Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-1359-TMC-JDA
05-03-2022
Jacob Baker, Federal Election Commission, Plaintiffs, v. United States District Federal Court, State Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
Jacob Baker (“Baker”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action purportedly on behalf of the Federal Election Commission against the United States District Court and the State Court. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Baker is a non-prisoner litigant, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B) D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Upon review, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Baker commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form. [Doc. 1.] The handwriting on the Complaint is nearly illegible and the allegations are difficult to decipher. However, the undersigned is able to glean the following pertinent allegations and information.
Citing various federal statutes, Baker asserts the Court has federal question and diversity jurisdiction, and he alleges as follows, verbatim:
Modern status of pendent federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.[ §] 1338(b) over state claim of unfair competition when joined with related claim under federal trademark laws.[Id. at 3.] He further alleges that “[t]he requirement of finality of judgment is interpreted strictly when bar of merger is at stake.” [Id. at 5.] As to the allegations supporting his claim, he essentially repeats the allegations noted above. [Id.] For his relief, Baker asserts as follows:
Create a new claim based on the judgment itself. However, pursuant to the distinction made in the restatement between finality for purposes of merger and bar and finality for purposes of issue preclusion. Claim preclusion the application of the rules of merger and bar is not.[Id.] Baker's remaining allegations are unintelligible. Baker has attached to his Complaint forty-nine pages of exhibits, which consist of various pages of orders and other documents from his prior cases filed in this Court, documents and correspondences from the Social Security Administration, and Baker's handwritten notes that are virtually illegible. [Doc. 11.] The undersigned has carefully reviewed each of the documents filed in this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Baker filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). “Federal courts possess an inherent authority to dismiss cases with prejudice sua sponte.” Gantt v. Md. Div. of Corr., 894 F.Supp. 226, 229 (D. Md. 1995) (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); White v. Raymark Indust., Inc., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1986); Zaczek v. Fauquier Cnty., Va., 764 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D. Va.1991)).
Because Baker is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which a plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct a plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Baker is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain factual allegations, otherwise the claim is nothing more than a bare assertion and frivolous. See White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating minimum level of factual support required); Cook v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 184 Fed.Appx. 348, 349 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hile the liberal pleading requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(a) demand only a short and plain statement of the claim, a plaintiff must often offer more detail than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendants.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
It is unclear from the allegations in the Complaint what causes of action Baker intends to assert in this action. Regardless, upon review, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
On the Civil Cover Sheet filed with the Complaint, Baker marked nearly half the boxes on the form. [Doc. 2.] The undersigned is simply unable to determine what claims Baker intends to assert in this action.
This Action is Duplicative
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that this action is duplicative of at least one prior action filed in this Court. Specifically, the present action appears to involve claims and allegations similar to an action Baker filed in this Court in 2014 against the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See Baker v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 8:14-cv-00113-JMC-JDA (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2014). It appears to the Court that Baker is attempting to re-assert the same claims under the same facts as his prior case. Indeed, Baker specifically cites his prior action on the Complaint filed in this case. [Doc. 1 at 1.] As such, because the present action is duplicative of Baker's prior case, this action warrants dismissal. “[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous.” Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-cv-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, at *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (holding the “Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency”), aff'd, 631 Fed.Appx. 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that, “[b]ecause district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).” Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (“district courts may dismiss duplicative complaints under section 1915”)); Wilkins v. Harley, Case No. 6:11-cv-3463-MBS-KFM, 2012 WL 256566, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2012) (“this duplicate § 1983 Complaint is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 260159 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, because the present action is a meritless duplicate of prior lawsuits filed by Baker, the present case is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal. See Lester v. Perry Corr. Inst., No. 4:12-cv-971-TMC-TER, 2012 WL 1963592, at *3 (D.S.C. May 10, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1963566 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), aff'd, 479 Fed.Appx. 509 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.”).
The Court takes judicial notice of Baker's prior actions filed in this Court at case numbers 6:12-cv-02871, 6:12-cv-3154, 6:12-cv-3221, 6:13-cv-1280, 8:14-cv-0113, and 6:16-cv-3522, and 6:20-cv-3839. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Further, Baker filed other actions in this Court naming the Federal Election Commission as a party and making similar incoherent allegations as he makes in this case. See Federal Election Commission v. Baker, No. 6:20-cv-3839-JMC-JDA (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2020); Baker v. Federal Election Commission, No. 6:16-cv-3522-JMC-JDA (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2016); Baker v. Federal Election Commission, No. 6:12-cv-3154-JMC-JDA (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2012). Those cases were summarily dismissed. In the present action, Baker again names the Federal Election Commission as a party, though he fails to state a claim against that party.
Failure to State a Claim
Additionally, this case should be dismissed for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. As noted, it is unclear what causes of action Baker intends to assert in this action. In any case, he has failed to present allegations to support any claim for relief that is plausible. Although Baker cites numerous federal statutes, his “rambling, incoherent allegations simply fail to state any claim for relief” and the Complaint should therefore be dismissed. Boyd v. United States, No. 7:20-cv-00178-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 823099, at * 3 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 816077 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2020).
The law is well settled that more than conclusory statements are required to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-79. To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain specific facts that adequately support a claim. Id. Although a court must give “liberal construction” to pro se pleadings, the court may not “ignore a petitioner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim.” United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012). And, as noted, the “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints . . . [do] not require . . . courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278.
The present Complaint simply fails to state any factual or legal basis for any federal claims. The allegations are nonsensical and incoherent. Baker does not allege supporting facts suggesting any violation of the Constitution or federal law. Instead, the Complaint consists of disjointed words and phrases that fail to state any sort of plausible claim. As such, even with liberal construction, the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief and summary dismissal is therefore appropriate. See, e.g., Bryant v. United States Marshal, No. 2:18-cv-2582-MBS-MGB, 2018 WL 5258810, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255014 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018), aff'd, 764 Fed.Appx. 344 (4th Cir. 2019).
The undersigned further questions whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Although Baker cites various federal statutes and the United States Constitution, the undersigned finds that he presents no allegations to state a claim for relief under any statutory or constitutional provision. As such, it does not appear that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action. And, even if the Court did have jurisdiction, the Court itself is not a proper defendant that may be sued.
This Action is Frivolous
Moreover, the allegations in the Complaint, to the extent they can be understood, lack any arguable basis in law or fact. As such, the Complaint is subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). And, given that the pleading filed in this case is essentially incoherent and duplicative of prior actions, the undersigned concludes that the legal deficiencies of the Complaint cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleadings. As such, given Baker's nonsensical allegations, it appears that amendment would not cure the pleading deficiencies and would be futile. See Bryant, 2018 WL 5258810 at *4.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Baker cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Baker an opportunity to amend. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).