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finding that although plaintiff might have been victim of past discrimination, she failed to demonstrate irreparable injury without showing that defendant's current policy would discriminate against her
Summary of this case from TRAVELHOST, INC. v. FIGGOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-0913-D
August 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Karen Jo Barrow's ("Barrow's") July 12, 2001 application for a preliminary injunction is denied.
Plaintiff's preliminary injunction application is before the court under the procedure permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(e) and is being decided on the papers without an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp.2d 713, 715 (N.D. Tex.) (Fitzwater, J.), a ff'd, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (table), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 749 (2001).
The court sets out in this memorandum opinion and order its findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Rule 52(a).
Barrow, a teacher employed by defendant Greenville Independent School District ("GISD"), maintains that she wishes to apply for a currently-open position as Assistant Principal at the Greenville Middle School, but contends she will not do so because GISD has in the past (in 1998) declined to interview her for an administrator position because her children attend a local private Christian school rather than the GISD public schools. To establish a right to a preliminary injunction, Barrow must establish (1) a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that she will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to her outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendants, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp.2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex.) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (N.D. Tex.) (Fitzwater, J.)), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). (table)), aff'd, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (table), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121. S.Ct. 749 (2001). "A preliminary injunction `is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'" Id. (quoting White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989); Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 111 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Barrow has failed to demonstrate a substantial threat of irreparable injury. She concedes that she has not yet applied for the position of Assistant Principal at the Greenville Middle School. Although she contends that doing so would be futile, she has not established that current GISD policy precludes her from being fully considered on the same terms as any other applicant. Although Barrow may have been a victim of past discrimination under another School Superintendent, GISD has introduced evidence that the present Interim Superintendent of Schools has personally asked Barrow to apply for the job in question. See GISD App. 44 (William Smith Aff.) ("I have personally spoken with Karen Jo Barrow asking her to apply for the position, as I think she would be an effective and successful administrator for GISD."). Absent a showing that this is a subterfuge and that GISD intends to discriminate against Barrow on the basis of where her children attend school, she has failed to establish a substantial threat that she will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.
Without prejudice to her moving anew for a preliminary injunction if she applies for the position of Assistant Principal at the Greenville Middle School and encounters unlawful discrimination, the court denies her July 12, 2001 application for a preliminary injunction.