Summary
In 157 W. 123rd St. Tenants Assn. v. Hickson (142 Misc.2d 984 [App Term, 1st Dept 1989]), the court held that where a tenant's association managed an in rem building under the City's supervision pursuant to a tenant interim lease (TIL) program, there was sufficient governmental "entwinement" to trigger Fourteenth Amendment protection.
Summary of this case from City of New York v. ClemonsOpinion
March 15, 1989
Appeal from the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, Paul L. Klein, J.
James Briscoe West for appellant.
Ishmael Lahab and Fern Fisher-Brandveen for respondent.
Order entered August 3, 1988 affirmed, with $10 costs.
Tenant resides in an in rem building operated by petitioner tenants association under the City of New York's Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program. The city is the owner of the building and supervises petitioner's management during petitioner's interim lease with the city. In this holdover proceeding, petitioner served a notice of termination specifying no reason for termination of the tenant's month-to-month tenancy other than expiration of the term. Civil Court held that the notice was ineffective on due process grounds as a predicate for an eviction proceeding, and granted tenant's application for dismissal.
We affirm. As a general rule, where the State (or city) "'has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence' with a [housing] program or project, the program or project 'cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment'" (Matter of Fuller v Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 318). While the TIL program is transitory in nature, the city oversees petitioner's activities and operation, monitors its building management skills, sets initial rents and approves subsequent rent increases, and must approve the commencement of holdover proceedings. Thus, the city is so "entwined" with the conduct of the program as to constitute significant and meaningful governmental participation, triggering constitutional due process guarantees (see generally, Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 158). One of those guarantees is that a tenant is entitled to notice of the alleged cause for eviction and procedural due process in the determination of whether cause exists. "Eviction * * * requires a cause other than mere expiration of the lease" (Hudsonview Terrace v Maury, 100 Misc.2d 331, 332 [App Term, 1st Dept]). Since petitioner did not allege any cause for removal of the tenant, the petition was properly dismissed.
OSTRAU, P.J., PARNESS and MILLER, JJ., concur.