was his only criminal arrest and conviction. After finishing his sentence, Mr. P was transferred to immigration detention and, appearing without counsel before the immigration judge, was ordered removed from the United States on the basis that he has committed an aggravated felony theft offense. While remaining detained, Mr. P appealed pro se to the BIA, but his removal order was affirmed. Mr. P did not give up, and again appealed pro se to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He also filed a motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel. IJC was appointed, and Mr. P was released from detention.IJC’s student and faculty attorneys pieced together a creative defense built around existing BIA precedent and a careful reading of New York’s larceny statute. In an earlier case, the BIA clarified that under federal law, a “theft offense” under INA section 101(a)(43)(G) is defined as the “taking of, or exercise of control over, property without consent….”Matter ofGarcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436, 440 (BIA 2008). In addition, there was BIA caselaw following Garcia-Madruga that held that larceny in the third degree (an offense identical to Mr. P.’s statute of conviction for all material purposes) was not categorically an aggravated felony. After the submission of briefing on this caselaw by IJC before the Second Circuit, the Government moved to remand back to the BIA. The Second Circuit granted the Government’s request, and remanded Mr. P’s case without decision. Upon remand, the BIA held that Mr. P’s offense of conviction was not categorically an aggravated felony theft offense. The BIA held that NYPL § 155.40(1) is not categorically a match to the definition of the federal theft offense because the state statute encompasses takings with and without consent. Accordingly, the BIA remanded the case with instructions to apply the modified categorical approach.IJC argued before the immigration judge that, upon application of the modified categorical approach, there was insufficient evidence that