Opinion
Cause No. IP 99-0282-C-M/S.
October 24, 2000.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Speedway SuperAmerica LLC's ("SSA") motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Roberta M. Baker's ("Baker") claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Baker alleges that SSA discriminated against her due to her age by failing to properly train her and by demoting her from her manager position to an assistant manager position at a new store. The Court has fully considered the parties' arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS SSA's motion for summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. BAKER'S WORK HISTORY WITH SSA
Plaintiff Roberta Baker was born July 20, 1977. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 1. Cheker Oil hired Baker in 1977 as a part-time cashier at Store 7346, which is located at 1811 Indianapolis Road, Crawfordsville, Indiana (hereinafter "Store 7346"). It promoted her to assistant manager six months later, and promoted her to manager three months later. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. Marathon Oil Company purchased Cheker in 1983 and the former Cheker stores became a part of a Marathon subsidiary, Emro Marketing Company. Id. ¶ 6. The former Cheker stations thereafter began operating as Speedway facilities. Id. On January 1, 1999 — as the result of a merger between Marathon Oil Company and Ashland, Inc. — the stores began operating under the banner "Speedway SuperAmerica." Id. ¶ 7.
According to Baker, Store 7346 was a small store about the size of a house trailer. Id. ¶ 8. Baker supervised one assistant manager and three part-time cashiers. She was a salaried-exempt employee earning $545 per week, and was required to work at least 50 hours per week. She sometimes worked as many as 70 hours per week without additional compensation. Id. ¶ 10.
B. SSA DECIDES TO REBUILD BAKER'S STORE
Environmental Protection Agency regulations required SSA to bring all of its underground metal gasoline tanks at its various facilities up to EPA standards by the end of 1998. Id. ¶ 16. As a result, SSA decided in late 1997 or early 1998 to raze Store 7346 and build a larger store on the same site. SSA also determined that it would close another Crawfordsville location, Store 6053. SSA decided to rebuild rather than close Store 7346, in part, because it thought it may be able to pick up sales from a nearby grocery store that had closed. Id. ¶ 17.
C. SSA TRANSFERS BAKER DURING THE REBUILD
Dave Wallace, a district manager and Baker's direct supervisor, assumed responsibility for Store 7346 in late 1994. Wallace was born April 4, 1941. Id. ¶ 14. During the rebuild of Store 7346, Wallace assigned its employees to different areas. Id. ¶ 19. For example, in April 1998 Wallace transferred Baker to Store 6053 where she acted as co-manager with Dawn Cecil ("Cecil"). Cecil was off work for approximately two weeks for surgery during the rebuilding period. Id. ¶ 20. When Cecil returned from her leave, she and Baker served as co-managers of that facility. Id. Baker suffered no loss of title, pay, or benefits while she served as manager of Store 6053 during the rebuild of Store 7346. Id. ¶ 22.
D. SSA REOPENS BAKER'S STORE AS A MUCH LARGER STORE
Prior to the rebuild, Store 7346 was approximately 12' x 25', had limited shelving, and no fast food items. Id. ¶ 25. When it reopened in June 1998, it was approximately three times larger than the previous store. Id. ¶ 26. The new store had twelve employees, including at least four assistant managers, while the old store had only four to six employees. Id. ¶ 27. Prior to the rebuild, Store 7346 was open seventeen hours per day; following the rebuild, it became a 24-hour operation and its inventory increased from $10,000 to $80,000. Id. ¶ 28.
The rebuilt store had more merchandise than the old store, including fast food items and fountain drinks. According to Baker, it was "completely bigger" and nicer, with more customers. Id. ¶ 30. With the greater number of employees, the manager of the new store had increased responsibilities with respect to managing and scheduling personnel, as well as being responsible for the larger amount of money and merchandise. Id. ¶ 31. SSA considers it a promotion for a manager of a small store to take a larger store, such as Store 7346 after the rebuild. Id. ¶ 82.
Finally, the new store was also equipped with a new computer system called Point of Sales ("POS"), which replaced the old registers that had been used prior to the rebuild. Id. ¶ 29. After receiving six hours of training on the POS system in June 1998, Baker felt capable of operating the POS with assistance. Id. ¶ 78. According to Baker, SSA gave younger employees Garry Merrill and Debbie Sarver POS training that it had denied Baker. Pl.'s Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 78.
E. SSA INFORMS BAKER THAT SHE WILL NOT MANAGE THE NEW STORE
Neil Blanos, born October 29, 1936, is a region manager for SSA. In March 1998, Blanos directly supervised Wallace. Id. ¶ 11. Beginning in 1994, Blanos' area of responsibility included Stores 7346 and 6053 in Crawfordsville. Id. ¶ 13.
After it became clear in late 1997 that Store 7346 would be rebuilt and expanded, Wallace recommended to Blanos that SSA not retain Baker as store manager after Store 7346 reopened because he did not feel Baker was capable of managing a larger location. Id. ¶ 40. Wallace's recommendation was based in part on his assessment that Baker had previously demonstrated that she lacked the ability to effectively hire and train employees, resulting in Store 7346 being short of help and having excessive overtime. Id. ¶ 41. Another factor in Wallace's recommendation was that Baker's store had experienced unacceptably high cash and inventory shortages. Id. ¶ 42. A third but less important factor in Wallace's recommendation was the chronically poor appearance of the store under Baker's management. Id. ¶ 43.
In late November 1997, Blanos accepted Wallace's recommendation. Blanos believed that Baker had high losses of inventory and cash, high employee turnover, unsatisfactory merchandising skills, and problems in maintaining store appearance. Blanos shared Wallace's opinion that Baker did not have the necessary ability to manager a large volume store. Id. ¶ 50; Pl's Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 50; Def.'s Reply ¶ 50. Blanos believed a larger store such as rebuilt Store 7346 was a "very different business" requiring greater people skills and managerial abilities than were required to manage SSA's smaller stores, such as Store 7346 prior to its rebuild. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 51.
During a routine visit to Store 7346 in March 1998, Blanos — in Wallace's presence — told Baker that SSA had not selected her to manage the new store because he and Wallace did not consider her capable of handling the larger store. Blanos also informed her that he would retain her as a first shift assistant manager at the new store once it reopened. Id. ¶ 58. During the conversation Blanos asked Baker about the rumors concerning her possibly retiring after Store 7346 was rebuilt. Id. ¶ 59. According to Baker, Blanos asked her at least twice about whether she wanted to retire. Baker Dep. at 41-42. After Blanos mentioned retiring, Wallace asked Baker "Aren't you about 58?" Def.'s Reply ¶ 107. Baker acknowledged that she had talked about retiring but said she had gotten herself straightened out and thought she could handle things better because she was now taking Prozac to deal with the stress. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 60. Blanos told Baker that if she chose to, she could remain at the rebuilt store as an assistant manager without any reduction in her compensation. Id. ¶ 61. In response to Baker's comment that she could manage the larger store, Wallace put his hand on her shoulder and said "I know you can." Baker Dep. at 35.
Prior to March 26, 1998, Baker had spoken to her husband about the possibility of taking an early retirement. This conversation occurred two or three years before her husband retired on October 30, 1999. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 54. Wallace and Baker had once discussed her job performance and her possible retirement, but the subject was never addressed again by either party. Id. ¶ 55. Baker admits that she may have discussed her thoughts about retiring when her husband did with other SSA employees in addition to Wallace. Id. ¶ 56.
Blanos also went over Baker's performance problems, including her lack of being able to hire and train people and her problems with cash shortages. Id. ¶ 67. Although assistant managers normally worked second shift, Blanos told Baker that in recognition of her many years of service he would allow her to continue to work days. Id. ¶ 68. SSA's reclassification of Baker occurred because it had no other small store to put her in as a manager. Blanos testified that "if we had another small store to put her in, we would have left her as the manager of that store, but we ran out of small stores." Id. ¶ 85.
As assistant manager, Baker's wages began at $9.90 per hour. Blanos instructed Wallace that if he had to work Baker 50 hours so she could earn the same that she had as a manager, then he should do so. Blanos also believed that as a non-exempt employee, Baker could see an increase in her total earnings. Id. ¶ 69. SSA guarantees 45-hour assistant managers a minimum of 45 hours of work weekly. Id. ¶ 70. As of January 1999, assistant managers are not entitled to sick leave, but a manager does receive one year of sick leave for each year of full-time work with the company. Pl's Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 69. A manager receives greater life insurance benefits than an assistant manager, and managers are entitled to bonuses while assistant managers are not. Id. Although Baker had received a bonus as manager of Store 7346, she would no longer receive a bonus as an assistant manager. Id.
Similarly, after Store 6053 closed SSA also reclassified Cecil as a 45-hour assistant store manager at another store despite the fact that she had no performance problems. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 76. Cecil was 34 and had been rated "outstanding" in the two evaluations preceding her reclassification. Id. ¶ 77.
F. SSA NAMES VICKI MASON AS MANAGER OF REBUILT STORE 7346
In 1993 Wallace hired Vicki Mason, born August 17, 1958, as a store manager at a Speedway facility in Plainfield, Indiana. Id. ¶ 44. Mason had prior experience with another oil company both as a store manager and a district manager. Id. ¶ 45. The size of the Plainfield store was about the same as Store 7346 after the rebuild. The Plainfield store was doing approximately $350,000 annually in outside (gasoline sales) business, while SSA projected that the new Crawfordsville store would do between $150,000-$175,000 in outside sales. Plainfield had $115,000 in inside sales, while the new Crawfordsville location was projected to sell $100,000. Id. ¶ 46. When Wallace hired Mason in 1993, she told him the Crawfordsville store was closer to her home and that if SSA ever rebuilt it she would be interested in the store manager position. Id. ¶ 47.
Because SSA had invested $1,200,000 to rebuild Store 7346, it made a business decision to assign the "best qualified person" to manage the new, rebuilt store. Blanos and Doug Kenyon, SSA's human resources representative, each concurred with Wallace's recommendation that the best qualified person was Mason because she had been managing a new prototype high-volume store in Plainfield and had outstanding evaluations. Id. ¶ 52. Wallace first interviewed Mason for the position of manager of Store 7346 in late February or early March 1998. Id. ¶ 48. Wallace was not aware of any times Mason had been disciplined, and she had been rated in her annual evaluations as "outstanding" and capable of advancement. Mason accepted the lateral transfer to manage rebuilt Store 7346. Id. ¶ 49; Pl.'s Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 49 Mason was 39 at the time of the transfer. Pl.'s Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 103.
G. SSA'S EVALUATION OF BAKER'S PERFORMANCE
Wallace evaluated Baker's performance annually from 1995 until June 1998. Pl.'s Response to Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 91. Wallace recommended Baker for a "merit consideration" or "merit increase" pay raise for "satisfactory" and "very satisfactory" performances for 1996-1998. Id. ¶ 92. In fact, Baker received a merit increase one week before SSA notified her that it was reclassifying her as an assistant manager. Id. ¶ 108. In 1995, Wallace considered Baker's performance to be "very satisfactory" and commented, "[Roberta Baker is a] real asset to the company." Id. ¶ 96.
From 1995-1998, Baker received a "very satisfactory" rating under the subsections entitled "relates well with customers," "cooperates with other employees and supervisor," and "communicates clearly and concisely (verbal or written)." Id. ¶ 122. Wallace also commented regarding Baker's communication skills as follows: "Communication skills very good with vendors, cigarette [representatives], delivery people, employees and management" for 1995; "Cooperates well with everyone, good communication skills" for 1996; "Cooperation and communication good, requires little supervision" for 1997; and "Cooperation and communication skills very good" for 1998. Id. ¶ 123.
Additionally, Wallace evaluated Baker as "very satisfactory" in 1995 and 1996 and "outstanding" (the highest rating available on an appraisal) in 1997 and 1998 for the area of "accurate in handling money," a subsection of "Control of Company Assets." In 1997-1998, Baker's "control shortages" were rated as "satisfactory." Under the "Strengths and Achievements" section on the 1997 appraisal, Wallace commented that "Shortages, S.O.C., inventory levels and inside sales have improved from last year," and in 1998 noted that "Shortages . . . . are down." Id. ¶ 42.
From 1995-1998 Wallace commented under the "Merchandising" section that Baker's suggestive selling was either "good" or "very good." Id. ¶ 43. He also rated her "very satisfactory" for the subsection of "Merchandising" called "maintains adequate inventories and merchandise well displayed" for 1997-1998, and rated her "outstanding" in 1995. Id. Wallace evaluated Baker's store appearance in 1997 and 1998 as "very satisfactory" and commented in 1998 that her store appearance had "been maintained for the year." Id. Wallace rated Baker's ability to train employees as "very satisfactory" from 1995-1998. Id. ¶ 41.
In annual performance appraisals in February of 1996-1998, SSA rated Baker as not capable of advancing, and on each appraisal form the comment "not interested in advancing" was written. Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 37. Blanos concluded from Wallace's annual appraisals of Baker's performance that she was not capable of advancing to a larger store. Id. ¶ 38. On June 2, 1998, the final appraisal before her reclassification to assistant manager, Baker received an overall performance rating of "satisfactory." Id. ¶ 39.
Although Baker claims that she checked the "not interested" box because as store manager, she did not believe she could advance to a higher position within her store, she admitted in her deposition that the reason she checked the box was because she was not interested. Baker Dep. at 74.
Baker did receive four disciplinary write-ups. Id. ¶ 32. On August 2, 1995 Wallace issued a written warning for excessive cash shortages in June and July of that year. Id. ¶ 33. On August 17, 1995, Wallace issued another written warning for an inventory shortage of over $1,000. Id. ¶ 34. On May 2, 1996 Wallace again issued a written warning for another inventory shortage of over $1,000 and for failing to prepare accurately required company reports. Id. ¶ 35. Finally, in January 1998 Wallace issued a written warning for failing to follow SSA policies requiring that cash over $100 be placed in the safe, which resulted in a loss of $200 that could not be tracked. Id. ¶ 36.
Baker filed this lawsuit alleging that SSA denied her training on the new computer system and demoted her to assistant manager because of her age. The parties have fully briefed SSA's motion for summary judgment, and it is now ripe for ruling.
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent. Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit has recently emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Even when discriminatory intent is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant presents no evidence to indicate motive or intent in support of her position. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994).
B. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT STANDARDS
Two methods exist for Baker to satisfy her burden of proof: by direct evidence that age discrimination motivated SSA's decisions, or by the indirect, burden-shifting method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Seventh Circuit has defined direct evidence as evidence which if believed will "prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption." Plair v. E.J. Brach Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1996) (offering, as an example of direct evidence, an employer's statement "I did not hire you because you are a woman"). Evidence of discriminatory motives must have some relationship to the employment action in question; inappropriate but isolated comments that amount to no more than stray remarks are insufficient. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997). When such evidence is presented, it shifts the burden to the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even if the proscribed criterion had played no role in the decision. Id. The persuasiveness of that showing will normally be for the trier of fact to assess, unless the Court can say without reservation that a reasonable finder of fact would be compelled to credit the employer's case on this point. Id.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Baker has the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of age discrimination. Wilson v. AM General Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1119 (7th Cir. 1999). If Baker succeeds in establishing her prima facie case, only then does the burden shift to SSA to come forward with evidence of a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1998). If SSA does so, the inference of discrimination dissolves and Baker must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that SSA's proffered reasons are false and only pretexts for discrimination. Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). "The ultimate question is `whether the same events would have transpired if the employee had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same.'" Wilson, 167 F.3d at 1120.
Baker appears to be alleging two different claims for age discrimination. First, she claims that she was denied training. To establish a prima facie case for failure to train, Baker must establish: (1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that SSA provided training to its employees; (3) that she was eligible for training; and (4) that she was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that she was denied training given to other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group. Malcara v. City of Madison, 224 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2000).
Baker's other claim of age discrimination is that when SSA closed her store and reopened the larger, high-volume prototype store, it did not allow her to retain her position as manager. Because SSA eliminated Baker's and Cecil's positions as managers of the smaller SSA stores, it appears that Baker was involved in a reduction in force ("RIF"). A RIF occurs when an employer permanently eliminates certain positions from its workforce. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under these circumstances, Baker must show that: (1) she was a member of the protected class; (2) she reasonably performed to SSA's expectations; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably. Id. With these standards in mind, the Court will now address Baker's claims.
III. DISCUSSION A. FAILURE TO TRAIN
Baker's failure to train is based upon her allegation that two younger employees — Garry Merrill and Debbie Sarver — were given POS training opportunities that SSA denied Baker. Noticeably absent from the record and Baker's brief, however, are the ages of either Merrill or Sarver. Although Baker informs the Court that both Merrill and Sarver were younger, she sheds no light on how much younger. While the younger employees need not necessarily be outside the protected class, "they should be substantially — i.e., at least ten years — younger than the terminated employee." Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). With no evidence that either Merrill or Sarver was substantially younger, Baker's failure to train claim fails. Accordingly, SSA is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
B. RECLASSIFICATION TO ASSISTANT MANAGER POSITION 1. Baker's Alleged Direct Evidence
According to Baker, after Blanos told her that he did not think she was capable of managing the new store, she began to cry. In response, Blanos said "Well, I thought you were going to retire. You had talked about retiring." In addition, Wallace said "Aren't you about 58?" Baker replied that she was 60. Blanos then said "But you talked about retiring. Are you sure you don't want to retire?" Baker's Opposition Brief at p. 21. Even assuming Blanos and Wallace made these comments, they do not amount to direct evidence that they decided to reclassify Baker as an assistant manager because of her age. Indeed, there is no evidence that either Blanos or Wallace told Baker they were reclassifying her because of her age. Instead, they simply mentioned the idea of retirement after they had already informed Baker of their decision. The Seventh Circuit has held that similar comments are not direct evidence of age discrimination. See Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an employer's suggestion of retirement did not give rise to an inference of discrimination when presented as a more palatable option to dismissal or layoff). With no direct evidence of age discrimination, Baker must resort to the indirect method of proof.
Although Baker alleged the Blanos "repeatedly" inquired about her retirement plans, she testified that she could only be sure that he had done so two times. Baker Dep. at 41-42.
2. Baker's Indirect Proof
Baker refers to SSA's reclassification of her from manager of a small SSA store to assistant manager of the new store as a "demotion." Although the parties dispute whether SSA actually demoted Baker or simply reclassified her to a different title, it is undisputed that the alleged change in status occurred during a RIF. Indeed, SSA made a business decision to eliminate Baker's and Cecil's positions as managers of smaller Store 7346 and Store 6053. This is not a case where SSA then redistributed those duties among the corporate workforce; instead, it completely eliminated those positions and their corresponding duties. Because SSA's decision to either demote or reclassify Baker was done pursuant to a RIF, one element Baker must establish to make her prima facie case is that similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably. Michas, 209 F.3d at 693. SSA contends that Baker cannot establish a prima facie case because it treated the only other similarly situated employee, Cecil (age 34), in the exact same manner: it reclassified her as an assistant manager. Baker disagrees. According to her, Mason (age 39) was the only other employee that was similarly situated and SSA treated her more favorably by allowing her to become manager of the rebuilt Store 7346.
To establish that another employee was similarly situated, Baker must show that the "comparables are similarly situated in all respects." Spath v. Hayes Wheels International Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2000). Baker claims that Mason, who took over as manager of the rebuilt Store 7346, was similarly situated to her because: (1) they both had the job classification of "Supervisor II"; (2) they both made the same salary; and (3) although the volume was higher at the rebuilt store, the job duties of a manager remained the same. Even assuming Baker and Mason had the same title and made the same amount of money, it does not necessarily follow that they were similarly situated in all respects.
For example, Mason had been managing one of SSA's newer, high-volume prototype stores in Plainfield. In Blanos' opinion, managing a larger store such as Plainfield or the rebuilt Store 7346 was a "very different business" that required greater people skills and managerial abilities than were required to manage SSA's smaller stores. Indeed, a manager of one of the newer stores was responsible for a larger amount of money and merchandise. Morever, the new store had twelve employees — including four assistant managers — while the old store had just four to six employees. The value of the new store's inventory was eight times greater than that of the smaller store, and the new store had a new POS computer system that replaced the old registers used in the smaller stores. Finally, SSA considered it a promotion for a manager of one of its small stores to take a larger store, while it considered Mason's move to the rebuilt Store 7346 — from a similar "superstore" in Plainfield — as only a lateral transfer. In sum, the undisputed facts show that a manager of one of SSA's "superstores" had significantly greater duties and responsibilities than managers of the smaller stores. As a result, Baker and Mason were not similarly situated.
That leaves Baker with Cecil, the only other employee affected by SSA's decision to close its smaller Crawfordsville stores and rebuild Store 7346. Cecil, age 34 during the relevant time period, was the manager of Store 6053. The parties dispute whether Cecil and Baker were similarly situated. The Court need not address the issue, however, because Baker loses either way. If Cecil were similarly situated, it is undisputed that SSA treated her in the exact same manner: it reclassified her as an assistant manager. Thus, Baker's prima facie case fails because there is no evidence that SSA treated similarly situated younger employees more favorably.
Similarly, if Cecil was not similarly situated, Baker's case still fails because she has no other evidence of a similarly situated employee that SSA treated more favorably. Accordingly, SSA is entitled to summary judgment on Baker's claim that its reclassification of her to assistant manager was discriminatory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Baker has failed to present sufficient evidence from which the Court could find a genuine issue of material fact on her age discrimination claims. Accordingly, SSA's motion for summary judgment on those claims is GRANTED.