Opinion
No. 5-102 / 04-0823
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cherokee County, Don E. Courtney, Judge.
Appellants appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in the defendant's favor and dismissing their action for injunctive relief. AFFIRMED.
George W. Wittgraf of Sayre, Wittgraf Meloy, Cherokee, for appellants.
John A. Wibe, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On October 7, 2003, the Cherokee County Board of Supervisors (Board) held a zoning public meeting to consider a request by Barry Johnson, as a representative of Little Sioux Raceway, Inc., to rezone certain property from agricultural to light industrial. The members of the Board were LeRoy Schoon, Ronald Wetherell, Edwin Clow, Jim Peck, and Jeff Simonsen.
Johnson proposed building a racetrack on the property. Several opponents to the racetrack spoke at the hearing. David Phipps, a former Board member, noted Johnson had not addressed engineering, financial, or site plans, or requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The minutes of the meeting then show:
It was moved by Schoon seconded by Clow to deny the rezoning recommendation presented by the Zoning Board and refer the application back to the Zoning Board so applicant can furnish site plans and evidence of compliance with State DOT and DNR requirements. Roll call vote; Simonsen aye; Wetherell nay; Schoon aye; Peck aye; Clow aye. Motion carried.
On October 14, 2003, the Board approved the minutes of the October 7 meeting.
In January 2004 plaintiffs filed a petition for an injunction. They pointed out that Article 8 of the Cherokee County Zoning Regulations provides:
Whenever a Petition requesting an amendment, supplement or change has been denied by the Board of Supervisors, such Petition, or one substantially similar, shall not be reconsidered sooner than one (1) year after the previous denial.
Plaintiffs claimed the Board had denied Johnson's rezoning request at the October 7, 2003, meeting. They sought to prohibit the Board from reconsidering the rezoning request until October 2004.
The Board filed a motion for summary judgment, stating the Board had not denied the rezoning request, but had "tabled" it. The Board attached affidavits from the members of the Board, who all stated they did not intend to deny the rezoning application. The Board members agreed they had sent the matter back to the zoning commission for further study, and then it would again be submitted to the Board.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The court concluded:
[T]he court finds that all of the members of Defendant clearly intended to table Raceway's rezoning application when they sent it back to the zoning commission for review of an expanded site plan on October 7, 2003. The court concludes that Defendant effectively tabled the application at that time and, thus, the one-year provision in Article 8 of the Cherokee County Zoning Regulations does not apply. Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Some of the plaintiffs have appealed.
II. Standard of Review
A request for an injunction invokes the district court's equitable jurisdiction. Sear v. Clayton County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 1999). On an appeal from an entry of summary judgment, however, our review is not de novo. Coralville Hotel Assocs., L.C. v. City of Coralville, 684 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 2004). "The proper scope of review of a case in equity resulting in summary judgment is for correction of errors of law." Id.
Summary judgment will be upheld when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Smith v. Shagnasty's, 688 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 2004).
III. Analysis
Appellants contend the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the Board. They assert the minutes of the Board's meeting clearly show the rezoning proposal was denied, and under Cherokee's zoning regulations the Board cannot consider the matter for one year. Appellants claim the district court should not have considered the extrinsic evidence of the Board members' affidavits.
We may consider the meaning of a Board's minutes. See Build-A-Rama, Inc. v. Peck, 475 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991) (finding a Board of Adjustment had granted defendant a variance, not a special use permit). Generally, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning. Lauridsen v. City of Okoboji Bd. of Adjustment, 554 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Iowa 1996). However, words should not be interpreted in isolation. Iowa Fuel Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991). We consider words in the context in which they are used. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., Iowa Dep't of Commerce, 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004); Nash Finch Co. v. City Council of City of Cedar Rapids, 672 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 2003).
Thus, we do not consider the word "deny" in isolation. See Iowa Fuel, 471 N.W.2d at 863. In order to consider the word "deny" in context, we consider the entire entry regarding the Board's action on the rezoning request in this case. Considered in context, it is clear the Board did not intend to deny the request made by Little Sioux Raceway, Inc., but instead intended to send it back to the zoning commission for further consideration. The minutes state the application is referred back to the zoning commission, which the Board would not have done if it had meant to deny the request outright. We are able to reach this conclusion based solely on the Board's minutes, and therefore, we do not consider the extrinsic evidence of the Board members' affidavits.
We determine the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Board.