Opinion
No: C-99-4569 PJH
May 30, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The motion of defendant Carl Payne for summary judgment (Docket No. 48) came on for hearing on May 30, 2001, before this court, the Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton presiding. Plaintiff Rashid Alatraqchi appeared by his counsel Robert E. Lazo, and defendant appeared by his counsel, Deputy City Attorney Owen P. Martikan. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion for the following reasons.
Defendant Carl Payne ("Payne"), a San Francisco Police Officer, arrested plaintiff on June 15, 1998, following a traffic stop. Plaintiff, who is of Arabic descent, was driving a limousine that was parked in a passenger-loading zone on Beach Street, near Larkin Street. Plaintiff was unable to produce proof of automobile insurance when requested to do so. He was arrested for threatening a police officer.
When plaintiff appeared in court, plaintiff entered a "no contest" plea to a charge of disturbing the peace on the night of the arrest. In exchange for the plea, the court dismissed two other charges against plaintiff — threatening a police officer and driving without proof of financial responsibility. Plaintiff paid a $100 fine and a $100 penalty.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action against defendants Payne and City and County of San Francisco, alleging that Payne falsely arrested and imprisoned him, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. On March 5, 2001, the court dismissed defendant City and County of San Francisco from the case. Payne now moves for summary judgment.
The court interprets plaintiff's claim as a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging arrest without probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Section provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. that Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Payne argues that there are no disputed issues of fact in this case, and that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Payne contends that under the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim that necessarily invalidates his plea. Plaintiff opposes the motion, claiming that he does not seek to overturn his plea in this lawsuit, that the court has already ruled that the evidence of the plea is not admissible at trial, and that the jury could find that Payne was motivated by anti-Arab sentiments when he arrested plaintiff.
The issue in this case is whether Payne had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. If a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect, the suspect cannot later claim false arrest. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Probable cause depends on the objective facts and circumstances of the arrest; the subjective intent of the arresting officer is irrelevant. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994); see a1so Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (if probable cause exists, the officer's ulterior motives will not invalidate his objectively justifiable behavior). Thus, plaintiff cannot base a false arrest claim on the arresting officer's alleged racial animus.
Heck v. Humphrey precludes a § 1983 claim based on actions that would render a conviction or sentence invalid, where that conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Because a successful § 1983 action for false arrest would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiffs conviction, plaintiff's false arrest claim must be dismissed. "[1]n other words, ... if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed." Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Heck).
Plaintiff argues that his "no contest" plea is irrelevant and cannot be considered by the court, because under Federal Rule of Evidence 410, a nolo contendere plea is not admissible at trial as evidence against him. Plaintiff's argument misstates the law. Rule 410 prohibits the use of a "no contest" plea, against the defendant who made the plea, as an admission or as evidence of guilt in another proceeding. In this case, however, Payne does not seek to use plaintiff's plea against plaintiff as an admission or as evidence of guilt. Under Heck, plaintiff's "no contest" plea is significant merely by the fact of its existence, and by the fact that it resulted in a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff has no § 1983 claim if such claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction. Accordingly, Payne's motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The action is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff's reassertion of his claims should he invalidate his conviction.
This order fully adjudicates the motion listed at No. 48 on the clerk's docket for this case, and terminates all pending motions. The June 11, 2001, trial date is hereby VACATED.