Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0353, Sect. 'T' (4)
August 20, 2003
ORDER
Before this Court are cross-motions for summary judgment, filed by Plaintiffs, American Home Assurance and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, [Doc. 11], and filed by Defendants, Chevron USA, Inc., and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., [Doc. 16]. Both motions came before this Court for hearing on the briefs on February 26, 2003. After considering the written briefs, the law, the record, and the applicable jurisprudence, this Court is now ready to rule.
I. PROCEDURE AND BACKGROUND
James R. Blackmon originally filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Civil Action No. 00-1907, seeking to recover damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained on or about March 1, 2000. Blackmon, an employee of M-I L.L.C. CM-I'), was injured working with personnel from Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ('Halliburton'), on a rig operated by Chevron USA, Inc. ('Chevron'). Blackmon sued all three entities for his injuries. Thereafter, M-I was dismissed when it was determined that the Chevron Genesis spar would be considered a work platform for litigation purposes, thus limiting Blackmon's claim against M-I to worker's compensation.
In his Original Complaint, Blackmon also named M-I as a defendant, alleging Jones Act status; however, M-1 was dismissed without prejudice because since the structure was a fixed platform thereby negating any Jones Act claim.
Blackmon was engaged in mud-engineering activities while on the GENESIS spar.
The CHEVRON GENESIS is a floating production platform, more commonly known as a spar in offshore parlance, anchored to the seabed by chains attached to pilings driven into the seafloor, located in the Gulf of Mexico off of the Louisiana coast. Although the platform is capable of limited movement over certain wellheads in the subject field, the movement is accomplished by loosening/tightening the anchor chains to maneuver the platform over a given wellhead. In Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit determined the nature of these types of structures for purposes of Jones Act claims. In Fields, the Court determined that the NEPTUNE spar, owned by Oryx Energy was not a vessel but rather a fixed platform. The Court distinguished that work platforms such as the NEPTUNE spar are designed for primarily stationary residence and true vessels are intended to be used as a means of transportation over navigable water. The Court applied a three prong test to determine if a spar is a work platform: (1) whether the structure was constructed to serve primarily as a work platform; (2) whether the structure was moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and (3) whether the transportation function of the structure went beyond theoretical mobility and occasional incidental movement. Id. at 357.
Relying on the decision in Fields, Judge Carl Barbier, in Channel v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., 2001 WL 515220 (E.D.La. 2001), held that the CHEVRON GENESIS spar was a work platform rather than a vessel
While M-I notified American Home Assurance and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (collectively 'AIG'), its primary liability and excess compensation insurer, on or before March 31, 2000 of Blackmon's claims for worker's compensation, AIG were never made a party to the Blackmon litigation.
The Commercial General Liability policy issued by American Home, bearing Policy No. GL 544-16-14 RA, was effective March 1, 2000 through March 1, 2001. The named insured is M-I. See Exhibit J, American Home Policy, Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs. National Union issued a Commercial Umbrella insurance policy to Smith International, Inc. ('Smith'), bearing policy No. BE701-86-01, with effective dates of March 1, 2000 through March 1, 2001. See Exhibit K, National Union policy, Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs. M-I, a subsidiary of Smith, is afforded coverage under the policy.
As to Blackmon's tort suit, Chevron requested defense and indemnity from M-I pursuant to a Master Service Order and Agreement ('MSA') between Chevron and M-I, and Halliburton likewise requested defense and indemnity pursuant to a Mutual Indemnity and Waiver of Recourse Agreement ('MIA') signed between Chevron, Halliburton, and M-I. Subsequently, M-I became a plaintiff-in-intervention to recover compensation benefits. M-I accepted the tenders of indemnity, and agreed to assume the defense of Chevron on August 18, 2000, followed by their agreement to assume the defense of Halliburton on September 25, 2000. M-I notified AIG Claims Service, a separate unit of AIG, of the liability claim against Chevron and Halliburton on February 15, 2001. Representatives of AIG and M-I conferred on July 10, 2001 concerning the status of the claim, the issue of coverage, and the evaluation of the claim. AIG, through its representative, offered Blackmon a settlement figure of $900,000 on or about August 3, 2001, at a settlement conference for the resolution of the suit before United States Magistrate Judge Karen Roby. AIG requested, on December 10, 2001, that Chevron and Halliburton participate in the settlement of the Blackmon matter, whereupon both Chevron and Halliburton declined to participate in the settlement negotiations. On December 12, 2001, AIG settled the Blackmon litigation for 52,000,000.00 (TWO MILLION DOLLARS AND 00/100), as per the settlement documents and the Agreement to Release All Claims. Ancillary to the settlement with Blackmon, M-I assigned its rights in the litigation to AIG, who subsequently filed this separate suit seeking to recover the $2,000,000.00 settlement amount against Chevron and Halliburton. On December 13, 2001, this Court entered an Order of Dismissal without Costs and Without Prejudice retaining the rights of any party to reopen the action if settlement was untimely. On February 6, 2002, the Court signed and entered a 'Final Motion of Dismissal with Prejudice' as to "all matter and claims by any party against any party . . . to M-I LLC, . . . Chevron USA, Inc., and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. . . ."
The MSA was originally entered into on November 6, 1991 between M-I and Chevron.
The MIA was originally entered into on September 4, 1998 between M-I, Chevron, and Halliburton.
Civil Action 00-1907, Rec. Doc. 86, Order of Dismissal.
Civil Action 00-1907, Rec. Doc. 88, Final Motion of Dismissal with Prejudice.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES IN FAVOR OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Plaintiffs, American Home/National UnionPlaintiffs, AIG7 argue that pursuant to the Louisiana Offshore Indemnity Act, La. R.S. 9:2780, any indemnity/additional insured obligation in favor of the indemnitee is void and unenforceable. Therefore, since the LOIA renders the defense/indemnity and additional insured provisions of the MSA and the MIA absolute nullities, neither MI nor its insurers are obliged to defend or indemnify Chevron and Halliburton, any agreement by MI to assume such a defense, or an agreement by the insurers to fund a settlement is without effect, and American Home and National Union are entitled to recover all sums expended in settling the Blackmon claims. Further, by virtue of the contractual agreement made by complainants insured, M-I, complainants are entitled to recovery of all sums expended in defending against Chevron and Halliburton.
B. Defendants, Chevron/Halliburton
Defendants, Chevron and Halliburton assert that the LOIA cannot declare null and void indemnity language absent an adjudication. Accordingly, they argue that a determination or trial on the merits after the claim which brought about the indemnification request has been settled would be inappropriate. The Defendants argue that the LOIA does not apply to an already settled claim, as it applies if and only if the party seeking indemnification is found to be solely or concurrently at fault. Hence, without an adjudication of fault or negligence, the LOIA cannot apply, and cannot void an indemnification agreement between parties to an agreement. In the present situation, Defendants maintain that they never settled nor contributed to the resolution of the Blackmon case; AIG was the party that resolved the case, hence, there was no adjudication of fault in the Blackmon case. If allowed to present evidence as to Chevron and Halliburton, it would in effect, be re-litigating Blackmon's claim which was settled with full prejudice as per the Order of Dismissal of this Court.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Law on Motion for Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c)), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/VRISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)."A dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Skotak, 953 F.2d at 913, citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. ('OCSLA'), provides federal subject matter jurisdiction for cases involving injuries which occur on platforms on the outer continental shelf. Plaintiff claims that his injuries involved the negligence of Chevron equipment and unsafe conditions on the GENESIS spar, which is located in the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore, the claims of the Plaintiff are governed by OCSLA, and federal subject matter jurisdiction is present regardless of the citizenship of the parties.
C. Court's Analysis and Conclusions
Initially enacted as an effort to address "inequity foisted on certain contractors and their employees by the defense or indemnity provisions, either or both, contained in some agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas [etc.] . . .," the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, La. R.S, 9:2780 seeks to void any defense and indemnity agreements between contracting parties if the party seeking indemnification is found to be solely or concurrently at fault, According to the plain language of the statute, the proper determination, analysis, and application of the statute must be rendered after the determination of fault by a court. On the face of the statute, any effort to invoke the provisions of the LOIA, and therefore render an indemnity provision null and void, prior to a determination of fault of the indemnitee through a trial on the merits, is essentially premature and outside the scope of the act. In Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So.2d 833, 839, (La, 1987), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed this issue. The Court stated that "[w]hether an oil company (indemnitee) is free from fault and thus outside the scope of the Act can only be determined after trial on the merits." Impliedly, it is understood that a final adjudication must be taken, when available, in order to apply the LOIA to an appropriate indemnification agreement. See also, Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corp., 848 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1988). "We agree with Chevron that in Meloy, the Louisiana. Supreme Court made the determination of fault by the court central to the application of the anti-indemnity bar of the Oilfield Indemnity Act." Tanksley at 516.
Roberts v. Energy Development Corp., 104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1997); Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 95-1425 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So.2d 25; Lewis v. Diamond Services Corp., 637 So.2d 825 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1994), writ denied, 643 So.2d 159.
La. R.S.9:2780. Certain indemnification agreements invalid
It is the intent of the legislature by this Section to declare null and void and against public policy of the state of Louisiana any provision in any agreement which requires defense and/or indemnification, for death or bodily injury to persons, where there is negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee, or an agent or employee of the indemnitee, or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee.
which is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent, employee, or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee.
In Tanksley, an employee of Services, Equipment and Engineering, Inc., ("SEE") was injured on a Chevron platform. Chevron sought indemnification from SEE; however, SEE declined and acquired summary judgment in the case asserting that the LOIA voided the indemnity agreement. Chevron appealed the district court decision to grant summary judgment. Chevron then settled with the plaintiff but tried to maintain its appeal seeking remand of the case to determine its actual fault, i.e., to ascertain if the LOIA applied. The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Politz, declined to remand the case noting that since Chevron elected to settle the case rather than go to trial, Chevron foreclosed its opportunity to be adjudicated free from fault.
In the issue at bar, a trial on the merits to determine Chevron's fault or negligence was not only legally possible, it was imminent and was foreclosed only by the compromise settlement with Tanksley. The parties undoubtedly reached this settlement after a careful weighing of all relevant factors and risks. For reasons it deemed sufficient, Chevron [a named defendant] opted to forego a trial at which it would either have been found liable or exonerated. The appeal of the certainty of settlement overrode the contending appeal of the uncertainty of trial. As a consequence, because of Chevron's choice, there will be no trial on the merits of Tanksley's claims to determine whether Chevron was 'free from fault and thus outside the scope of the Act.'Tanksley at 517-18. Judge Politz held that Chevron's decision to settle the case prior to a determination of fault precluded them from maintaining their appeal for a determination of fault, and absent a legal bar for a determination, the LOIA nullified the agreement.
In Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., 834 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit was called upon to apply the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Meloy to a situation in which the court legally could not determine the fault issue. Melancon, an injured oilfield worker, sued Amoco, the platform owner, for work-related injuries. Amoco filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractor, the employer of the injured workman, under an indemnification provision in the oilfield contract. The court found that Melancon had become a borrowed employee of Amoco. As a consequence, his only remedy against Amoco was for compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. The Court ruled that since there could be no determination of fault, as a matter of law, the Oilfield Indemnity Act did not nullify the indemnity agreement, and that Amoco was entitled to recover the costs of defense of the tort suit brought by the plaintiff and the costs it incurred in pressing its demands for indemnification.
In Gaspard v. Offshore Crane Equipment, Inc., et al., 1998 WL 388597 (E.D. La., Berrigan, J.), the plaintiff was injured while working on a supply vessel alongside a Chevron platform. A crane malfunctioned on the platform, causing the headache ball to fall and hit Gaspard in the legs. Seacor was the owner of the vessel, which was chartered to Chevron. Nabors was the owner and operator of the crane, and also Gaspard's employer. Prior to the accident, Chevron entered into an indemnification agreement with Nabors as well as one with Seacor. Chevron demanded defense and indemnification from both parties, which only Nabors agreed to do. Seacor obtained summary judgment against Chevron, as the court found that the agreement did not cover an accident occurring under the then present circumstances. The remaining parties entered into a settlement agreement in which Chevron/Nabors agreed to contribute certain funds. Seacor refused to participate in the settlement. Chevron appealed the granting of summary judgment against Seacor. The Fifth Circuit reversed and found that the accident did come within the scope of the agreement, leading Chevron to seek reimbursement of the settlement contribution from Seacor plus Nabors' cost of defending Chevron. The District Court noticed that the case presented several factual similarities to Tanksley, including that Seacor, like SEE, was released from the case prior to settlement, and that Chevron elected to settle rather than have the case go to trial. The Court, relying on Tanksley, decided that since the case had settled, the LOIA rendered void the indemnification agreement between Nabors and Chevron since Chevron had not been adjudicated free from fault. The Court found that settling foreclosed trial on the merits and was indistinguishable, as a matter of law, from Tanksley, The Court also found that any indemnification language in a relevant indemnification agreement is an absolute nullity for which any party, including a third party, on its own initiative, can render void. The justification for this reasoning is that, pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Art. 7, parties may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. As such, those provisions are absolutely null. Thus, when under the LOIA, any effort by a party attempting to circumvent the LOIA is an absolute nullity.
Art. 2030. Absolute nullity of contracts
A contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral. A contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.
Absolute nullity may be invoked by any person or may be declared by the court on its own initiative. Acts 1984, No. 331, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1985.
Art. 7. Laws for the preservation of the public interest
Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute nullity. Acts 1987, No. 124, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.
The ramifications of allowing the employer's compensation insurer to enter the suit, pay a settlement, acquire rights as to compensation for the settlement, and then seek to void the indemnity agreement thereby invoking the LOIA are enormous. No doubt that Chevron and Halliburton, as Judge Politz observed the actions of Chevron in the Tanksley opinion, undoubtedly weighed the options of settlement or litigation. In Tanksley, Chevron chose to settle, thereby foreclosing their availability of an adjudication of fault. The Court wrote, "for reasons which it deemed sufficient, Chevron opted to forego a trial at which it would either have been found liable or exonerated/' Tanksley at 518. It was the actions of Chevron, itself a named defendant, which foreclosed their options. However, where this case differs factually from Tanksley is that Chevron and Halliburton chose litigation over settlement in this matter. Both defendants declined to participate in the settlement of this matter with full knowledge that an adjudication of no-fault would allow them to uphold the indemnity agreements and preclude the application of the LOIA; this decision not to participate was essentially swept out from under them by the compensation insurer of M-I. AIG asserts in their memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment, ". . . it is the indemnitee that bears the burden of proving itself free of fault in order to place its demands outside the scope of the Act [LOIA]." If Chevron and Halliburton would have chosen to settle the Blackmon matter and then sought to have their respective fault adjudicated, they too would have been foreclosed from pursuing their matter, as Chevron was in Tanksley, Such is not the case here. Chevron and Halliburton chose litigation, and the attempt by AIG to pay the settlement, acquire M-I's rights, and to pursue contribution from Chevron and Halliburton, was merely an end-around attempt to void the indemnity agreements under the veil of jurisprudent, precedent which is factually different from the Blackmon matter.
AIG, Memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment, p. 4.
AIG's solution is untenable to this Court: "To permit Chevron/Halliburton to escape reimbursement in this case would allow an end run around the Act as result of economic pressure on its contractor to assume the defense or risk the repercussions. Without illustrating that they were free from fault, Chevron/Halliburton are not entitled to defense and indemnity and must reimburse American Home and National Union, both individually and assignees of the claims of M-I." AIG asserts that Chevron/Halliburton must illustrate their own freedom from fault in order to avoid the prohibitions against defense and indemnity, absent such a showing, they are not entitled to such protection. The reasoning of AIG must be flawed in that the burden of proof to prove fault rests with the Plaintiffs in this case. The Defendants are not under the gun to prove their lack of negligence, instead, it is the Plaintiffs who must illustrate to the fault of the Defendants in order to void the indemnity agreement under the LOIA. AIG's solution leaves much to be desired when it was the actions of AIG which precluded a determination of fault which could have acted to invalidate the indemnity agreements. Why should this Court allow AIG an end-around by settling the matter prior to an adjudication of fault? If AIG's motion is granted, with an injured worker subject to Louisiana law, coupled to an indemnity agreement/contract potentially subject to the LOIA, there is immediate incentive for the contractor to agree to indemnify and hold harmless the defense of the oil company, and thereafter settle the claim. What is that incentive? That incentive is that the LOIA would presumptively nullify the indemnity agreement due to the absence of an adjudication of fault, and the contractor would be entitled to reimbursement. The oil company would necessarily be forced to pay since it cannot re-litigate a settled claim, and it has the burden of proving freedom from fault, which in the envisioned scenario, it cannot do. This unenviable position would force the oil company to settle the case as soon as possible because without settlement, they would be forced to contribute. They would never be able to prove freedom from fault, and never be able to collect a cost of defense claim because they cannot be ruled free from fault, as contemplated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Meloy. In Thomas v. Amoco Oil Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D.La. 1993), the Court opined that generally, the LOIA voids indemnity agreements only to the extent that the contractual indemnitee is found either negligent or strictly liable. This was the true intention of the Act.
AIG, Memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment, p. 5.
On the other hand, another solution is possible. If an oil company demanded assumption of defense for an injury on a platform subject to Louisiana law, the contractor would have two options: to deny the request, or to grant the request. If the contractor denied the request, then the oil company could litigate the claim fully and then seek reimbursement of costs of defense if found free from fault. If the oil company is found at fault, then the LOIA applies by prohibiting defense and indemnity, and the contractor is protected from a prospective cost of defense claim. If the contractor assumes the defense, the contractor is protected from a cost of defense claim assuming that the oil company is at fault. However, if the oil company chose to settle the claim, then it, with full knowledge of its actions, would be precluded from a determination of fault. If the contractor settles the claim, the option of the contractor to seek to nullify the indemnity agreement is foreclosed. In either situation involving settlement where all parties are not present to the settlement, the matter is foreclosed. Nevertheless, if the contractor assumes the defense of the oil company, then it should not be allowed to come back years later and assert that the LOIA presumptively nullifies the indemnity provisions precluding the oil company from a determination of fault.
One of the underlying assumptions to the reasoning in Gaspard, and disagreed with by this Court, is that Gaspard assumes that the LOIA applies. AIG argues the rationale of Gaspard as its basis for summary judgment, and seeks to void the contract, as the assumption of the defense of Chevron and: Halliburton was null and void pursuant to the intent of the act. However, it appears that the intent of Gaspard, as to Civil Code Art. 7, in seeking a complete bar to indemnification contracts, assumes that the LOIA applies to the parties. The problem with this reasoning remains that the strict language of the LOIA voids only those agreements of indemnitees who are deemed to be at fault or negligent. The language of the LOIA does not include indemnity agreements of parties who have not been deemed at fault. It is this Court's belief that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the LOIA, while seeking to protect the rights of certain contractors', was to void indemnity agreements where the indemnitee was adjudicated at fault. Gaspard seeks to render null and void all indemnity agreements under the guise of an absolute nullity, as they are contrary to public policy; however, while Civil Code article 7 states that persons cannot 'by their judicial acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest,' the LOIA specifically refers to only those agreements where there is "fault or negligence on the part of the indemnitee." La. R.S. 9:2780(A). The construction of the Civil Code dictates that absolute nullities can never be enforced, and that the prescription time for invoking an absolute nullity never expires. However, any analysis resulting in a final determination that all indemnity agreements are absolute nullities runs head-first into the intent of the Louisiana Legislature in their verbiage in the LOIA. The Legislature provided a very specific savings clause in the LOIA, which reads, "It is the intent of the legislature by this Section to declare null and void and against public policy of the state of Louisiana any provision in any agreement which requires defense and/or indemnification, for death or bodily injury to persons, where there is negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee, or an agent or employee of the indemnitee, or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee." La. R.S. 9:2780(A) (emphasis ours). If the Legislature wanted to invalidate all indemnity agreements as contrary to public policy, they could have chosen language during the authoring of the LOIA in the legislative session. The language of the Act mandates this Court to hold viable the indemnity agreements in place under the current factual scenario. In truth, the indemnity agreements provide protection to the parties that are signatories to the instrument, and are not viewed by this Court as contrary to public policy. Parties enter into the agreement with full knowledge of the LOIA and the criteria for nullification of the indemnity agreements. Taking this ruling into account, the LOIA still acts as the Louisiana Legislature originally intended: 'to protect the inequity foisted onto certain contractors and their employees.' The ruling in Gaspard assumes that the LOIA applies to all indemnity agreements, and specifically to a situation where the indemnitee, Chevron, settles the claim foreclosing adjudication of fault. Such was the case in Tanksley and Gaspard, and the accompanying rationale, but that is not the scenario in the immediate matter. What we are left with is the finding of this Court that the LOIA only voids indemnity agreements with adjudicated fault parties, assuming the indemnitee did not settle the claim. Since Chevron's and Halliburton's fault was never determined nor did they contribute to Blackmon's resolution thus precluding an adjudication of fault, the indemnification contracts are to be honored.
La. C.C. art. 2032.
D. Conclusion
The Court hereby GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Chevron and Halliburton. Just as National Union and American Home are obliged, under this ruling, to prove fault in order to void the indemnity agreement by invoking the LOIA, the cost of defense provisions are subject to the same scenario. Each party is to pay its own costs. Additionally, the motion for summary judgment of American Home and National Union is DENIED.