9 Even where a conviction does not serve as a per se bar to applying for relief under the statute, it may have a strong or even conclusive effect on the immigration court’s exercise of discretion in deciding whether to grant that relief under governing agency precedent or regulations. See, e.g., Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (describing the factors immigration judges must consider in deciding whether to grant relief from removal, including “the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness”); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002) (making “drug trafficking offenses” a presumptive bar to “withholding of removal,” a form of asylum offered to non-citizens who are more likely than not subject to persecution in their home country), overruled on other grounds, Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) (holding that “[t]he Attorney General, in general, will not favorably exercise discretion [to grant a criminal conviction waiver] under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) . . . in cases involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances” but that “ a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion”).