Opinion
Case No. 6:15-cv-469-GKS-DCI
2021-07-13
Seana BARNETT, Plaintiff, v. Sara MACARTHUR and Dennis M. Lemma, Defendants.
David S. Shankman, Kendra D. Presswood, Shankman Leone, PA, Tampa, FL, Kathleen D. Kirwin, The KirwinLaw Practice, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff Seana Barnett. D. Andrew DeBevoise, Thomas W. Poulton, Erin McCaughey Tueche, Jeffrey K. Grant, DeBevoise & Poulton, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant Sara MacArthur. D. Andrew DeBevoise, Thomas W. Poulton, DeBevoise & Poulton, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant Dennis M. Lemma.
David S. Shankman, Kendra D. Presswood, Shankman Leone, PA, Tampa, FL, Kathleen D. Kirwin, The KirwinLaw Practice, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff Seana Barnett.
D. Andrew DeBevoise, Thomas W. Poulton, Erin McCaughey Tueche, Jeffrey K. Grant, DeBevoise & Poulton, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant Sara MacArthur.
D. Andrew DeBevoise, Thomas W. Poulton, DeBevoise & Poulton, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant Dennis M. Lemma.
ORDER
G. KENDALL SHARP, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE came on for consideration without oral argument upon Plaintiff Seana Barnett's (Barnett) Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion) (Doc. 199), to which Defendant, Sheriff Dennis M. Lemma (Lemma), filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition, (Doc. 209), and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 213).
Plaintiff Barnett seeks summary judgment on her Monell claim against Sheriff Lemma (Count II) and requests that a trial be scheduled to determine her damages. The gravamen of Plaintiff's motion is that the undisputed evidence of record establishes Defendant Lemma's liability for Barnett's continued detention without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. Thus, she argues that the Seminole County Sheriff's Department's DUI Hold Policy violates § 1983 because: (1) Barnett's constitutional rights were violated, (2) Lemma had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights and (3) Lemma's policy or custom caused the violation.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be Searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Defendant Lemma contends that the sole issue remaining in this case is whether Plaintiff's continued detention was constitutionally unreasonable, (Doc. 209, p. 3), and that "whether the hold policy was unconstitutionally applied to Barnett" (Doc. 209, p. 3).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On November 16, 2016, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part on Count II, Count IV, Count V, Count VI, Count VII, and Count VIII. The Court also awarded summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff Seana Barnett's Fourteenth Amendment claims and punitive damages claims. (Doc. 111). However, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in part on qualified immunity for Deputy MacArthur.
On interlocutory appeal, Deputy MacArthur appealed the denial of qualified immunity. Barnett v. MacArthur , 715 Fed. App'x 894, 908 (11th Cir. 2017) ( Barnett I ). Plaintiff's cross-appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In this first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Deputy MacArthur was not entitled to qualified immunity reasoning that " Section 316.193 simply requires one of three conditions to be met to ensure sobriety prior to releasing a DUI arrestee, one of which is an eight hour lapse from the time of arrest and one of which is a blood-alcohol level below 0.05. Fla. Stat. § 316.193(9)(b)-(c)." Barnett I , 715 F. App'x at 908. Thus, the disjunctive language of Section 316.193(9), Florida Statutes, provides three alternatives one of which allows for holding a person for eight (8) hours after a DUI arrest or releasing the person at the discretion of the officer. The Florida statute does not mandate holding a person arrested for DUI for eight hours irrespective of what evidence is later adduced.
Thereafter, from March 12 through 15, 2018, Counts I and III were tried before a jury which returned a verdict in favor of both Defendants. The jury specifically determined that Defendant MacArthur had not "intentionally commit[ ] acts that violated Plaintiff Barnett's Fourth Amendment right under the United States Constitution not to be arrested or detained without probable cause." (Doc. 169, Verdict, question number 1) (emphasis added). This determination by the jury resolved the question that Deputy MacArthur initially had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Barnett.
A second appeal followed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment "in favor of the Sheriff on the Monell claim related to Ms. Barnett's detention, but summarily affirm[ed] in all other respects." Barnett II , 956 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, Lemma v. Barnett , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1373, 209 L.Ed.2d 120 (2021). The case was remanded for trial on Plaintiff's challenge to the DUI Hold Policy against the Sheriff relying on McConney v. Houston , 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989) ("On this issue, we are persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in McConney ") (following a warrantless arrest for intoxication, officers have no affirmative duty to inquire further but once ascertained arrestee is not intoxicated, must be released).
B. Facts
Plaintiff and Defendant have argued differing versions of which facts are material in deciding Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her detention claim against Sheriff Lemma. The facts in connection with Plaintiff's Motion on her detention claim remain largely unchanged from those of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, although, as this is Plaintiff's motion, the Court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Motion) Doc. 199, pp. 5-9; Doc. 213, pp. 3-6.
Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 209, pp. 6-11.
To begin, there is no dispute in this case that Ms. Barnett was not drunk. Nor, is there a dispute that Ms. Barnett was arrested by Deputy MacArthur at approximately 4:00 a.m., she was given two breathalyzer tests which both registered 0.000 for breath-alcohol around 5:00 a.m., that she posted bail at around 11:00 a.m., and that pursuant to the Defendant's DUI eight-hour Hold Policy Plaintiff was not released from jail until shortly after 1:00 p.m., over eight hours after her arrest for DUI.
Motion, Doc. 209, p. 11.
Defendant "agrees that [Deputy] MacArthur had no particular discretion as to release Barnett despite the .000 result," (Doc. 2019, p. 11), nor did other Jail employees. It is also undisputed that the Seminole County, Florida, Sheriff's Office has an unwritten mandatory eight-hour Hold Policy in connection with DUI arrests which the Sheriff's Office enforces.
Moreover, in Barnett II , the Court of Appeals set "out the evidence presented at summary judgment on [Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on] the [Plaintiff's] detention claim against the Sheriff under Monell ." Barnett II , 956 F.3d at 1295-96.
Deputy MacArthur arrested Ms. Barnett for driving under the influence. On the way to the Seminole County Jail, Deputy MacArthur told Ms. Barnett that she thought she was impaired because of alcohol.
At her deposition, Deputy MacArthur testified that there was no indication that Ms. Barnett had been using drugs. Specifically, she did not observe any evidence of drugs in Ms. Barnett's vehicle, find any drugs in her purse, or smell marijuana in her car. Ms. Barnett, moreover, did not slur or speak in a manner that suggested she was impaired. Indeed, Deputy MacArthur testified that she did not have probable cause to believe that Ms. Barnett was under the influence of drugs. See D.E. 64 at 104 ("Q. Well, you didn't have any probable cause to believe she was under any drugs or any kind of prescription medicine or anything when you arrested her, correct? ... A. Correct."). In the arrest and offense reports, Deputy MacArthur indicated that the arrest was alcohol-related and that any drug use was unknown: "Alcohol Related: Y"; "Drug Related: U." See D.E. 35-4 at 2; D.E. 64-14 at 1.
B
When Ms. Barnett arrived at the Jail, Keith Betham, the breath test operator, observed her for 20 minutes and then conducted breathalyzer testing. Ms. Barnett provided two breath samples, both of which registered 0.000 for alcohol. Mr. Betham testified at his deposition that after observing Ms. Barnett, he did not see any signs that she was impaired by drugs. He nevertheless obtained a urine sample from Ms. Barnett at Deputy MacArthur's request. The urine test results, which came back around four weeks later, confirmed that Ms. Barnett did not have any drugs in her system.
Even though the breathalyzer tests established that Ms. Barnett was not intoxicated, she was required to remain at the jail for eight hours from the time of her arrest pursuant to the "hold policy" of the Seminole County Sheriff's Office. Mr. Betham testified that under this policy, even if a DUI arrestee's breathalyzer test results are 0.000, and even if there is no indication that the arrestee is under the influence of drugs, she still must wait eight hours from the time of the arrest to be released-even if she posts bond.
Shane Love, the Captain of Operations at the Jail. confirmed at his deposition that it is the policy of the Seminole County Sheriff's Office to detain DUI arrestees for at least eight hours, even if their breathalyzer test results are 0.000. Deputy MacArthur similarly testified that once she arrested Ms. Barnett, she was going to have to stay in jail for eight hours pursuant to this policy.
In accordance with the hold policy, Ms. Barnett's jail arrest card stated that she was arrested at 4:10 a.m. and noted that she "can go at 12:10"-eight hours later.
D.E. 64-17. Ms. Barnett ultimately was released a little over eight hours from the time of her arrest, at 1:13 p.m., despite having posted bond at 10:58 a.m.
Barnett II , 956 F.3d at 1295-96 (emphasis added).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Disputed issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment, but factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary do not. Id. "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden, the Court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party may rely solely on the pleadings to satisfy its burden. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, a non-moving party bearing the burden of proof must go beyond the pleadings and submit affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions that designate specific facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the evidence offered by the non-moving party "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," the Court may grant summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, summary judgment is mandated against a party who fails to prove an essential element of its case "with respect to which [the party] has the burden of proof." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff challenges the Sheriff's unwritten eight-hour Hold Policy as unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Barnett. Sheriff Lemma argues inter alia that Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of the Hold Policy itself is improperly raised in her Motion for Summary Judgment and that, instead, "the threshold question of probable cause was disproven beyond a reasonable doubt." (Doc. 209, p. 14). Therefore, Defendant strenuously contends that Plaintiff's constitutional challenge must first be presented to a jury in accordance with the most recent decision by Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Barnett II , 956 F.3d 1291.
However, in its Opinion, the Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that "[o]ur holding does not mean that the hold policy is categorically unconstitutional. That is a question we do not and need not decide." Barnett II , 956 F.3d at 1299 n.5 (emphasis added).
"Interpretation of a statute or ordinance is a question of law and therefore may be determined by the court on a motion for summary judgment. See United States v. Prosperi , 201 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000)". Rectory Park, L.C. v. City of Delray Beach , 208 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd , 82 F. App'x 221 (11th Cir. 2003). Burns v. Town of Palm Beach , 2018 WL 4868710, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118437 (First Amendment), aff'd , 343 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2018). Thus, this Motion is properly before the Court. A. Municipal Liability Standard
"Local governing bodies can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, it is well-settled that "under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’ " Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ).
Official capacity suits against a law enforcement officer "represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell , 436 U.S. at 691 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018. A "municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his [or her] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation." McDowell v. Brown , 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). See Favors v. City of Atlanta , 849 Fed.Appx. 813 (11th Cir. 2021).
Additionally, "[i]f the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action is properly made by [the] government's authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly understood." Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292. In order to correctly plead that a municipality should be held liable for the actions of its employees because it ratified said actions, a plaintiff must show a "persistent failure to take disciplinary action against officers," which "can give rise to the inference that a municipality has ratified conduct, thereby establishing a ‘custom’ within the meaning of Monell ." Fundiller v. City of Cooper City , 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Further, "a municipality's failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions of its employees can rise to the level of a custom or policy ‘if the municipality tacitly authorizes these actions or displays deliberate indifference’ towards the misconduct." Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka , 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brooks v. Scheib , 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987) ).
B. Constitutional Standards
A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application. While such challenges are "the most difficult ... to mount successfully," United States v. Salerno , 481 U. S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987), the Court has never held that these claims cannot be brought under any otherwise enforceable provision of the Constitution. Cf. Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 918 (2011) (pointing to several Terms in which "the Court adjudicated more facial challenges on the merits than it did as-applied challenges").
City of Los Angeles v. Patel , 576 U.S. 409, 415, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) (warrantless searches).
The Supreme Court has explained the proper analysis for facial challenges to statutes.
Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a "law is unconstitutional in all of its applications."
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party , 552 U. S. 442, 449, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 170 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2008). But when assessing whether a statute meets this standard, the Court has considered only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct. ....
when addressing a facial challenge to a statute authorizing warrantless searches , the proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is searches that the law actually authorizes, not those for which it is irrelevant. If exigency or a warrant justifies an officer's search, the subject of the search must permit it to proceed irrespective of whether it is authorized by statute. Statutes authorizing warrantless searches also do no work where the subject of a search has consented. Accordingly, the constitutional "applications" that petitioner claims prevent facial relief here are irrelevant to our analysis because they do not involve actual applications of the statute.
City of Los Angeles , 576 U.S. at 418-19, 135 S.Ct. 2443 (emphasis added). And,
[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately proved.
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice ,
probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is not the end of the matter, for "[d]etention [in jail] ... is a type of seizure of the person to which Fourth Amendment protections attach." Alcocer v. Mills , 906 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2018). Just as "probable cause may cease to exist after a warrant is issued," United States v. Grubbs , 547 U.S. 90, 95 n.2, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195 (2006), it may also dissipate after an officer makes a warrantless arrest. See, e.g., BeVier v. Hucal , 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The continuation of even a lawful arrest violates the Fourth Amendment when the police discover additional facts dissipating their earlier probable cause."); McConney v. City of Houston , 863 F.2d 1180, 1185 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[O]nce a responsible officer actually does ascertain beyond a reasonable doubt that one who has been so arrested is not intoxicated, the arrestee should be released."); Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles , 935 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2019) ("It is well-established that a person may not be arrested, or must be released from arrest, if previously established probable cause has dissipated.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Barnett II , 956 F.3d at 1297 (emphasis added).
In the first appeal of this case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Deputy MacArthur was not entitled to qualified immunity reasoning that
Section 316.193 simply requires one of three conditions to be met to ensure sobriety prior to releasing a DUI arrestee, one of which is an eight hour lapse from the time of arrest and one of which is a blood-alcohol level below 0.05. Fla. Stat. § 316.193(9)(b)-(c).
Barnett I , 715 F. App'x at 908 (emphasis added). Thus, the disjunctive language of Section 316.193(9), Florida Statutes, allows for the option of holding a person for eight hours after a DUI arrest or of releasing the person, in the discretion of an officer, based upon evidence and the continued existence of probable cause. The Florida statute does not command holding a person arrested for DUI for eight hours no matter what evidence is later adduced.
Indeed, the Court went on to explain that
Florida law [ Section 316.193(9), Florida Statutes ] grants officers discretion in making a DUI arrest and in releasing a DUI arrestee. When an officer exercises this discretion under Florida law, the Constitution requires her to exercise her discretion in a way that does not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. When an officer exercises her discretion to refrain from releasing a DUI arrestee where there is no longer a basis for the arrest or detention, on the unsupported ex post justification that "there was something," she exercises her discretion in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Barnett I , 715 F. App'x at 908 (emphasis added).
By contrast, the Seminole County Sheriff's Office established and well-known unwritten DUI Hold Policy here at issue commands, without exception, that every warrantless arrestee for DUI be held for eight hours, unlike the Florida Statute upon which it is alleged to be premised. Under this mandatory Hold Policy, Seminole County Deputies, and other jail employees have no discretion to release an arrestee who it is known beyond a reasonable doubt is not under the influence of alcohol. Once probable cause has dissipated and there is no lawful basis for detention, it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to continue to detain a warrantless arrestee. Moreover,
Such as a Booking Sergeant.
Florida Statute § 316.1934 provides that if a person registers, "at th[e] time" of a breathylzer test, a "breath-alcohol level of 0.05 or less, it is presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired." Fla. Stat. § 316.1934(2)(a).
Festa v. Santa Rosa County , 413 F. Appx. 182, 186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting statute) (emphasis added). Hence, the Court declares the Seminole County Sheriff's Hold Policy unconstitutional because, unlike the Florida Statute, it requires that every DUI arrestee be detained for eight hours without exception even after objective breathalyzer evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intoxicated and probable cause no longer exists to continue the detention.
"If there was at that time a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.05 or less, it is presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired." Fla. Stat. § 316.1934(2)(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
Fla. Statute § 316.193(9), provides:
(9) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:
(a) Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;
(b) Until the person's blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or
(c) Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.
Fla. Stat. § 316.193(9) (2021) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court permanently enjoins enforcement of the Seminole County Sheriff's Office unwritten eight-hour mandatory DUI Hold Policy. See AFSCME Council 79 v. Scott , 717 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2013) (remedies). In accordance with Florida law, the Seminole County Sheriff's Office may not continue to detain DUI arrestees once there is evidence, such as a breathalyzer result of a "breath-alcohol level ... less than 0.05," Fla. Stat. § 316.193(9)(b), and for whom there is no probable cause to be detained on another charge.
"The Court granted a declaratory judgment holding the EO unconstitutional and issued an injunction coextensive with that declaration, which barred drug testing of ‘both Union and non-union employees.... currently employed at covered agencies’ as of the date of the district court's order." AFSCME Council 79 v. Scott , 717 F.3d 851, 862 (11th Cir. 2013).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Seminole County, Florida, Sheriff's Office eight-hour mandatory DUI Hold Policy violates the Fourth Amendment and is hereby declared unconstitutional.
2. The Seminole County, Florida, Sheriff's Office is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing its mandatory DUI Hold Policy, INSTANTER.
3. Plaintiff Seana Barnett's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 199), on Count II, of the Amended Complaint, is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, Seana Barnett and against Defendant, Sheriff Dennis M. Lemma.
4. This case is set for the October 2021 jury trial term commencing October 1, 2021, on the issue of damages for the time Plaintiff was unconstitutionally held after the objective breathalyzer results verified that Ms. Barnett was not under the influence of alcohol.
DONE AND ORDERED at Orlando, Florida, this 13th day of July, 2021.