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Aranda v. Shannon

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
May 11, 2016
DOCKET NO. A-0534-14T3 (App. Div. May. 11, 2016)

Opinion

DOCKET NO. A-0534-14T3

05-11-2016

KELLY ARANDA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MCKENZIE SHANNON and LESLIE SHANNON, Defendants. CHARLES P. INGENITO, Intervenor-Appellant.

Charles P. Ingenito, appellant pro se. Raff & Raff, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A. Levy, on the brief).


NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Manahan. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2844-12. Charles P. Ingenito, appellant pro se. Raff & Raff, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A. Levy, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Charles P. Ingenito appeals from an order entered by the Law Division judge denying a claim for a quantum meruit recovery of attorneys' fees after plaintiff Kelly Aranda, his former client, settled an underlying personal injury action represented by new counsel. Given the motion judge's failure to provide the requisite statement of reasons for the decision per Rule 1:7-4, we reverse and remand.

We recite a summary of the underlying facts and procedural history for the purpose of context. On April 10, 2010, plaintiff was involved in a car accident where her vehicle was rear-ended. Plaintiff suffered injuries to her lower back and retained Ingenito to represent her in a lawsuit against the driver. Ingenito was disbarred in October 2013 while the lawsuit was pending. Plaintiff then retained Raff & Raff, LLP, as her attorneys. Trial was scheduled for April 28, 2014, and Raff & Raff appeared on plaintiff's behalf. A conference was held immediately before trial, and the parties reached a settlement.

Following the settlement, on July 11, 2014, plaintiff moved for an order to determine what portion of the attorneys' fees, if any, was owed to Ingenito. Plaintiff's position was that Ingenito was entitled to his actual costs and only a nominal fee, if any, because the case could have been dismissed with prejudice due to the lack of a physician certificate of permanency. Ingenito purportedly submitted an email in opposition to plaintiff's motion, claiming to have completed significant work on the case and that Raff & Raff was only entitled to ten percent of the fee. No hearing or oral argument was held by the judge on the motion.

The email is from Ingenito and sent to Ingenito's email address, but is addressed to the trustee handling matters concerning his disbarment, the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, the Passaic County motion's clerk, the judge, the Bergen County Courthouse, and Raff & Raff. In his email, he asks the court to "accept this [email] as [his] affidavit[.]"

Oral argument was not requested by plaintiff in her notice of motion.

On July 11, 2014, the judge issued an order denying Ingenito's quantum meruit claim for attorneys' fees. The judge did not issue an accompanying written or oral statement of reasons for entry of the order. The order was marked "unopposed[.]" On July 18, 2014, Ingenito submitted an email in response to the order attempting to clarify that the motion was opposed. From the record, it is unclear whether there was a reply from plaintiff or the judge to Ingenito's emails. This appeal followed.

Again, the email was from Ingenito and sent to Ingenito's own email address, and was addressed to the same parties as the June 27, 2014 email. --------

Among other arguments, Ingenito asserts that he submitted the affidavit of compliance and fulfilled the requirements of Rule 1:20-20(b)(15). While failure to comply with that Rule may have been a valid basis for denying Ingenito any recovery, the judge gave no explanation for his order. Thus, it is unclear if compliance with the Rule was considered.

As required by Rule 1:7-4, trial judges must "by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right . . . ." See also Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006) (requiring an adequate explanation of the basis for a court's action); R. 1:6-2(f) (requiring a statement of reasons for the entry of interlocutory orders). The failure to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law "constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)).

We have repeatedly noted that fact-finding is important in determining quantum meruit recovery of discharged lawyers. In Glick v. Barclays De Zoete Wedd, Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 299, 311 (App. Div. 1997), we declined to determine whether two lawyers could be compensated under quantum meruit recovery "because the trial judge did not permit a plenary hearing on [the] issue[,]" and did not make any "findings as to the reason for the lawyers' discharge, thus leaving a record devoid of evidence upon which the issue could be resolved." As noted in La Mantia v. Durst, 234 N.J. Super. 534, 543 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 181 (1989), the judge should develop a record and make findings of fact "so as to assure that there is both a fair accommodation of client interests and recognition of the true worth of the inception and preparation phase of a litigated matter."

Here, the judge failed to set forth his reasons for determining that Ingenito was not entitled to quantum meruit recovery, as required by the Rule. The July 11, 2014 order was marked unopposed, but fact-findings and conclusions of law are required even when deciding an unopposed motion. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 300-01 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that judges are not relieved from the obligation to set forth facts and make conclusions of law when a summary judgment motion is unopposed).

We are therefore constrained to remand for further fact-finding and a statement of reasons by the judge. Given our determination, we have not addressed the merits of the substantive issues raised on appeal.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION


Summaries of

Aranda v. Shannon

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
May 11, 2016
DOCKET NO. A-0534-14T3 (App. Div. May. 11, 2016)
Case details for

Aranda v. Shannon

Case Details

Full title:KELLY ARANDA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MCKENZIE SHANNON and LESLIE…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Date published: May 11, 2016

Citations

DOCKET NO. A-0534-14T3 (App. Div. May. 11, 2016)