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In Anderson the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the granting by the trial court based on findings that the plaintiff had presented a prima facie case and, perhaps more importantly, that the dismissal was based on the erroneous exclusion of certain evidence.
Summary of this case from B. Samuel v. Xavier U.Opinion
No. 84-C-0568.
January 14, 1985.
APPEAL FROM EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WINN, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE HIRAM J. WRIGHT, J.
James D. Caldwell, Culpepper, Teat, Caldwell Avery, Jonesboro, for applicant.
J.P. Mauffray, Jr., Jena, for respondent.
We granted writs in this case to review the trial judge's granting a defense motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case in this judge tried lawsuit. An accident with resulting property damage and personal injury occurred when plaintiffs' automobile struck a cow on U.S. Highway 84, just outside of Winnfield, Louisiana on September 15, 1981.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the district court after appeal by plaintiffs. 445 So.2d 113 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1984).
Liability in this lawsuit was predicated on defendant's alleged breach of R.S. 3:2803 and of Civil Code Articles 2315, 2316, 2317, and 2321. R.S. 3:2803 provides "No person owning livestock shall knowingly, willfully, or negligently permit his livestock to go at large upon the following public highways of the state: . . . (10) U.S. 84 . . . Jct. U.S. 71, at Clarence, to Jct. U.S. 65 at Ferriday."
The pertinent contested issue was whether the defendant W.A. McCarty owned the cow. In this respect two distinct evidentiary matters have drawn the attention of the Court. What, if any, were the markings used by defendant on his cattle? And were defendant's markings found on the cow which was killed in the automobile collision?
Defendant's trial testimony indicated that at the time of the accident he maintained at least sixty head of cattle, which had access to grazing on the property adjoining the area of Highway 84 where the accident occurred. With respect to any identifying markings used by the defendant on his cattle, defendant testified that years ago he had a brand registered in Baton Rouge, which had long since expired, and a stock mark, recorded at the Winn Parish Courthouse about 1930, which he assumed was taken off the records since he had "quit marking." Defendant denied ever registering any other marks or brands or authorizing anyone else to do so on his behalf. However, defendant also testified that his son, Howard A. McCarty, his daughter, Geraldine Taylor, and his grandsons "tend to" the cattle since he is no longer able to do so. In fact, he asserted that these relatives have an ownership interest in the cattle, which are not really considered "any person's cows just ours."
A certified copy of the record indicated that the stock mark had been voided in June, 1979, by Aubrey McCarty, also known as Howard A. McCarty. Howard A. McCarty is W.A. McCarty's son.
Plaintiff on the other hand, introduced a certified copy of a page from the Winn Parish Clerk of Court's brand book, which bore an entry signed by Howard A. McCarty. The entry, recorded July 18, 1979, reported the identifying stock mark for the cattle of W.A. McCarty (defendant here) to be "Crop off Right Ear — Underslope in Left Ear." While there may be no statutory requirement that such brand book be maintained by the parish clerk of court and no statute which, as in the case of the Livestock Brand Commission, La.Rev.Stat. 3:731 et seq., recites that a certified copy of a brand or mark registered under its provisions "shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership of the animal by the person whose brand or mark it may be," (La.Rev.Stat. 3:743), nonetheless, the document is at least a written acknowledgement by Howard A. McCarty, defendant's son, that the stock mark of defendant W.A. McCarty was as described. And there was no valid objection to its introduction. Certainly, the brand book supports the conclusion that the defendant, or a member or members of his family marked or were to mark the "partnership . . . cows" with a crop off the right ear and an underslope in the left ear.
This stock mark was cancelled on November 25, 1981, by Howard A. McCarty, ten days after this accident occurred, according to plaintiff's exhibit #8, a certified copy of a page of the brand book, found on page 40 of the record.
Counsel for defendant neither protested the form of the evidence (i.e., neither sworn testimony nor testimony in deposition form) nor that it constituted impermissible hearsay. He protested essentially that his client took issue with the substance of the offering, by stating if he wants to introduce the document as being . . . as being public records, that is fine. But the witness has already testified, you know, that he didn't . . . he didn't do that and he didn't authorize the person who apparently did it to do it. Defendant's protest went not to admissibility but to the weight to be given the instrument in the trial court's resolution of fact in the case.
Relative to the marks on the cow involved in the collision with plaintiff's automobile, Trooper Cotton testified at trial that the markings consisted of "a crop on the right ear with a underslope on the bottom portion," a single ear marking. His proffered accident report, however, described "a young heifer with a crop on right ear and an upper slope on lower portion of left ear," a double ear marking. As concluded by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, the description contained in the accident report essentially matched that filed relative to W.A. McCarty's cattle in the Winn Parish brand book.
There is little difference between the brand book description of an "under slope in left ear" and the accident report description of an "upper slope on lower portion of left ear."
Neither this accident report nor further testimony from the trooper to correct his original misstatement, however, was permitted in evidence. When counsel for plaintiff sought to clarify the trooper's oral testimony, defense counsel's objection was sustained on the grounds that the questioning was repetitious. Furthermore, the trooper volunteered on cross-examination that his choice of words in the report in describing the cow's identifying markings was aided by advice from a livestock officer. One Bill Barber recited to Trooper Cotton the words Cotton used in the report. Defense counsel objected to introduction of the report and to any further discussion of the accident report's description of the cow on the grounds of hearsay and the stock patrolman's not being called personally as a witness. The trial judge sustained the objection.
After disallowing introduction of the trooper's accident report, the trial judge declared that the brand book registration and the trooper's testimony simply did not coincide, and thus, there was no evidence before the court that defendant owned the cow. While the judge excluded the report on the basis of the hearsay objection, he may have been motivated at least in part by a belief that the trial testimony and the report were identical with regard to the description of the brand markings. If that were his belief, or assumption, he was incorrect, for the report was distinctly different from the testimony. The Court of Appeal more than likely perceived the significance of the report to plaintiff's case, but affirmed the trial court's exclusion nonetheless. They reasoned that the report did not qualify as past recollection recorded.
Testimony from the trial transcript included these comments by the judge: And I asked the Trooper myself when he was on the stand if what he saw matched up with what he put on his report and he said it did. Same ear markings were in the upper and lower part of the ear. Even if I accept the full evidence of what cows Mr. McCarty owns from the brand registration or mark registration that is filed in evidence, they don't match. Trial transcript at 112.
Upon our review of the law and the evidence, we conclude that the report should have been admitted. It does meet the requirements of the past recollection recorded exception. The elements to be considered in determining the admissibility of past recollection recorded include:
(1) the witness's first hand knowledge of the event;
(2) recordation at or near the time of the event while the witness had a clear and accurate memory of it;
(3) lack of present recollection of the event;
This is the only requirement that might arguably be lacking in this case. As we review the testimony, however, it seems fairly clear that the trooper did not have present recollection but was reciting what he believed to be in the report, a belief that was mistaken.
(4) the witness's vouching for the accuracy of the report.
C. McCormick, Evidence 712 (2d ed. 1972). The Court of Appeal opinion rejected the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule for the reason that the trooper, in their view, was unable to vouch for the accuracy of the description contained in his report because he was not conversant with the terms of livestock marking.
Although the trooper volunteered that "I wouldn't know a crop from an upperslope or anything else," he is certainly qualified to recognize whether a cow has markings on only one ear or on both ears. On redirect examination, he made it clear that he observed the cow and the markings. The trooper simply relied on the terms provided by an experienced stockman to describe the markings which the trooper himself observed. Trooper Cotton testified, "his terms and what I saw appeared to be the same." Essentially, then, the trooper testified that he was reporting what he observed, but using the language or terms provided by the stock patrolman.
Even if the trial court's exclusion of the report were justified by the imprecise argument which accompanied its tender the report should have been admitted when offered anew by the plaintiff after defendant, on cross-examination, again explored the matter of the accident report, its contents and its validity. On redirect, plaintiff was entitled to seek an explanation of statements elicited on cross-examination (La.Rev.Stat. 15:281), statements (or testimony) which confirmed that the substance of the report was an accurate recitation of what the trooper observed at the scene. At this point, the best evidence of what was in the report was the report itself, and the trial court should have permitted its introduction at that time.
We turn now to the law on the motion for directed verdict. Until 1977, the motion for directed verdict did not exist in Louisiana civil procedure. At that time, C.C.P. art. 1810 was added by 1977 La.Acts. 699. It provided:
Art. 1810. Directed verdicts
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
As enacted, however, C.C.P. art. 1810 did not appear to contemplate the use of a directed verdict in a non-jury trial. La.Act 156 of 1978 amended art. 1810 to provide for its use in just such a situation:
B. In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
1983 La.Act 534 transferred former C.C.P. art 1810 B so that it became art. 1672 B (in a chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to Dismissal) since art. 1810 was included in the section of the code dealing alone with jury trials.
In 1980, this Court adopted the following test in determining whether or not to grant the motion for directed verdict in a jury trial:
. . . could reasonable persons, reviewing all the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff, have reached different conclusions[?] Breithaupt v. Sellers, 390 So.2d 870 (La. 1980).
There has been no case in this Court's jurisprudence addressing the rule or test for determining whether or not to grant the motion for directed verdict in a judge trial. At least two Court of Appeal decisions have addressed the issue. In Chandler v. Fuqua, 420 So.2d 1348 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1982) and Sevin v. Shape Spa, 384 So.2d 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980) the Third and Fourth Circuits respectively concluded that the judge in a judge tried case may, like his federal counterpart, grant a directed verdict for a defendant at the close of plaintiff's case, if on weighing the facts presented at that point, he would grant judgment for the defendant, and irrespective of whether plaintiff has presented a prima facie case (or some evidence as to each element required to be proved).
There are, however, contrary resolutions on this issue in the national jurisprudence. Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1972); Rogge v. Weaver, 368 P.2d 810 (Alaska, 1962); Arbenz v. Bebout, 444 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1968).
The Florida Supreme Court in Tillman v. Baskin, supra following the Alaska Supreme Court in Rogge v. Weaver, supra and citing the Wyoming Supreme Court in Arbenz v. Bebout, supra has rejected the resolution of the federal courts in the interpretation of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(B), the counterpart to Florida's Rule 1.420.
The Florida Supreme Court stated:
Federal courts apparently feel justified in permitting their trial judges to weigh evidence following the presentation of a plaintiff's prima facie case, because such a holding enables judges to "expedite the trial of cases," and "dispose of cases at the earliest opportunity." Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 6th Cir. 1945, 148 F.2d 407, 410. Their interpretation of the rule regarding involuntary dismissals, however, has not been universally accepted. Professor Roscoe Steffen of the University of Chicago Law School has called it "a misbegotten offspring of an unseemly desire for speed and hurry [which] has no place in our system of justice." 27 U. Chicago L.Rev. 94, 125 (1959). The Supreme Court of Alaska also has rejected the federal interpretation, stating:
"Where plaintiff's proof has failed in some aspect the motion should, of course, be granted. Where plaintiff's proof is overwhelming, application of the rule is made easy and the motion should be denied. But where plaintiff has presented a prima facie case based on unimpeached evidence we are of the opinion that the trial judge should not grant the motion even though he is the trier of the facts and may not himself feel at that point in the trial that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proof. We believe that in the latter situation the trial judge should follow the alternative offered by the rule wherein it is provided that he '* * * may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence', and deny the motion. If, after denial of the motion, the defendant declines to present any evidence, the judge must, of course, then exercise his own judgment in applying the law to the facts presented and rule on the motion and decide the case." Rogge v. Weaver, Alaska 1962, 368 P.2d 810, 813. Accord, Arbenz v. Bebout, Wyo. 1968, 444 P.2d 317.
It is not necessary to the resolution of this case in its present posture to decide this issue. The trial judge's grant of motion for directed verdict was prompted by an erroneous exclusion of the trooper's report. Without the report there was no proof of any sort before the court that the markings on the dead cow corresponded with the identifying marks registered to the defendant in the Parish Brand Book. Therefore, the trial judge has not had the opportunity to apply either standard — whether "reasonable persons reviewing all the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff [might] have reached different conclusions" or preponderance of the evidence — to the entire plaintiff's case, including the trooper's report. For this reason the trial court's granting of the motion for directed verdict cannot be permitted to stand.
Decree
For these reasons we reverse the trial court and Court of Appeal judgments dismissing plaintiff's suit with prejudice and remand to the trial court for resumption of trial.
REVERSED, REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT.
DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.
I respectfully dissent.
In the early evening hours of November 15, 1981, plaintiffs Marshall W. Anderson and Louise G. Anderson were driving in a westerly direction on U.S. Highway 84 just outside of Winnfield when the 1979 Ford LTD in which they were riding struck a cow allegedly belonging to defendant W.A. McCarty. According to the testimony of Mr. Anderson the cow ran onto the roadway from the left shoulder and proceeded into the path of the automobile. As a result of the collision, the automobile sustained severe damage to the front end and, according to the petition, Mr. Anderson suffered an acute lumbo sacral strain.
Plaintiffs sued defendant for the damage to their property and for personal injuries. Liability was predicated on defendant's alleged breach of R.S. 3:2803 and of Civil Code Arts. 2315, 16, 17 and 21. At trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case. The defense argued that plaintiffs failed to prove that Mr. McCarty was the owner of the wandering cow. The trial court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed both adverse rulings ( Anderson v. McCarty, 445 So.2d 113 (La.App. 1984)), and we granted writs ( 449 So.2d 1352 (La. 1984)).
"No person owning livestock shall knowingly, willfully or negligently permit his livestock to go at large upon the following public highways of the state: . . . (10). U.S. 84 Jct. U.S. 71, at Clarence, to Jct. U.S. 65 at Ferriday." R.S. 3:2803.
The central issue on appeal is whether a directed verdict was proper, given the evidence adduced from plaintiffs' case. In a case tried before a judge, a directed verdict should be granted only where the plaintiff has shown no right to relief at the close of his case. The plaintiff must establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. "Proof by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that, taking the evidence as a whole, such proof shows that the fact or cause sought to be proved is more probable than not." Prestenbach v. Sentry Insurance Co., 340 So.2d 1331, 1334 (La. 1976); Marcotte v. The Travelers Insurance Co., 258 La. 989, 249 So.2d 105 (1971).
"B. In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence." C.C.P. 1672(B), formerly Art. 1810(B).
At the close of plaintiffs' case in the instant matter, the following evidence had been elicited.
The defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had been a cattleman for a number of years and owned approximately eighty head of cattle at the time of the accident. He also testified that although he did not own the land adjacent to the site of the accident, the owner of the land did in fact allow him to graze his cattle on the land.
Plaintiffs also called Trooper Donald Cotton of the Louisiana State Police. Trooper Cotton investigated the accident and prepared a written accident report. The key portion of his trial testimony related to his observations of certain markings on the cow's ears. Defendant's stock mark was registered in the office of the Clerk of Court for Winn Parish as "crop off right ear — underslope in left ear." Defendant denied that he had registered such a marking. Trooper Cotton testified on direct examination that he observed "what they call a crop on the right ear with a underslope on the bottom portion . . . [of] that same ear." This testimony was at variance with the accident report wherein Trooper Cotton described the markings as "crop on right ear and an upperslope on lower portion of left ear." (Emphasis added).
The Winn Parish Registry shows that the marking was registered by Howard A. McCarty, defendant's son whom the defendant admitted assisted him with his cattle. The marking presumably registered to defendant, but canceled after the accident, was "split in left ear, underslope in right ear."
It was at this point that plaintiffs' troubles arose. Plaintiffs' counsel gingerly tried to point out to Trooper Cotton that his testimony contradicted his accident report. Defense counsel launched a barrage of objections. The trial court sustained an objection to the line of questioning as being repetitious, and plaintiffs' counsel was forced to go forward.
Plaintiffs' counsel then tried to introduce the accident report as substantive evidence, countering defendant's hearsay objection with the contention that the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule was applicable. The trial judge refused to admit the report, whereupon plaintiffs rested.
Plaintiffs chief argument to this court is that the lower courts erred in holding the accident report inadmissible.
The trial court sustained the hearsay objection, giving no reasons. The court of appeal ruled that the report was inadmissible since Trooper Cotton could not vouch for the accuracy of the descriptive terms used in the report. Apparently, Trooper Cotton, being unfamiliar with stockman's terminology, had used descriptive terms given to him by an officer of the stock patrol who was also present at the scene of the accident. Therefore, although Trooper Cotton had personally observed the markings, the statement in the report was in fact the statement of the stock patrolman as recorded by Trooper Cotton.
Plaintiffs contend that if the report had been admitted, there would have been sufficient evidence to establish ownership of the cow in the defendant.
It is not necessary to rule on the admissibility of the accident report, for even if the report had been admitted, plaintiffs would not have presented sufficient evidence to prove ownership of the cow.
Revised Statutes 3:731 et seq. created the Livestock Brand Commission and provides a central registry for the recordation of livestock brands and markings. R.S. 3:743 states that "in all suits, . . . wherein the title to animals is at issue, . . ." a certified copy of a brand or mark "shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership of the animal by the person whose brand or mark it may be."
Plaintiffs, however, produced no such evidence of recordation at trial. The recordation plaintiffs relied upon was a "brand book" provided by the Winn Parish Clerk of Court as a convenience to members of that parish. We have found no authority that the recordation in a "brand book" gives rise to any presumption of ownership.
Mr. and Mrs. Anderson argue that ownership can be proved by circumstantial evidence, citing Bunkie Funeral Home, Inc. v. McNutt, 414 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 1982). However, plaintiffs' evidence does not prove defendant's ownership of the cow by a preponderance of the evidence.
There is no evidence, for example, whether defendant was the only cattleman whose cattle grazed near the accident site. As mentioned previously, defendant was not the owner of the land adjacent to the accident site but was allowed by the owner to graze his cattle on the land. There is no evidence that other cattle owners did not have similar privileges.
The evidence regarding the markings on the cow's ears is also unclear. Not only were photographs taken of the cow's ears, the ears themselves were amputated and retained by the state police. However, the ears were lost at troop headquarters, and Trooper Cotton neglected to bring the photographs to the trial in spite of a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to do so. Plaintiffs' counsel did not force compliance with his subpoena; the photographs were therefore never introduced into evidence. Further, the stock patrolman whose observations were recorded in the accident report was not even called to testify in support of plaintiffs' case.
Plaintiffs' final argument is that their motion for a new trial under C.C.P. 1973 should have been granted.
"A new trial may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor, except as otherwise provided by law." C.C.P. 1973.
A new trial should be granted "when the trial judge is convinced by his examination of the facts that the judgment would result in a miscarriage of justice." Lamb v. Lamb, 430 So.2d 51, 53 (La. 1983). The trial judge is given a broad grant of authority, and his ruling should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of his discretion. There is no such abuse in the case before us.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion, believing the rulings of the lower courts should be affirmed.