs' favor, could enable them to establish their claims against LCHNO under Title VII ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Louisiana anti-discrimination law.
In an employment discrimination case under both Title VII and Louisiana law, plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination by either direct or circumstantial evidence. If they use circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs have the initial burden of proving a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
"Courts have continually turned to federal employment discrimination law, including Title VII and the well-developed jurisprudence arising thereunder, for interpretation of Louisiana's anti-discrimination statute." Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1990); Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So.2d 843, 848 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1995));accord Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989).
If the circumstantial evidence demonstrates a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises and
the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. . . . [S]hould the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination.Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (quotation and citation omitted); accord Nichols, 138 F.3d at 566. This standard also governs a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1996); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).
If defendant meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears and plaintiffs "ha[ve] the opportunity to prove that [defendant's] articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination." Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart, 156 F.3d 581, 587 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted, 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.), panel opin. reinstated in relevant part, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting structure, which permits an inference of discrimination to be presumed from circumstantial evidence, is inapplicable when plaintiffs are able to present direct evidence of discrimination. Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1996). "Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact (i.e., unlawful discrimination) without inference or presumption."Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993). "Direct evidence is that which can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the defendant's discriminatory intent."Kormoczy v. United States Dept. of Housing Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1995). In Title VII cases, "direct evidence includes any statement or written document showing a discriminatory motive on its face." Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1994). Defendants can counter such evidence "only by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have acted as they did without regard to the plaintiffs race." Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990).
"A plaintiff who can offer sufficient direct evidence of intentional discrimination should prevail" in defeating defendant's summary judgment motion. Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). Once a plaintiff has presented direct evidence of discrimination, "summary judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a [discrimination claim] is the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Texas v. Crest Asset Mgmt., Inc., 85 F. Supp.2d 722, 729 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (quotation omitted).
The current record includes statements by LCHNO supervisors that could be considered direct evidence of discriminatory intent. For example, in their Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, defendants admit that "[i]n October, 1998 Margie Clarke told Tanya Robinson that Robinson should replace or demote minority charge nurses." Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, ¶ 15. Although defendants deny that Clarke had authority to tell Robinson to demote or replace anyone, other evidence indicates that Clarke represented herself to plaintiffs and others as having such authority, and that Robinson's superiors followed up with her to find out when she intended to demote or discharge Bass and Harrison. Plaintiffs' Exh. 6, Bass deposition at 97-98; Plaintiffs' Exh. 13, declaration of Vernon Dutton; Plaintiffs' Exh. 16, declaration of Raul Salas; Plaintiffs' Exh. 19, declaration of Ruby Shrieves; Defendants' Exh. B, Harrison deposition at 211-12; Plaintiffs' Exh. 10, Robinson deposition at 158-60.
Defendants also admit that Merlin Aalborg, the Chief Executive Officer of LCHNO, asked LCHNO's Chief of Staff, Dr. John Thiele, in August 1998 whether Dr. Thiele thought the Baptist unit where plaintiffs worked was "too black." Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, ¶ 13. Robinson's former supervisor, Michael Holliday, avers that Aalborg "made racial slurs and derrogatory [sic] statements regarding African-Americans and other minorities working at LifeCare" in conversations with Holliday and told me that there were too many blacks working at LifeCare's Baptist campus. Plaintiffs' Exh. 11, declaration of Michael Holliday. Holliday also states that Aalborg "contacted" him "and asked [him] whether Tonya [sic] Robinson was starting a reverse plantation because all the White nurses were working at night, and all the black nurses worked during the day." Id. These statements can be interpreted as direct evidence of discriminatory animus by LCHNO's CEO.
Thus, on the current record, material fact issues are in dispute, including but not limited to whether Clarke represented to plaintiffs and others that she had the authority to order Robinson to demote or discharge Bass and Harrison; whether plaintiffs reasonably believed that Clarke had such authority; whether Robinson's superiors wanted or encouraged her to demote or discharge Bass and Harrison; whether plaintiffs took advantage of LCHNO's grievance procedure; and whether plaintiffs were constructively discharged and/or subjected to a severe and pervasive racially discriminatory work environment. A reasonable factfinder could resolve these questions in plaintiffs' favor by finding a racially discriminatory intent by defendant to demote, discharge or harass them. See Sreeram v. Louisiana State Univ. Med. Ctr., 188 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1999) (race-related comments may be sufficient evidence of discrimination if they are proximate in time to the job termination, made by an individual with authority over the challenged employment decision and related to that decision); Krystek v. University of So. Miss., 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999) (same as to gender-related comments); Portis, 34 F.3d at 325 (plaintiff is entitled to all "reasonable inferences" to be drawn from direct evidence of discriminatory comments); Texas, 85 F. Supp.2d at 732 (denying summary judgment motion in light of direct evidence of racially discriminatory statements); Thompson v. Erickson, No. 1:96CV348-DA, 1998 WL 94823, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 7, 1998) (same); see also Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) (supervisor's "routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions");Vaughn, 918 F.2d at 521-23 (reversing judgment for defendant when plaintiff presented direct evidence of race discrimination and defendant failed to show that it would have acted as it did without regard to plaintiff's race).
LCHNO admits to some comments by Clarke and Aalborg that can be viewed on their face as motivated by racial animus, yet LCHNO denies any intent to discriminate against, demote or discharge plaintiffs. These denials create a disputed fact issue and do not amount to a preponderance of the evidence that defendant would have acted as it did without regard to plaintiffs' race. Accordingly, LCHNO has not shown that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' race discrimination claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiffs' state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that those claims against all defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment of defendants LifeCare Holdings, Inc. and LifeCare Management Services, L.L.C. is GRANTED and that all claims of racial discrimination against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of the summary judgment motion is DENIED. Jury trial will proceed as scheduled on May 1, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. on plaintiffs' remaining claims of race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Louisiana anti-discrimination law against the sole remaining defendant, LifeCare Hospitals of New Orleans, L.L.C.