Summary
concluding that a statutory action granting a government agent the right to sue for injunctive relief has a different history and purpose than an equitable action for injunctive relief
Summary of this case from State ex rel. Office of the Attorney General v. NOS Communications, Inc.Opinion
No. 77-827
Decided July 12, 1978.
Nursing homes — Unlicensed operation — Enjoined, when.
In an action by the Director of Health to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed nursing home pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, an injunction shall be granted where it is undisputed that the evidence shows that the facility is a nursing home pursuant to R.C. 3721.01, that the nursing home is unlicensed and that the home is unlicensed because it does not comply with essential licensing requirements.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Carroll County.
The events giving rise to the instant cause began some time before June 1974, when Mr. and Mrs. Woodrow Ring, officers of Tri-City Geriatric Health Care Center, Inc. (appellee herein), decided, in part because of a dispute with their landlord as to rents and as to who should pay for improvements required by an adjudication order, to move their nursing home operation from quarters leased from the First Baptist Church of Massillon, to a building in Carroll County on which they had a purchase contract. Mrs. Ring called the office of the State Department of Health to inquire about applying for a license for the new home on June 15, and on June 30 she submitted a license application. At about that time she also discussed renovating the new facility with a representative of the Department of Industrial Relations. A few weeks later Mrs. Ring moved nine patients into the unlicensed facility.
The procedure for licensing a nursing home is set forth in R.C. 3721.07 which provides:
"Every person desiring to operate a home as defined in section 3721.01 of the Revised Code shall apply for such a license to the director of health. The director shall issue a license for the home, if after investigation of the applicant and inspection of the home, the following requirements or conditions are satisfied or complied with:
"(A) The applicant has not been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude;
"(B) The applicant is not violating any of the regulations made by the public health council or any order issued by the director of health;
"(C) The buildings in which the home is housed have been approved by the department of industrial relations, and the state fire marshal or a township, municipal, or other legally constituted fire department approved by the marshal. In the standards, and by the state fire marshal, and by section 3721.071 of the Revised Code[;]
"(D) The applicant, if it be an individual, or the principal participants, if it be an association or a corporation, is or are suitable financially and morally to operate a home defined in section 3721.01 of the Revised Code;
"(E) The applicant is equipped to furnish humane, kind, and adequate treatment and care;
"(F) The home does not maintain or contain:
"(1) Facilities for the performance of major surgical procedures;
"(2) Facilities for providing therapeutic radiation;
"(3) An emergency ward;
"(4) A clinical laboratory unless it is under the supervision of a clinical pathologist who is a licensed physician in this state;
"(5) Facilities for radiological examinations unless such examinations are performed only by a person licensed to practice medicine, surgery, or dentistry in this state.
"(G) The home does not accept or treat outpatients except upon the written orders of a physician licensed in this state, maternity cases, boarding children, and does not house transient guests housed for twenty-four hours or less.
"When the director issues a license, the license shall remain in effect until revoked by the director or voided at the request of the applicant; provided, there shall be an annual renewal fee payable during the month of January of each calendar year.
"Any applicant who is denied a license may appeal in accordance with sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code."
From July to November 1974, Mrs. Ring increased the number of patients in the new home, made some repairs on the building and began plans for, but not the actual work on, the installation of a $27,000 sprinkler system for the new facility. During that time, according to her testimony, Mrs. Ring was informed by a Mr. Donahue and a Mr. Sanders of the Department of Health that she was operating the home illegally. She also received two letters informing her that she was not to operate a nursing home in the new facility. (On October 11, 1974, the Department of Industrial Relations sent a letter listing the improvements it would require "before the building can be reopened as a nursing home and approved by this department." Approximately two weeks later the Department of Health wrote Mrs. Ring stating her application was being processed and notifying her that "no more than two patients or residents may be admitted to your home until a license has been issued by the Director of Health.")
Mrs. Ring testified that Mr. Donahue and Mr. Hoyt Sanders "appeared on the scene and told me personally that I was operating illegally and that I should seek legal counsel and this is what I did." When asked by the court when this occurred, she testified that she didn't remember the exact date but that "I was in the hospital ten days and I just got out a while." Earlier, Mrs. Ring testified that she was in the hospital for ten days at roughly the same time that the welfare patients were moved from the Massillon facility and the patients who remained with her were moved to the new home.
After November 1974, Mrs. Ring began to install the sprinkler system and to continue with other renovations. In February 1975, without having either granted or denied the home a license and, according to the testimony of one of the investigators, some time long after such licenses are usually acted upon, the Director of Health, appellant herein, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Carroll County to enjoin, pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, the operation of the Tri-City home. (Approximately ten months later the Department of Industrial Relations issued a final adjudication order against the home which appellee has appealed pursuant to R.C. 3781.031.)
During the hearing on appellant's motion to enjoin the operation of the home, the parties stipulated that the Tri-City facility was unlicensed and that it was operated as a nursing home within the meaning of R.C. 3721.01. Ruling that the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity" applies to the instant cause, the trial court denied the injunction, directed appellee to make further changes in the home and ordered appellant to issue a license. The Court of Appeals for Carroll County ruled that "where a statute creates a new statutory right of action, equitable principles may not be applicable" but affirmed the trial court's denial of the injunction on the grounds that R.C. 3721.07 (the statute setting forth the requirement that nursing homes be licensed) was unconstitutionally applied in the instant cause. The appellate court also substituted the common pleas court's order with an order to appellant to either grant or deny appellee's license application within ten days.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to an allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. William J. McDonald, for appellant.
Mr. Harry W. Schmuck, for appellees.
The main issue raised by the instant cause is whether equitable principles and maxims apply in a statutory injunction action brought by the Director of Health to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed nursing home.
Appellant also contends that the principle of laches does not apply to the state of Ohio. We agree. Lee v. Sturges (1889), 46 Ohio St. 153, 176. See, also, Besl Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 146, 150, which applies the same doctrine to the assertion of estoppel against a state or its agencies in the exercise of a governmental function.
The injunction sought in the instant cause is authorized pursuant to R.C. 3721.08. That statute provides, as follows:
"The director of health shall petition the court of common pleas of the county in which the home is located for an order enjoining any person * * * from operating a home as defined in section 3721.01 of the Revised Code without a license or from operating a home where, in the director's judgment, there is a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home. The court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief upon a showing that the respondent named in the petition is operating a home without a licence or there is a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home." (Emphasis added.)
The meaning of R.C. 3721.08 is clear. It grants a court jurisdiction to grant "such injunctive relief," that is, to enjoin the illegal or dangerous operation of a nursing home. Moreover, it grants that limited jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of a nursing home either if that home is operated "without a license" or if there is "a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home." It is not necessary, pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, to show both a danger and unlicensed operation. However, because it might be less harmful to the residents of a home to stay in an unlicensed facility which complies with all essential licensing requirements than to be moved when the facility's operation is enjoined, we find, for the purposes of an R.C. 3721.08 injunction, that the evidence must show, in addition to the facts that the facility is a nursing home and that the home is unlicensed, that the home is unlicensed because the facility or the Director fails to comply with essential licensing requirements.
Given the express jurisdictional limitations imposed by R.C. 3721.08, we find that the Court of Appeals was without authority to order that appellant issue or deny a license within ten days and that the appropriate method for appellees to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 3721.07, as applied to the facts of the instant cause and in light of the deadlines for applications imposed by Rule 3701-17-03 of the Ohio Administrative Code, is an action in mandamus to compel the Director to issue or deny the license.
Since the operation of a dangerous facility is already enjoinable at the request of the Director of Health pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, for a showing that a facility essentially complies with licensing regulations, the evidence must show more than that the facility is not dangerous.
The parties in the instant cause stipulated that appellee is operating a nursing home and that the home is unlicensed. In addition, the evidence in the instant cause reveals that the Tri-City home fails to comply with essential licensing requirements such as the width of hallways, the number of staff members and certain fire regulations. The statutory prerequisites for an R.C. 3721.08 injunction have, therefore, been met. Therefore, unless equitable defenses or maxims are also to be considered by a court entertaining an R.C. 3721.08 motion for an injunction, the injunction should be granted.
It is established law in Ohio that, when a statute grants a specific injunctive remedy to an individual or to the state, the party requesting the injunction "need not aver and show, as under ordinary rules in equity, that great or irreparable injury is about to be done for which he has no adequate remedy at law * * *." Stephan v. Daniels (1875), 27 Ohio St. 527, 536. (See, also, State v. Alexander Brothers, Inc., 43 Ohio App.2d 154; 29 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 176, Injunctions, Section 13; and 42 American Jurisprudence 2d 776, Injunctions, Section 38, for further support of the propositions that the traditional concepts for the issuance of equity injunctions do not apply in statutory injunction actions.)
Moreover, it is the majority rule in federal courts and the law in a growing number of state jurisdictions that, where an injunction is authorized by a statute designed to provide a governmental agent with the means to enforce public policy, "no balancing of equities is necessary," Brown v. Hecht Co. (C.A.D.C. 1943), 137 F.2d 689, 692; State v. O.K. Transfer Company (1958), 215 Ore. 8, 15, 330 P.2d 510; and "[i]t is enough if the statutory conditions are made to appear." Ibid., at pages 15-16. See, also, United States v. San Francisco (1940), 310 U.S. 16, 30; Conway v. State Board of Health (1965), 252 Miss. 315, 173 So.2d 412; Nevada Real Estate Comm. v. Ressel (1956), 72 Nev. 79, 294 P.2d 1115; Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners v. Hyder (1977), 114 Ariz. 544, 562 P.2d 717.
Given the fact that statutory actions granting governmental agents the right to sue for injunctive relief have a history and purpose different from equitable actions for injunctive relief, we find the rule that statutory injunctions should issue if the statutory requirements are fulfilled to be appropriate to actions under R.C. 3721.08. Unlike equitable-injunction actions which were developed in response to a rigid and often inadequate common-law system for redressing non-violent wrongs suffered by one individual at the hands of another, R.C. 3721.08 was designed by the General Assembly to benefit society by proscribing behavior (the unlicensed operation of nursing homes) which the General Assembly has determined not to be in the public interest. It would, therefore, be redundant to require the Director of Health to show irreparable damage or lack of an adequate legal remedy once he has already proved that the conditions which the General Assembly has deemed worthy of injunctive relief exist. In addition, it would be inappropriate to balance the equities or require the Director of Health to do equity in an R.C. 3721.08 injunction action because R.C. 3721.08 injunctions and similar injunctions which authorize a governmental agent to sue to enjoin activities deemed harmful by the General Assembly are not designed primarily to do justice to the parties but to prevent harm to the general public. (Allowing appellee to continue to run an unlicensed home which violates essential requirements for licensing because the Director has been slow to grant or deny appellee a license may balance the equities between the Director and appellee, but it ignores the legislative purpose behind the granting of such relief — to protect the well being of those who reside in nursing homes.)
1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 30 (4 Ed.), Section 23.
In Brown v. Hecht (C.A.D.C. 1943), 137 F.2d 689, at page 691, the court discussed a wartime price administration statute in a manner which is applicable to the instant cause:
"Its purpose is not in any degree to punish the defendant, but solely to protect the public. It is a police regulation of great scope and importance. Innocent non-conformity with the Price Control Act is as inflationary and as damaging to competitors and the public as guilty non-conformity. * * *"
We therefore hold that, in an R.C. 3721.08 action brought by the Director of Health to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed nursing home, the injunction should be granted if the statutory conditions exist. Since the parties have stipulated that appellee is operating a home as defined in R.C. 3721.01 and that appellee is doing so without a license, and since the home violates essential licensing requirements, the order of the Court of Appeals denying the Director's petition for an injunction is overruled. Moreover, since the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction in an R.C. 3721.08 action to order the Director to grant or deny a license, that order is overruled as well. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CELEBREZZE, P. BROWN, SWEENEY and LOCHER, JJ., concur.