Opinion
January 5, 1932.
February 3, 1932.
Courts — Jurisdiction — Federal and state courts — District — Words and phrases — Corporation — Foreign corporations — Action of trespass — Act of Congress of 1920, U.S. Code, title 46, section 668, 41 Stat. at Large 1007.
1. Under section 33 of the Act of Congress of 1920, 41 Stat. at Large 1007, which provides that in actions of trespass for injuries, jurisdiction may be under the court of the district "in which defendant resides or in which his principal office is located," the action may be brought in either a federal court or a court of common pleas of Pennsylvania, inasmuch as there are judicial districts both of the United States and of Pennsylvania.
2. An action of trespass for injuries sustained on defendant's vessel in the Delaware River in Pennsylvania, will be dismissed where it appears that the defendant is a foreign corporation having its principal office in another state.
Before FRAZER, C. J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY and DREW, JJ.
Appeal, No. 136, Jan. T., 1932, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. No. 4, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1929, No. 5629, making absolute rule to dismiss action for want of jurisdiction, in case of Anna S. Bainbridge v. Merchants Miners Transportation Company. Affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries.
Rule to dismiss action for want of jurisdiction. Before FINLETTER, P. J.
From the record it appeared that the action was brought in Philadelphia against a foreign corporation having its principal place of business in Baltimore, and that the accident happened on board of a vessel owned by defendant, in the Delaware River in Pennsylvania. Other facts appear by the opinion of the court below, as follows by FINLETTER, P. J.:
This is a suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a seaman, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.
It therefore is based upon section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, U.S. Code, title 46, section 688, 41 Statutes at Large 1007, commonly called the Jones Act.
Defendant raised the question of jurisdiction by petition presented immediately after the filing of plaintiff's statement. Until the statement was filed, defendant could not know whether or not plaintiff's intended claim was under the Merchant Marine Act. The summons might relate to any action of trespass. When by the statement it was evident that plaintiff had elected to proceed under the act, defendant made prompt objection to the jurisdiction.
Before the passage of the Jones Act seamen possessed the following remedies: (1) an action in rem in the federal courts for maintenance and cure, wages, and indemnity, if the vessel is unseaworthy; (2) an action in personam in either federal or state courts for the like causes; to which is added by section 33 of the Jones Act an action for damages for negligence in either the state or federal courts.
It was determined in Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 813, that jurisdiction is concurrent in both state and federal courts.
Question is raised in the instant case whether the jurisdiction of the state courts is limited to the district of the residence of the defendant, or, in the case of a corporation, to the district of its principal office; or whether, on the other hand, all state courts are open to such claims.
The answer depends upon the interpretation of the last part of section 33, which provides: "Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides, or in which his principal office is located."
It is argued by plaintiff that the provision cited above was held in the Engel Case, and others, to prescribe only the venue of actions brought in the federal courts. It is true that they do hold that actions brought in the federal courts must be in the district of residence, but it does not follow, and was not held, that actions brought in state courts were not subject to the same limitation.
The legislative reasons for limiting the new right of action in federal courts to the residence of the defendant apply with equal force to actions brought in state courts.
Much is made by the plaintiff of the use of the word "district" in the act, it being argued that that word has special significance and limitation to federal districts. It is not in fact so limited. And it is not true, as argued by plaintiff, that federal courts alone have districts. For example, our own court is "The Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania."
In Petterson v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Fed. (2) 219, Judge HAND said: "The clause 'the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides' fits a state court properly enough because the word 'district' will answer the local jurisdiction of such a court as well as a federal district. The use of the singular is not significant, since the phrase 'the court' may have been used distributively, i. e., 'any court.' Besides, the earlier express provisions leave no doubt."
In Caceres v. U.S. Shipping Board, 299 Fed. 968, suit was brought in a New York state court. The action was removed to the federal court, and was there dismissed because the defendant's principal office was not in New York, the court saying, "The motion to dismiss the complaint . . . . . . must be granted, not in the exercise of discretion, but under the express provisions of the Merchant Marine Act." A similar result followed in Wienbroer v. U.S. Shipping Board, 299 Fed. 272.
In our opinion we have no jurisdiction because the principal office of the defendant is not within the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania.
Rule absolute.
Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned was the order, quoting it.
Edwin J. McDermott, with him William Charles Brown, for appellant.
James W. West, 3d, and Frank H. Massey, 2d, for appellee, were not heard.
Argued January 5, 1932.
The order of the court below dismissing this action for want of jurisdiction is affirmed on the opinion of Judge FINLETTER, which clearly and adequately discusses the question involved.
Judgment affirmed.