Opinion
Case No. 2:03CV494TC
September 24, 2003
ORDER
On May 27, 2003, Defendant Risk Management Alternatives, Inc. ("Risk Management") filed a Notice of Removal of this action from the Third District Court for the State of Utah. On June 2, 2003, Risk Management filed an Amended Notice of Removal, in which Defendants Robert Thorup, American Express Co., Inc., and Ray, Quinney Nebeker joined. The remaining Defendants (Save Your Back Therapy Supply (SYB) Centers, Inc., Sleep Wellness Center Sandy, and Wendell Martens) were not joined in the notice of removal because, apparently, they had not yet been served by the Plaintiff. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone. Inc., 204 F. Supp.2d 1149, 1152 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (requiring only served defendants to consent to removal of action). Plaintiff Timothy P. Apgood filed an Objection to Removal on June 27, 2003 (hereinafter "Objection"). The removing Defendants filed briefs in opposition to Apgood's Objection. Oral argument would not be helpful to the court, and the court will make its decision based on the parties' briefs in this matter.
Defendants have raised a question regarding the date Apgood actually filed his Objection to Removal with this court. For purposes of analysis, the court assumes Apgood's Objection was timely.
Apgood alleges ten causes of action, one of which is a federal claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The other nine causes of action are brought under state law. Apgood does not dispute that this court has subject matter jurisdiction ( i.e., federal question jurisdiction) over Apgood's FDCPA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Apgood's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Apgood argues that the court should remand all claims back to state court for the following reasons: (1) the Utah State Court has concurrent jurisdiction over Apgood's FDCPA claim; (2) only one of the ten claims is based on federal law; (3) the State of Utah has a strong interest in having the case adjudicated in state court; and (4) Defendant Risk Management failed to join all defendants in its petition for removal. Objection at 1-2.
The removing Defendants argue that Apgood's request for remand was untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). They also assert that the Notice (and Amended Notice) of Removal properly joined all defendants who had been served at the time of removal.
See infra note 1.
There is no question that the court has subject matter and supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff s causes of action. The removing Defendants submitted a procedurally proper Amended Notice of Removal. This court may not decline to hear the FDCPA claim. "[F]ederal courts have a `virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise jurisdiction given them." Todd v. DSN Dealer Serv. Network. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (D. Kan. 1994) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); see also, e.g., Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that district court did not have discretion to remand entire case including properly removed federal claim).
For the foregoing reasons, this court has and hereby exercises jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's claims, and Plaintiff's request for remand to the state court is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.