Opinion
Civil No. 07-1272 (JAF).
January 11, 2008
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, minor Leonardo Alvarado-Sánchez, represented by his mother, Leida Sánchez-Ortiz, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007) and 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (2005) ("Article 1802") against Defendants, First Hospital Corporation; Alternative Behavioral Services; First Hospital Panamericano; First Corrections Puerto Rico; Administration of Juvenile Institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("AJI"); José Negrón-Fernández, Administrator of Juvenile Institutions, and his conjugal partnership with Jane Doe; Rafael O. Malavé, sub-director of Juvenile Institutions, and his conjugal partnership with Jane Roe; and various other unknown defendants.Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, resulting from Defendants' failure to prevent repeated acts of physical aggression and attempted rape against him during his court-ordered stay at the Puerto Rico Adolescent Training School ("PRATS"), located in Río Grande, Puerto Rico. Id. Defendants Malavé, AJI, Negrón, and the conjugal partnership of Negrón and Jane Doe, move to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Docket Document Nos. 15, 32. Plaintiff opposes. Docket Document No. 20.
I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis
We derive the following factual summary from Plaintiff's complaint. Docket Document No. 1. As we must, we assume that all of Plaintiff's allegations are true and make all reasonable inferences in his favor. Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
In 2002, a court order placed Plaintiff, a minor who suffers from schizophrenia, under the custody and supervision of PRATS in Río Grande, Puerto Rico. From the time Plaintiff entered PRATS until 2004, other PRATS residents frequently assaulted him and threatened to rape him.
On one occasion, four or five residents subdued Plaintiff using physical force and weapons, surrounded him, and attempted to rape him. When Plaintiff resisted, the other residents attacked him.
Another time, a resident assaulted Plaintiff, provoking him into defending himself. The incident resulted in Plaintiff's confinement. PRATS employees tied up Plaintiff and placed him in confinement with a resident who was not similarly restrained. The other resident beat Plaintiff, urinated on him, and threw hot coffee on him. PRATS employees supplied the resident with the coffee. Other employees did nothing to stop the assault on Plaintiff.
Once, while other residents assaulted Plaintiff, Gerardo Clemente, a PRATS employee, shouted out "kill him."
Additionally, Plaintiff did not receive his medication consistently; was treated with the wrong medication; did not get a proper education; received inadequate nutrition; feared for his life; and was assaulted by PRATS employees with a water pressure hose when he attempted to defend himself.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the pleadings, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e begin by accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [nonmovant]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1992). We then determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under which relief can be granted.
A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and need only give the respondent fair notice of the nature of the claim and petitioner's basis for it. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief." Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007)).
III. Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against AJI and its employees in their official capacity; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) there is no supervisory liability for Defendants Malavé and Negrón under § 1983; and (4) Defendants Malavé and Negrón are entitled to qualified immunity. Docket Document No. 15. We examine each of these arguments in turn.
A. Eleventh Amendment
Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against Defendant AJI and its employees, Malavé and Negrón, in their official capacities. Docket Document No. 15.
The Eleventh Amendment states that the "[j]udicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the . . . States by citizens of another State." U.S. CONST., amend. XI; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating that "an unconsenting State is immune from federal-court suits brought by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State"). The main purpose of the Amendment "is to minimize federal courts' involvement in disbursal of state monies." Gotay Sanchez v. Pereira, 343 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (D.P.R. 2004). The Eleventh Amendment, accordingly, also bars suits for monetary relief against state officers in their official capacities, because such awards would be paid from the state treasury. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
"For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the Commonwealth [of Puerto Rico] is treated as if it were a state; consequently, the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit brought against it." Id. at 71-72 (citing Metcalf Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Espinal-Dominguez v. Puerto Rico, 352 F.3d 490, 493-94 (1st Cir. 2003). Because "a state only has existence through its instrumentalities that carry out its functions and establish its public policy . . . suits brought against non-autonomous instrumentalities of the state [are] considered suits against the state itself." Padilla Cintron v. Rossello Gonzalez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 48, 57 (D.P.R. 2003).
Both parties to this case agree that Defendant AJI is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth. Docket Document Nos. 12, 15. We, therefore, find that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against AJI and Malavé and Negrón in their official capacities, and dismiss those claims with prejudice.
B. Failure to State a Claim Under § 1983
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983. Docket Document No. 15.
Under § 1983, persons acting under color of state law are liable for subjecting any citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Docket Document No. 1. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations do not amount to constitutional violations. Docket Document No. 15.
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment upon convicted criminals. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989) ("The state does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt.") (quotingIngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40 (1977)). Because Plaintiff is not a convicted criminal, the Eighth Amendment cannot serve as the basis for his § 1983 claim. 2. Due Process
Plaintiff alleges violations of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Docket Document No. 1. Because the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, and Plaintiff's claims are directed at Commonwealth actors, we analyze Plaintiff's due process allegations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "To state a claim for a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must (1) assert a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) show that state action deprived her of that interest without due process of law."Siaca v. Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P.R., 160 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (D.P.R. 2001). Here, Plaintiff has alleged gross negligence and deliberate indifference, not the deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to allege a violation of his procedural due process rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, also protects substantive due process rights when state actors engage in conscience-shocking behavior. Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2007). For liability to attach, an official action must be sufficiently conscience-shocking as to be unjustifiable by any government interest. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998); Collins v. Nuzzo, 244 F.3d 246, 251 (1st Cir. 2001).
"For involuntarily committed patients, 'a set of unique rules has developed' according to which 'failures to act . . . may comprise a due process or other constitutional violation because the state-imposed circumstance of confinement prevents such individuals from helping themselves.'" Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 98 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (finding that Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process requires the state to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with the services necessary to ensure their "reasonable safety").
Plaintiff alleges that, during his court-ordered confinement in PRATS, he suffered repeated physical assaults as a direct result of Defendants' deliberate indifference and, in some cases, direction and encouragement. Docket Document No. 1. We find that these allegations, if true, would constitute a violation of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights. See Rennie, 264 F.3d at 117 (affirming district court finding of a substantive due process violation where defendants observed the use of excessive force against a mental health patient and failed to intervene);Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 71 (stating that the failure of a mental institution's staff to stop one patient from assaulting another may amount to a substantive due process claim triggering liability under § 1983). We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has successfully stated a § 1983 claim based on alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.
C. Supervisory Liability
Defendants argue that § 1983 does not allow for liability based on respondeat superior. Docket Document No. 15.
Under § 1983, a supervisor is liable for a deliberately indifferent act or omission when there is an affirmative link between the act or omission and the subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Negrón and Malavé, the administrator and sub-director of AJI, sent Plaintiff to PRATS despite the fact that they knew or should have known that PRATS employees tolerated and encouraged abuses against their residents. Docket Document No. 20. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants should have been aware of previous reports and litigation regarding this abuse. Id. Because a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference, these allegations suffice to survive a motion to dismiss.Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 92; Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994).
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that Malavé and Negrón are entitled to qualified immunity. Docket Document No. 15.
Qualified immunity protects state officials from the burden of standing trial or facing other onerous aspects of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). "The reach of this doctrine is long, but not infinite." Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2006). The test to determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity has three parts: (1) "whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation"; (2) "whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the putative violation"; and (3) "whether a reasonable officer, situated similarly to the defendant, would have understood the challenged act or omission to contravene the discerned constitutional right." Id. Qualified immunity, thus, "safeguards even unconstitutional conduct if a reasonable officer at the time and under the circumstances surrounding the action could have viewed it as lawful." Jordan v. Carter, 428 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2005).
As previously discussed, under substantive due process, mental health institutions holding involuntarily-committed patients are responsible for the inmates' reasonable safety. Youngsberg, 47 U.S. at 314-25; Rennie, 264 F.3d at 98. This constitutional right was clearly established when the incidents at issue in this case took place. We find that a reasonable administrator or sub-director of juvenile administrations would have understood that failing to address previous allegations of abuse and confining Plaintiff without taking measures to ensure his safety would contravene Plaintiff's constitutional rights. We, therefore, find that Defendants Malavé and Negrón are not entitled to qualified immunity.