Opinion
No. 1D19-4242
05-12-2021
Yarnell Rashard BAGLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Appellant was convicted of robbery, first-degree murder, and tampering with physical evidence. The victim was fatally shot on his walk home from the neighborhood convenience store. Appellant argues the trial court improperly admitted a witness's prior consistent statement. We disagree and affirm.
We review the trial court's ruling, which is fact-intensive, for an abuse of discretion. Johnston v. State , 863 So. 2d 271, 278 (Fla. 2003). Generally, prior consistent statements are inadmissible to corroborate or bolster a witness's trial testimony. Bradley v. State , 787 So. 2d 732, 743 (Fla. 2001). But prior consistent statements may be admissible as non-hearsay when "the person who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning that statement; and the statement is offered to ‘rebut an express or implied charge ... of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.’ " Id. (quoting Chandler v. State , 702 So. 2d 186, 197–98 (Fla. 1997) ); see § 90.801(2), Fla. Evid. Code (2020). Additionally, the prior consistent statement must have been made before the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, corruption, or other motive to falsify. J.B.J. v. State , 17 So. 3d 312, 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
The witness testified at trial that on the night of the robbery and murder she was in a car with Appellant and three other men. She testified Appellant left the car with a gun. After a few minutes, she heard gunshots. Later that night, Appellant got back into the car and stated he killed the victim because the victim thought the robbery was a joke. The men threatened to kill her if she told anyone.
The witness told a friend about what she observed that night. After her friend informed law enforcement, officers questioned the witness. At first, because she was scared and did not want to be involved, she told the officers several different versions of the events she witnessed. She testified that she told the truth after the officers asked her, "If I put you on the lie detector, are you going to pass?"
On cross-examination, the defense questioned the witness's testimony to law enforcement and testimony at trial. The defense asked her whether the officers told her that "everybody else is in jail except you" and whether they corrected her and asked her to restate what they told her. The defense also asked if she changed her version of events as a result of the officers’ statements. She replied that she told the truth. The defense's questions were obviously meant to discredit the witness by asking whether law enforcement improperly influenced the witness's testimony through implied threats and improper coaching.
The State sought to admit her prior consistent statement to her friend to rebut the defense's accusation that the officers improperly influenced her testimony. Therefore, her statement was made before the existence of the facts giving rise to the charge of fabrication because the statement was made before she spoke to the officers. See Fleitas v. State , 3 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding trial court did not err by admitting victim's prior statement to detective that predated the alleged improper influence or recent fabrication and that were used to rebut the defense's contention that the victim's testimony was not credible); cf. Peterson v. State , 874 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce witness's prior consistent statement to a detective when the witness made the statement after the facts giving rise to the charge of fabrication existed). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior consistent statement to rebut the allegation that law enforcement improperly influenced the witness's testimony.
AFFIRMED .
Winokur and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.