Opinion
4:04-cv-00174-BAE.
April 21, 2005
ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
In this breach of employment contract (etc.) action. Reverend Julius S. Baker, Sr., alleges that defendant African Methodist Episcopal Church (the Church) and one of its bishops, defendant Phillip R. Cousin, wrongfully terminated and defamed him. Doc. # 2. In moving for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff explained that he is a "duly ordained itinerant Elder/Minister in good standing of the A.M.E. Church" and, as a "constituted [church] member," he possesses a "property right and individual interest in preventing misapplication of [Church] funds." Doc. # 3 at 1. After serving the Church for 45 years, it wrongfully terminated him after he blew the whistle on Church bishops "for their wrong-doing as well as the misapplication of A.M.E. Church funds for personal gain and personal use." Id. at 2.
In addition, Baker contends, Church leaders violated the Church's own laws, including the "A.M.E. Church Bill of Rights," the "Church Corporate By-Laws/Positive Laws and the articles of incorporation/constitution set forth in the 2000 edition of the Book of Doctrine and Discipline." Id. at 2. And, he says, they violated his civil rights, including 18 U.S C. §§ 241-242. Id at 3. Claiming no adequate remedy at law. Baker sought an Order directing the defendants to "discontinue all efforts to wrongly deny [him] employment and benefits. [He] also requested reinstatement of his position/employment and benefits," including $40,000 in " pro se acting attorney fees." Id.
The Magistrate Judge granted plaintiff leave to file this case in forma pauperis, doc. # 6, but denied his injunctive-relief motion because, inter alia, he failed to show irreparable harm. Doc. # 7. Undaunted, Baker now moves for a Writ of Mandamus and for a Temporary Injunction, doc. ## 23, while the defendants move to dismiss his case and to enter a relitigation injunction against him. Doc. # 12.
II. ANALYSIS
A. "Litigation Menace"
In one form or another, Baker has brought this case before four federal district courts, two of which have dismissed it with prejudice. See doc. # 24 at 2-4. Indeed, he has brought essentially the same case twice before this Court. The first was in 2000, when the Court dismissed it without prejudice for lack of diversity jurisdiction. See Baker v. Council of Bishops, 400CV081, doc. ## 39-40 (S.D.Ga. Dismissal entered 10/16/00). The second was in 4/04, when Baker filed Baker v. The African Methodist Episcopal Church (Etc.). 204MC002, later transferred to the Northern District. Id. doc. # 2.
Plaintiff also has filed an unrelated case here. Baker v. Equity Resident 3266 Marsh Landing, 204CV154 doc # 3 (S D Ga IFP granted 11/18/04) (Evicted from his apartment, Baker sued his landlord for denying him "due process"), and faces an F R CIV P 4(m) dismissal sanction Doc. # 6
That Court dismissed his case with prejudice following a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) frivolity determination. In so doing, it recounted a prior, with-prejudice dismissal of essentially the same case before warning Baker "that such undue litigiousness is impermissible in this Court." Baker v. The African Methodist Episcopal Church, Non-Profit, Inc and Bishop Frank C. Cummings of the 6th Episcobal (Georgia), 1:04CV1225-CC, doc. # 7 (N.D.Ga. Order entered 7/30/04).
Baker v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Non-Profit, Inc., 2002 WL 1840931 (N D.Tex 8/8/02) (unpublished), later opinion denying IFP on appeal, 2002 WL 31780866 (N D Tex 12/5/02) (unpublished). The Northern District of Georgia also cited Baker v. AME Church Judicial Council, 320 F Supp.2d 786, 789 (N.D Ind 2004) (Federal district court sitting in Indiana lacked diversity jurisdiction over breach of employment contract claim by church elder residing in Georgia against attorney/minister residing in Indiana and church judicial council, even assuming there was sufficient amount in controversy, case could not have been brought in Indiana state court because events allegedly establishing and eventually breaching contract occurred outside Indiana)
And there exists yet another federal court proceeding involving the same basic claim. Baker v. Board of Incorporators, 6:92CV053-PCF, doc. # 13, 37 (M.D.Fla. Orders denying injunctive relief entered 7/8/92 and 7/17/92). Within that proceeding are found references to similar, 1991 Florida state court litigation. Though it is, due to the lack of online documentation, unclear what precisely Baker alleged there, the description by his opponent in his appeal from the Middle District's order (denying him injunctive relief on the same wrongful-termination-failure-to-reinstate claim) provides revealing details:
This dispute arises out of Baker's membership and ministerial status with the Appellee. African Methodist Episcopal Church. Baker filed his lawsuit alleging that he had been denied certain rights and privileges as a member and minister of the A.M.E. Church. In the complaint, Baker alleged that he had been denied certain rights and benefits and that as a result, he had suffered damages.
Subsequent to the filing of his lawsuit, Baker filed several for injunctive relief in which he sought to have the district court direct the A.M.E. Church to reinstate him as a minister and to restore his membership rights so that he would be allowed to vote and participate at the A.M.E. Church's General Conference. . . .
Prior to filing his complaint in the district court, Baker had twice filed civil actions against the A.M.E. Church in the state circuit courts of Gadsden County, Florida. In the state court actions, Baker made virtually identical allegations to those raised in the district court below. In both state court proceedings, the trial judges dismissed Baker's claims with prejudice See Reverend Julius Baker, Sr vs Phillip R. Cousins, et al., Florida Second Judicial Circuit (Gadsden County), Case No: 91-10, and Reverend Julius S Baker, Sr vs. Dr A J Richardson, Florida Second Judicial Circuit (Gadsden County), Case No: 91-142.
8/16/93 Brief of Appellees, 1993 WL 13131954 (footnote omitted), contained within Baker v. Board of Incorporators, 19 F.3d 1445 (Table) (11th Cir. 3/31/94) (affirming w/o opinion district court's denial of injunctive relief); see also Baker v. Cousin, 609 So.2d 41 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 12/3/92) (affirming lower court ruling w/o opinion); Baker v. Richardson, 608 So.2d 811 (Table) (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 11/23/92) (same).
The federal courts that have dismissed Baker's cases on the merits have repeatedly explained to him that courts cannot enmesh themselves in church matters, much less resolve questions of church law. See, e.g., Baker 1:04CV1225-CC, doc. # 7 at 5-6 (N.D.Ga.). Baker's response has been to ignore basic res judicata doctrine and re-file the same case, with minor changes (sometimes he sues a local bishop), in another court.
Worse, in many of these filings Baker has successfully shifted his case-filing cost to the taxpayers by pursuing IFP status He thus has evidenced a determination to repeatedly sue on the same, now-frivolous cause of action, in part at the taxpayers' expense. The implied message he thus sends with each new lawsuit is that he will keep suing his church all around the nation, and there is nothing it can do because (a) no court will stop him; (b) the taxpayers are actually subsidizing part of his efforts; and (c) he is judgment-proof.
Baker has (in his IFP filings) repeatedly sworn under oath that he is a pauper. The attached "U S Party/Case Index" printout reflects a "Julius S Baker, Sr" in four different bankruptcy cases filed between 1989-2001.
B. Res Judicata
As the Eleventh Circuit explained:
[R]es judicata can be applied only if all of four factors are shown: (1) the prior decision must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases must involve the same causes of action.EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotes, cites and alterations omitted). Here both the Church and Cousins have been sued by Baker before, and on the same cause of action (wrongful termination). While Baker has sometimes recharacterized his claims, in substance he brings the same claim over and over again, occasionally substituting a different bishop as an individual defendant. The instant defendants are therefore entitled to a res judicata dismissal with prejudice. See also Vines v. Univ. of La at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 712-13 (5th Cir. 2005).
Baker sometimes varies his lawsuits by suing a different bishop, but the core allegation (that his church wrongfully discharged him — and has since wrongfully failed to reinstate him — after he whistleblew alleged defalcations) has remained the same, coupled with a generalized allegation that the named bishop conspired with the Church to visit various injustices upon him.
C. Relitigation Injunction
The defendants are also entitled to a relitigation injunction Though Baker has filed far fewer lawsuits than the plaintiff declared a "litigation menace" in Johnson v. Barnes, 283 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (S.D.Ga. 2003). he nevertheless fits that profile, for it is the pattern and malicious intent, and not the sheer number of lawsuits filed, that supports such a finding. "It is therefore time to end [Baker's] litigation war once and for all." Id
Note that the litigant in that case has since violated this Court's relitigation injunction and is currently being prosecuted for criminal contempt of court Johnson v. Barnes, 203CV130 doc # 21 (S.D Ga Order entered 12/20/04)
Injunctions in this context can be grounded in, inter alia, the Court's inherent power and its authority under F.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S C. § 1927. See 5A WRIGHT MILLER, FED. PRAC. PROC. CIV.3D § 1336 (2004). "[W]hen bad-faith conduct can be sanctioned adequately under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a specific statute, a district court should rely on those other sources of authority rather than the inherent power of the court." Id at 629. This Court will blend the exercise of its inherent power with its invocation of Rule 11, in that the latter employs a useful notice mechanism See Johnson, 283 F.Supp.2d at 1301 n. 2.
"[R]ule 11 imposes a standard of good faith and reasonable investigation on both attorneys and pro se litigants, although the pro se status of a litigant should be taken into consideration in determining whether the rule has been violated" 95 A L R FED 107 § 6(a)
Bearing in mind that "[t]he central goal of [F.R.Civ.P.] 11 is to deter abusive litigation practices," Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1013 (7th Cir. 2004), Baker must show, within 21 days of the date this Order is served upon him, why the Court should not invoke its inherent power and F.R Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(B) authority to permanently enjoin him from, either directly or indirectly, litigating against the African Methodist Episcopal Church (the Church) or any of its members, employees or agents, any further in any court. See Smith v. Woosley, 399 F.3d 428, 431-34 (2nd Cir. 2005) (under 28 U.S.C. § 2283, federal court can enjoin relitigation in any court, including state courts, and protect the judgment of its own judgment as well as other district court judgments); Vines, 398 F.3d at 704-05; Mazur v. Woodson, 191 F.Supp.2d 676, 684 (E.D.Va. 2002) (sanctions in the form of a pre-filing injunction against repeat-litigation filers).
Where a party opponent files a Rule 11 motion, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) allows an offending party a 21-day "safe harbor" within which to correct or withdraw his Rule-11 violative filing and thus avoid Rule-11 sanctions See Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A G, 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir 2003) But when a court sua sponte invokes the rule under Rule 11(c)(1)(B), it "must employ (1) a 'show-cause' order to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, and (2) a higher standard ('akin to contempt') than in the case of party-initiated sanctions." Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1255 Baker therefore must, within 21 days of the date this Order is served upon him, show this Court that he did not, objectively speaking, file the instant case in bad faith. See id at n 2, see also 5A WRIGHT MILLER: FEDERAL PRAC PROC CIV 3D § 1337 ( Procedural Aspects Of Rule 11 Motions Due Process) (2004)
Baker also should show why the Court should not sua sponte impose a $500.00 sanction against him. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M A N Gutehoffnungshutte, 141 F.3d 1434, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (In order for Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed for excessive relitigation of issue already decided by court, disputed issue must have been clearly decided by court's earlier orders, and relitigation of issue must clearly offer no meritorious new arguments); id ("An improper purpose may be shown by excessive persistence in pursuing a claim or defense in the face of repeated adverse rulings"), St Amant v. Bernard, 859 F.2d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Repeat litigation of identical claims over identical subject matter may support an inference that the litigation was meant to harass opposing parties"); Lewin v. Cooke, 95 F.Supp.2d 513, 527 (E.D.Va. 2000) (Rule 11 monetary sanctions would be imposed against plaintiff for filing of frivolous suit against defendants; claims asserted in suit were substantively identical to those previously dismissed on the merits, and litigation history indicated improper purpose to harass defendants and further plaintiff's quest for revenge), aff'd., 28 Fed. Appx. 186 (4th Cir. 2002).
This would not be a criminal contempt fine, which would otherwise require related procedural protections, but a Rule 11 sanction Courts use Rule 11 both to sanction and deter patently frivolous litigants, while courts invoke criminal contempt to punish those who willfully disobey court orders. See In re DeVille, 361 F 3d 539, 553 (9th Cir 2004) ("It is clear that the [Rule 11] rulemakers did not have in mind the criminal contempt process" when drafting Rule 11)
Upon entry of the relitigation injunction, the Court will grant Baker leave to file with this Court only (1) a Notice of Appeal ( i e. he is free to appeal this Order and Judgment); (2) any legitimate, appeal-related pleadings; and (3) any responses to any further defense filings.
Finally, Baker should show why the Court should not publish this opinion so that any future Baker litigant targets may move this Court to impose contempt sanctions (if monetary sanctions do not work then the Court will consider an initial one-year incarceration) against him for violating the injunction.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff Reverend Julius S. Baker, Sr.'s Complaint WITH PREJUDICE. In addition. Baker is directed to show cause, within 21 days of the date this Order is served, why the Court should not enjoin and sanction him as set forth in Part II (C) supra.