Summary
upholding summary judgment on a plaintiff's DTPA claim seeking lost wages and mental anguish damages on the ground that the DTPA does not allow claims for damages for claims of bodily injury
Summary of this case from Gibbons v. Luby's Inc.Opinion
No. 10-05-00280-CV
Opinion delivered and filed February 14, 2007.
Appeal from the 17th District Court Tarrant County, Texas. Trial Court No. 17-201031-03.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Akin's father drowned in the swimming pool at Bally's health club. Akin brought wrongful death and survival actions against Bally for ordinary negligence, gross negligence, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), premises liability, fraud, and breach of contract. See TEX. BUS. COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 2002 Supp. 2006). The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Bally. Akin appeals. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
In four issues, Akin contends that the trial court erred in granting Bally's motion for summary judgment. Akin states his issues as follows:
1. Waiver and Release purportedly signed by the Decedent;
2. Fair Notice of the Waiver and Release to the Decedent;
3. Admission of Akin of the validity of the membership contract as a result of his pleadings filed in the matter;
3.[sic] Damages.
(Br. at 2.)
In a traditional summary-judgment motion, "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if" the summary-judgment evidence "show[s] that . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . ." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all competent evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005); accord Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). "We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo." See Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); Phillips v. Ivy, 160 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied).
Release. In Akin's Issues Nos. 1 and 2, he complains concerning a release provision in the health-club membership agreement between Bally and Akin's father, in which Akin's father agreed to release Bally from liability for Bally's negligence.
"[R]eleasing `a party in advance of liability for its own negligence'" constitutes "an extraordinary shifting of risk." Storage Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1993)). Such "extraordinary risk-shifting clauses must meet certain fair notice requirements." Green Int'l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. 1997) (citing Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 508); accord Storage Processors at 192. One fair-notice "requirement, of conspicuousness, mandates `that something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it.'" Storage Processors at 192 (quoting Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 508) (alteration in Storage Processors ); see TEX. BUS. COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon 2006) (defining "conspicuous"). "Language may satisfy the conspicuousness requirement by appearing in larger type, contrasting colors, or otherwise calling attention to itself." Storage Processors at 192 (citing Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Tex. 1997)); see Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 511.
Bally moved for summary judgment on Akin's negligence claims on the ground of the release. Akin argues that the release clause was not conspicuous, but was "camouflage[d]" by being placed on the back of the contract, on the same page with twenty other provisions, all beginning with a heading in all capital letters and bold face, parts of the body of those other provisions also being in all capital letters or in bold face. (Br. at 6.) Bally points out that the whole of the release clause appears in bold type, is the only paragraph enclosed by a box, and is expressly referenced by paragraph number just above the signature line. The release clause also appears in part in larger type. The release clause was conspicuous. The trial court did not err in granting Bally's summary-judgment ground on Akin's negligence claim. We overrule Akin's Issues Nos. 1 and 2.
Judicial Admissions. In Akin's first Issue No. 3, he assigns error as to the "[a]dmission of Akin of the validity of the membership contract as a result of his pleadings filed in the matter." (Br. at 2.)
The appellant's "brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h). A brief's issues that do not contain such argument "are inadequately briefed and present nothing for review." Batto v. Gafford, 119 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, no pet.); see Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994); In re H.E.L., No. 10-04-00204-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 609, *1-*2 (Tex.App.-Waco Jan. 26, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Akin's briefing on the issue is as follows, in its entirety:
Bally alleges that Akin admitted the validity of the membership Contract in his pleadings filed with the Court. Akin denies that as a matter of law he has judicially admitted the validity of the membership contract in as much as mere pleadings in the alternative and even apparent inconsistent or contradictory pleadings have never served as judicial admissions.
([sic] Br. at 5.) Akin inadequately briefs the issue of his judicial admissions. We overrule Akin's first Issue No. 3.
Damages . Akin's second Issue No. 3 concerns "[d]amages." (Br. at 2.) We understand the issue to include Akin's arguments concerning his gross-negligence claim, for which he may seek exemplary damages, and his DTPA claim, for which he may seek treble damages. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2006); TEX. BUS. COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b), (h) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
Gross Negligence. In Bally's motion for summary judgment, Bally contended that the release barred Akin's claim for gross negligence as well as for negligence. "[G]ross negligence involves two components:"
(1) viewed objectively from the actor's standpoint, the act or omission complained of must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and
(2) the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.
Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2001); accord Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994).
What lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence is the mental attitude of the defendant; that is what justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary damages. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously, i.e., knowingly, indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he didn't care.
Burks Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981).
Bally has defeated the negligence claim by proving a defense of release; Bally has not negated any element of negligence or gross negligence. The negligence release does not prevent proof of gross negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 723 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (Chapa, C.J., concurring in part dissenting in part). The trial court erred in sustaining the ground in Bally's summary-judgment motion lleging that the release barred damages for gross negligence. DTPA. In Bally's motion for summary judgment, it moved for judgment on Akin's DTPA cause of action on the ground that the DTPA barred Akin's claims for damages for death, bodily injury, and the infliction of mental anguish.
Most courts hold that pre-injury waivers of gross negligence are void as against public policy. Tex. Moto-Plex, Inc. v. Phelps, No. 11-03-00336-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 892, at *4 (Tex.App.-Eastland Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); accord Keszler v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 931 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 943 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); Rosen v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, No. 14-94-00775-CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 3225, at *20 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication); Smith v. Golden Triangle Raceway, 708 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ); see Mem'l Med. Ctr. v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 336 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); RESTATEMENT (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981); but see Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 127 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 721-22 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied). We do not believe that the First Court of Appeals appreciated the limitations on the San Antonio Court's holding. See Tesoro Petroleum at 127; cf. Newman at 721-22.
Our very narrow holding is that the release in this case does not release a claim for gross negligence. We do not express any opinion as to whether, in the context of this appeal of a summary judgment, Akin properly pleaded gross negligence. Nor, because this is not an appeal of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, do we express any opinion as to whether the record contains any evidence of any of the elements of negligence (other than duty), or of gross negligence's elements of extreme risk or actual awareness. We hold only that on this record from a traditional motion for summary judgment, Bally did not affirmatively attempt to negate the elements of gross negligence and did not conclusively prove all the elements of a defense to gross negligence.
The DTPA does not "apply to a cause of action for bodily injury or death or for the infliction of mental anguish," "[e]xcept as specifically provided by Subsections (b) and (h), Section 17.50." TEX. BUS. COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(e) (Vernon Supp. 2006); see id. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 2006); see generally Teel Bivins et al., The 1995 Revisions to the DTPA: Altering the Landscape, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1441, 1448 (1996). Section 17.50, in turn, provides, in relevant part:
(a) A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish:
. . .
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty; [or]
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person. . . .
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
(1) the amount of economic damages found by the trier of fact. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was committed knowingly, the consumer may also recover damages for mental anguish, as found by the trier of fact, and the trier of fact may award not more than three times the amount of economic damages; or if the trier of fact finds the conduct was committed intentionally, the consumer may recover damages for mental anguish, as found by the trier of fact, and the trier of fact may award not more than three times the amount of damages for mental anguish and economic damages;
. . . .
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of th[e DTPA], if a claimant is granted the right to bring a cause of action under th[e DTPA] by another law, the claimant is not limited to recovery of economic damages only, but may recover any actual damages incurred by the claimant, without regard to whether the conduct of the defendant was committed intentionally. . . . In applying Subsection (b)(1) to an award of damages under this subsection, the trier of fact is authorized to award a total of not more than three times actual damages, in accordance with that subsection.
TEX. BUS. COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50.
Akin pleaded, for example, for damages for lost wages and mental anguish resulting from the breach of an implied warranty and unconscionable action or course of action by Bally. Those claims fall within the exceptions to the DTPA's bar on claims under the DTPA for damages for death, bodily injury, and mental anguish. The trial court erred in sustaining the ground in Bally's summary-judgment motion alleging that the DTPA barred all of Akin's DTPA claims.
Having found that the trial court erred under both arguments in Akin's second issue No. 3, we sustain that issue.
CONCLUSION. Akin does not challenge Bally's other grounds for summary judgment on Akin's other causes of action. Having overruled Akin's Issues Nos. 1 and 2, and first Issue No. 3, and having sustained his second Issue No. 3, we reverse and remand as to gross negligence and the DTPA, and otherwise affirm.