Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0795-L
May 31, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Defendant Bank of America, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 4, 2002; Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's Summary Judgment Evidence, filed April 1, 2002; and Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Evidence, filed April 10, 2002. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Bank of America, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's Summary Judgment Evidence are overruled as moot; and Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Evidence are overruled as moot.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Paul Anderson ("Anderson") brings this suit to redress alleged discrimination and retaliation that violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 et seq. (Vernon 1996). Anderson contends that Defendant Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America") discriminated against him because he is African American, and that after he complained about this alleged discrimination he was terminated in retaliation. Defendant Bank of America contends that Anderson was not subject to discriminatory treatment and that he was terminated solely for poor job performance. Bank of America therefore moves for summary judgment on Anderson's discrimination and retaliation claims.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim.Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. In light of the summary judgment standard, the court evaluates Bank of America's summary judgment motion.
III. Analysis
A. Race Discrimination Claim
As previously stated, Anderson claims that Bank of America violated the TCHRA by discriminating against him because of his race. The law that governs claims brought under the TCHRA is identical to the law that governs the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Colbert v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 995 F. Supp. 697, 701 (N.D.Tex. 1998)). The court therefore sets forth controlling Title VII authority in order to evaluate whether there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Anderson's TCHRA race discrimination claim.
This action was removed from state court on April 25, 2001. Anderson's allegations against Bank of America therefore are set forth in his state court petition ("petition"). In the petition, Anderson claims that Bank of America discriminated against him "based on his race in the following respects (but not limited to the following respects): (a) The Bank put Anderson on probation for not following company policy but failed to put white counter-parts [sic] on probation for the same infraction; (b) The Bank failed to provide Anderson with [sic] same grievance procedures that were provided to white counterparts." Petition at 2. Although the petition expressly identifies the probation and alleged lack of grievance procedures as bases for Anderson's race discrimination claim, it is not clear from the petition whether Anderson contends that his termination also is a basis for his discrimination claim. Moreover, the petition contains the statement that "the City [sic] violated § 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code by retaliating and discriminating against Anderson in the following respects (but not limited to the following respects): (a) The Bank terminated Anderson's employment shortly after he complained of racial discrimination." Id. This language makes clear that Anderson contends that his termination is a basis for his retaliation claim, but does not clarify whether the termination is intended as a basis for the race discrimination claim. Defendant nevertheless moves for summary judgment on Anderson's discrimination claim by contending that his termination does not support the claim. Accordingly, Bank of America apparently believes that Anderson is asserting his termination as a basis for the discrimination claim. It is not clear from Bank of America's summary judgment briefing, however, whether it also is contending that the probation and alleged lack of grievance procedures do not support the discrimination claim. This court's resolution of Bank of America's summary judgment motion is the same regardless of this ambiguity.
Anderson's race discrimination claim is subject to the burden-shifting paradigm formulated for Title VII discrimination claims. Under the applicable burden-shifting paradigm, Anderson must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; Bank of America must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and finally, if the parties satisfy their initial burdens, the case reaches the "pretext state" and Anderson must then adduce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find pretext or intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has stated:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination . . ., a plaintiff may prove [his] claim either through direct evidence, statistical proof, or the test established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to show: (1) [he] was a member of a protected class, (2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] lost, (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that others similarly situated were more favorably treated.Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998); see also Rutherford v. Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); Shackleford v. Deloitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). To the extent Bank of America moves for summary judgment on Anderson's prima facie case of race discrimination, he must raise genuine issues of material fact to survive summary judgment.
Bank of America contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the fourth element of Anderson's prima facie case. Since the parties apparently agree that the first three elements are not at issue, the court considers only the fourth element in this summary judgment analysis.
Bank of America contends that the fourth element of a prima facie case for discrimination is that a plaintiff must prove that "he was replaced by someone outside the protected group." Defendant Bank of America's Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 17. Bank of America in part cites Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. as authority for this proposition, and produces the affidavit testimony of Bank of America supervisor Don Hatfield, who attests that after Anderson was terminated he was replaced by an African American named Lauren King. See id. Accordingly, Bank of America contends that Anderson cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the fourth element of his prima facie case because he was not replaced by someone outside his protected group.
Contrary to Bank of America's contention, Byers does not hold that the only way to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination is for the employee to show that he was replaced by someone outside his protected group. Byers also acknowledges that earlier authority from the Fifth Circuit appeared "to allow courts to find a prima facie case even where an employee has been replaced by someone of the same race." Byers, 209 F.3d at 427 (referring to Nieto v. L H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Hornsby v. Conoco, Inc.,
777 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the single fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within the protected [group] does not negate the possibility that the discharge was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons."). If a plaintiff was replaced by someone within the protected group, he must bring forth evidence that he otherwise was discriminated against to establish a prima facie case. See generally id.
Accordingly, although Anderson cannot demonstrate that he was replaced by someone outside his protected group (African American), this does not foreclose his ability to fulfill the fourth element of his prima facie case by raising genuine issues of material fact that he otherwise was discriminated against. After reviewing the parties' summary judgment evidence, the court finds that Anderson has raised genuine issues of material fact that he otherwise was discriminated against by Bank of America. For instance, Anderson has brought forth evidence that he was treated differently than a similarly situated white employee when he ordered computer equipment in violation of company policy, and that Bank of America's stated reasons for disciplining and terminating him were false. Summary judgment with respect to Anderson's prima facie case of race discrimination under the TCHRA therefore is inappropriate.
Likewise, with respect to Bank of America's obligation under the burden-shifting paradigm to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and Anderson's subsequent burden to establish pretext, the court finds that the parties' conflicting summary judgment evidence regarding these matters creates genuine issues of material fact for trial. Summary judgment on Anderson's race discrimination claim under the TCHRA therefore is inappropriate.
B. Retaliation Claim
Anderson contends that Bank of America retaliated against him because he complained of allegedly discriminatory practices directed towards him by Bank of America. Defendant Bank of America denies that it retaliated against Anderson, and moves for summary judgment on this claim.
To defeat summary judgment, Anderson must raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding each of the following: (1) that he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that a casual link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). The court has reviewed the parties' conflicting summary judgment evidence, and determines that Anderson has raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to the three elements of his retaliation claim. Summary judgment on Anderson's retaliation claim under the TCHRA therefore is inappropriate.
IV. The Parties' Evidentiary Objections
Both parties made myriad objections to the summary judgment evidence submitted by the opposing party. In reaching the decision that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Anderson's discrimination and retaliation claims, the court considered only that evidence which is competent summary judgment evidence. Accordingly, the parties' objections are overruled as moot.
The court also notes that the parties' objections, in many instances, were general and nonspecific, and frankly appeared to be form objections. The court further notes that several of the objections were simply frivolous. The parties are admonished that these types of objections place an undue burden on the court, must be avoided, and will not be permitted at the trial of this action.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment hereby is denied. Additionally, Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's Summary Judgment Evidence and Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Evidence hereby are overruled as moot.