Opinion
3D23-0937
05-08-2024
A.L.M., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Orlando A. Prescott, Judge Lower Tribunal No. 22-1058.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.
EMAS, J.
Following a bench trial, A.L.M., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for the offenses of possession of a firearm on school grounds, carrying a concealed firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm by a minor. On appeal from those adjudications, A.L.M. raises two claims: (1) the trial court erred by "entering the fray," assisting the prosecutor with questions during trial; and (2) the trial court erred in denying A.L.M.'s motion for judgment of dismissal on the concealed firearm count because the State failed to prove the firearm was concealed.
While it bears reminding that every trial judge "owes a duty of neutrality to the parties and may not favor one side or the other," M.W. v. State, 263 So.3d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), a principle that holds true whether in a proceeding before a jury or before the bench, we find the trial court's actions fell within the broad discretion afforded to the court to manage and regulate the course of the trial. Compare id. at 215 (where this court held it was within the court's discretion to direct the State to lay a proper foundation for witness testimony) with J.L.D. v. State, 4 So.3d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (where court took over witness questioning); Lyles v. State, 742 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (where trial court sua sponte ordered the State to present additional evidence in support of the prosecution's case).
A trial court must be ever-vigilant to avoid engaging in conduct or making statements that may inadvertently create a perception of bias, even when done in the interest of efficiency and moving a trial along at a proper pace. While such a goal is laudable, it cannot overcome the paramount need for a trial court not simply to act impartially, but to reasonably be perceived as acting impartially. See Kline v. JRD Mgmt. Corp., 165 So.3d 812, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("Significantly, the standards for disqualification do not turn on a demonstration of actual bias or partiality on the part of the judge or the judge's own perception of his or her impartiality. Rather, disqualification is required where the facts alleged and established, which must be taken as true, would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial proceeding.")
As to the claim that the State failed to establish the "concealment" element for the charge of possession of a concealed firearm by a minor, we find no merit, as the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was concealed from the ordinary sight of another person. See § 790.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2022) (defining "Concealed firearm" to mean "any firearm. . . which is carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal the firearm from the ordinary sight of another person."); Alexander v. State, 450 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (noting that "a firearm need not be absolutely invisible in order to be concealed, for purposes of the statute prohibiting carrying a concealed firearm, so long as the weapon was concealed from the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life, and the weapon was physically on the person or readily accessible to its bearer.") (citing Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349, 354 (Fla. 1981) (holding that "absolute invisibility is not a necessary element to a finding of concealment under section 790.001. The operative language of that section establishes a two-fold test. For a firearm to be concealed, it must be (1) on or about the person and (2) hidden from the ordinary sight of another person.")). See also M.R. v. State, 101 So.3d 389, 392 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding that, while a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal is reviewed de novo "facts adduced from the evidence are taken as true and 'all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the State'") (citations omitted).
Affirmed.