Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2598 (AK).
February 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [16] ("Pl. Motion), the Defendant's Opposition [17] ("Def. Opposition"), and Plaintiff's Reply [20] ("Pl. Reply") as well as the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [15] ("Def. Motion"), the Plaintiff's Opposition [18] ("Pl. Opposition"), and the Defendant's Reply [19] ("Def. Reply"). At issue in this case is a decision by a hearing officer in a Due Process hearing conducted on October 17 and 30 of 2003. The issue for the Hearing Officer was whether the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") had denied C.A., a minor student, a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"). The hearing officer concluded that DCPS had not denied FAPE to C.A., and that decision is the subject of the current action. I. BACKGROUND
C.A. is a minor child born on June 5, 1999. Through the DCPS's Early intervention Program, a plan was created to provide special instruction and psychological consultation from Out Came the Sun, as well as speech therapy from the Kids Communication Center. C.A.'s mother was a participant in these determinations. On June 3, 2002, a Transition Plan was created to provide C.A. with speech therapy, special instruction, and occupational therapy. On August 20, 2002, a multi-disciplinary team ("MDT") concluded that C.A.'s only disability was delayed speech and put in place an educational plan which was designed to provide the child with speech language training for one hour twice a week at Stoddert Elementary School.
On November 14, 2002, another IEP meeting was convened to determine C.A.'s eligibility for special education. It was determined that the child was to receive 5 hours of specialized instruction per week. To achieve this goal, the team's plan recommended that the child be placed at Stoddert Elementary School. The parents did not agree with the placement and wanted their son to remain at Barbara's Montessori School, where he was then enrolled.
A third MDT meeting was held on January 23, 2003 to discuss placement for C.A. In addition to the Stoddert school, three alternative placements were proposed. C.A.'s parents did not agree with these placements.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
A Court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although a Court should draw all reasonable inferences from the records submitted by the nonmoving party, the mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is insufficient to bar summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The adverse party's pleadings must demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id., To be genuine, the issue must be supported by sufficiently admissible evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. In determining materiality, the factual assertion must be capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See id.; See also Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In Celotex, the Supreme Court instructed that the "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.
The IDEA provides for judicial review in state and federal court for "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" rendered in a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(A). The Court employs a "preponderance of the evidence" standard in performing such judicial review. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i.)(2)(B)(iii); See also Lenn v. Portland School Committee, 998 F.2d 1083 (1 Cir. 1993).
Pursuant to the IDEA, "the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(B). Neither party here has requested the court to hear additional evidence; accordingly, the "motion[s] for summary judgment [are] simply the procedural vehicle for asking a judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record." Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7 Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The party challenging the Hearing Officer's determination bears the burden of persuading the court that the HOD was incorrect. Angevine v. Smith, 959 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court should not "reverse the hearing officer's findings simply because [the court] disagree[s] with them." Board of Education of Arlington Heights School District No. 25 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994, *12 (N.D.Ill. March 19, 2001). The Court may make an independent determination but "it must also give 'due weight' to the administrative proceeding and afford some deference to the expertise of the hearing officer and school officials responsible for the child's education." Lyons v. Smith, 829 F.Supp. 414, 418 (D.D.C. 1993). The district court reviewing an HOD should "defer to the hearing officer's factual findings based on credibility judgment unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence on the record would justify a contrary conclusion." S.H. v. State-Operated School Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-271 (3 Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Under the IDEA, when a claim is made that a minor child's rights under the IDEA have been violated, the parents "shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency." 20 U.S.C. 1415 (f)(1). It is clear to the Court, and undisputed by the parties that such a hearing took place on the 17th and 30th of October 2003. ( See Record at Bates # 000001.) Following that hearing, a Hearing Officer's Determination and Order was issued on November 21, 2003.
Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415 (i)(2)(A), any aggrieved party may file a civil action contesting the findings of the Hearing Officer. In the Court's capacity as a reviewing body of the Hearing Officer's determination, the Court will not supplant its views for that of the hearing officer with regard to factual findings made from evidence presented or from the record before the hearing officer. See S.H. v. State-Operated School Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-271 (3rd Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court defers to the Hearing Officer's factual findings unless "the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence on the record would justify a contrary conclusion." Id.
After conducting the 'Due Process Hearing,' the Hearing Officer in this case concluded that there existed "insufficient evidence that DCPS failed to consider the student's needs in developing an IEP and determining an appropriate placement." (HOD at 6, Bates # 000007.) The Hearing Officer further found that, "[i]n view of the evidence through the disclosures and the testimony of witnesses DCPS develop[ed]an IEP for the student and determined an appropriate placement, consequently, DCPS met its burden that it had not denied the student FAPE." (Id.) Absent from the HOD is a factual evidentiary predicate for his conclusions. Without any specific reference to the administrative record, the Court cannot review these conclusions to determine whether they are justified based on the record.
The Plaintiff's argues that "the hearing officer could not find that Stoddert was an appropriate placement." (Pl. Motion at 13.) The Hearing Officer specifically concluded that the placement was appropriate without explaining the factual bases for his finding. Therefore, the Court, based on the record and the HOD, cannot find that the DCPS failed to provide a FAPE to C.A., nor can the Court find that C.A. was afforded a FAPE. In short, the Hearing Officer's conclusory findings stymie this Court's ability to decide this case in either parties favor at this time.
For these reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED without prejudice, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED without prejudice, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this case be remanded to the Hearing Officer for an explanation of the bases for his findings. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that this review be conducted within 60 days of this Order, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Hearing Officer need not be bound by his prior conclusions but may, upon conducting a re-review of the record, make conclusions and findings in conformity with, or at odd with, those of his November 21, 2003 Order, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that if Hearing Officer Smith is no longer available to conduct said review, that the DCPS shall promptly find a suitable officer to conduct the review in his stead.