Summary
noting that the Spartanburg County Detention Center is administered by, and under the control of, the Spartanburg County Sherriff's Office, which is considered a state agency for purposes of a § 1983 claim
Summary of this case from Charles v. JohnsonOpinion
C/A No. 7:18-1920-BHH-JDA
07-30-2018
Stacy Danell Woodruff, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg City Police Department, Spartanburg Herald Journal, Spartanburg County Detention Center, Nikerra Pearson-Byrd, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Stacy Danell Woodruff ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Spartanburg County Detention Center, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was arrested on May 15, 2018, in Spartanburg, South Carolina. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Specifically, Plaintiff avers,
I was falsely arre[s]ted by Spartanburg City Police. Embarrassed by the Herald Journal newspaper. And being held against my will at the Spartanburg County Detention Center all because of mistaken iden[t]ity by Nikerra-Pearson-Byrd.[Id. at 5-6.] Plaintiff contends that these actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and that he is being falsely imprisoned. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the Defendants' unlawful actions, he sustained "severe mental pain, extreme emotional distress, anxiety, humiliation and embarrassment." [Id. at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks compensation for his false imprisonment; his mental and emotional distress, anxiety, humiliation, and embarrassment; the loss of his job; and defamation of his character. [Id.] Plaintiff also seeks an apology from the Spartanburg Herald Journal. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged with assault and batter of a high and aggravated nature at case number 2018A4210201860, which remains pending against him in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions.
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=42&CourtAgency=42101&Casenum=2018A4210201860&CaseType=C&HKey=102855611774101519771117576955989711110210911611969121881111218182851187410451574372119551111051071147469 (last visited Jul. 30, 2018).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and defamation. [See Doc. 1.] However, for the reasons below, these claims are not cognizable in this § 1983 action. Abstention under Younger and Heck
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendants, which resulted in his arrest and incarceration, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. As such, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award damages and other relief for his allegedly "false" arrest and imprisonment, thus the first element is satisfied. [Doc. 1 at 6.] The second element has been addressed by the Supreme Court: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also decided the third element in noting "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Plaintiff's Complaint essentially challenges the validity of his state detention and pending criminal charges, claiming that he was falsely arrested and is being held against his will. A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of his arrest and would significantly interfere with Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
Moreover, abstention in this case is also consistent with the principle announced in Heck v. Humphrey that,
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned, and he seeks damages for the Defendant's conduct. However, Plaintiff cannot bring claims based on the alleged wrongful conduct because the Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff has been charged in Spartanburg County with assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims—i.e., a finding that Plaintiff was falsely arrested and imprisoned—would imply that the pending charges against Plaintiff are invalid.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from custody, his claim should be brought, if at all, as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.").
Failure to State a Claim for Defamation
Allegations of defamation, slander, and libel fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989) (explaining civil rights statutes, such as § 1983, do not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under a state's tort law). Although state law provides for a right of action for slander or defamation, an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084106, at *3 (D.S.C. May 7, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2084383 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). Here, Plaintiff's defamation claim does not implicate the violation of any federal right. A § 1983 action may not be "based alone on a violation of state law or on a state tort." Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988). A state law claim "does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations concerning the purely state law claim of defamation fail to establish a claim for a violation of a federal right as required under § 1983, and therefore his claim must be dismissed. Wilson v. Ozmint, No. 3:10-cv-2887-RMG, 2011 WL 1336391, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2011).
Slander usually refers to acts of defamation that are "expressed in a transitory form, esp. speech," while libel refers to acts of defamation that are expressed "in a fixed medium, esp. writing but also a picture, sign, or electronic broadcast." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Defamation is the "act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Moreover, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear a state law defamation claim to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring his defamation claim under state law, and the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction, to the extent it would be proper, because Plaintiff's federal question claims are subject to summary dismissal. Defamation is a tort under state law that may be considered by this Court only under its diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Blackstock v. Miller, No. 4:17-cv-01926-RBH-KDW, 2017 WL 3530525, at *2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3500219 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2017). Thus, Plaintiff may bring state law claims against the Defendants only under the diversity statute, if the statutory requirements are satisfied. See Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011). The diversity statute requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of parties in a case means that the citizenship of every plaintiff must be different from the citizenship of every defendant. Central W. Va. Energy Co., 636 F.3d at 103. Here, both Plaintiff and all of the Defendants in this case appear to be South Carolina residents; thus, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction over this action. See, e.g., Newman-Greene, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (complete diversity required); C.L. Ritter Lumber Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 283 F.3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). Also, in absence of any plausible federal question claim, there is no basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a claim pursuant to the First Amendment rather than a defamation claim sounding in state law, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible federal constitutional claim because the First Amendment does not provide a private cause of action for defamation. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) ("Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation."); Sonnier v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette, No. 6:16-cv-1229, 2017 WL 778153, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2017) ("there is nothing in the First Amendment to create a private cause of action for either defamation or invasion of privacy"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 778003 (W.D. La. Feb. 24, 2017); Davis v. City of Aransas Pass, No. 2:13-cv-363, 2014 WL 2112701, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014) ("there is no federal constitutional right to be free from defamation or slander"). It is well settled that § 1983 may not be used to assert defamation claims. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12 (explaining interest in reputation alone does not implicate a "liberty" or "property" interest sufficient to invoke due process protection under § 1983); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining public humiliation, scorn, and ridicule from being criminally investigated does not state plausible claim for a constitutional violation). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that his constitutional rights were violated as to his claim for defamation.
Failure to Name a Proper Defendant
Finally, all of the named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this § 1983 action because Plaintiff has failed to name a Defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Neither Defendant Spartanburg Herald Journal, which allegedly published embarrassing information about Plaintiff, nor Defendant Nikerra Pearson-Byrd, who allegedly misidentified Plaintiff, are state actors, and therefore they cannot be sued in this § 1983 action.
The Spartanburg County Detention Center is administered by, and under the control of, the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., 987 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695-98 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding that Dorchester County Detention Center is controlled by the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and thus a state agency). As such, Plaintiff's claim is actually against the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, which is considered a state agency for purposes of Plaintiff's claim; see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-955 (D.S.C.1988) (explaining that a Sheriff's Office is a state agency). Because the Spartanburg County Sheriffs are state officers, not county employees, a suit against the Spartanburg County Detention Center is a suit against the state of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 954-955 (noting Sheriff's office is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit); see also Cash v. Thomas, No. 12-1278, 2013 WL 3804375, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court") (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996)).
A defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person," see Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001), and the Detention Center itself is only a facility or building, which cannot be sued as a "defendant" in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."); Williams, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 696; Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. As noted, the Spartanburg County Detention Center is administered by the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, which is a South Carolina state agency and an integral part of the state; thus, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. See U.S. Const. Amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F.Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989). As a result, the Spartanburg County Detention Center is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, the Spartanburg City Police Department is not a "person" amenable to suit under § 1983. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983, a person includes individuals and bodies politic and corporate). Courts have held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not considered a person and do not act under color of state law. See Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding the plaintiff failed to establish that the Lexington County Detention Center, "as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983"). In this case, Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Spartanburg City Police Department, which is a building or a group of officers in a building; as such, the Spartanburg City Police Department is not subject to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not "person" under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Because the Spartanburg City Police Department is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff's complaint against it should be summarily dismissed.
Additionally, to the extent the Spartanburg City Police Department is considered a municipal entity, it is subject to summary dismissal under municipality liability. A municipality or other local government entity may only be held liable under § 1983 "where the constitutionally offensive acts of [ ] employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal 'policy or custom.'" See Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Wolf v. Fauquier Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 2009) ("A county may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only 'when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.'") (citations omitted). Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of employees, absent official policy or custom resulting in an illegal action. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Plaintiff fails to identify any governmental policy or custom of Spartanburg City Police Department that caused his constitutional rights to be violated. Indeed, Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of any allegations whatsoever against the Spartanburg City Police Department, except that it falsely arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 30, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).