Summary
In Williams v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, a father who saw his son injured during a football game was denied recovery under La. C.C. art. 2315.6 from the defendant school board and high schools because they were found to be not liable for the son's injuries.
Summary of this case from Malbrough v. City of RayneOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-1043 SECTION "T" (2).
January 2, 2001.
This cause came for hearing on December 20, 2000, upon Motion of the Defendant, RPM Pizza, Inc. ("RPM"), for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having studied the arguments of the respective parties, the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court is filly advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Background:
This lawsuit arises out of an alleged confrontation between the Plaintiff, Donald Williams, and James Talbert, a former employee of the Defendant, RPM Pizza Inc. On June 11, 1999, the Plaintiff ordered a pizza from Domino's Pizza and requested that the pizza be delivered to his home in Westwego, Louisiana. Upon delivery, Williams met the Domino's driver, James Talbert, outside of his apartment complex. When Talbert requested $15.25 for the pizza, Williams informed Talbert that he had a discount coupon that he wished to apply to the pizza. Williams admitted, however, that he neglected to inform the store of the coupon upon placing his order. Talbert explained that he would not be able to accept the coupon and that Williams would have to use the coupon at a later date. The two men exchanged words, but Williams eventually agreed to pay the fill price for the pizza. In addition, Williams claims that he offered Talbert a tip.
RPM Pizza Inc. is a franchisee of Domino's Pizza.
After exchanging the pizza and the money, Williams allegedly began telling Talbert that he had a "nasty disposition." The two men exchanged words once again, and Talbert allegedly began screaming numerous vulgarities at Williams. Williams became angered and put the pizza on the ground, presumably to engage in a physical altercation with Talbert. Talbert then reached into his car and pulled out a pistol. Talbert brandished the weapon at Williams and his young son while yelling for Williams to engage in a fight. Frightened, Williams and his son retrieved their pizza and ran to their apartment. As they reached their apartment, Talbert retreated to his car and drove away.
After Talbert left the scene, Williams called the police to report the incident. When he arrived at the Domino's Pizza store, Talbert too reported the incident to his manager. When Talbert admitted to having a pistol in his vehicle, the manager immediately terminated his employment because such conduct is strictly prohibited by RPM's company policy.
The Domino's Pizza Security and Safety Awareness Class Driver Regulations specifically state that "No Team Member will carry on their person, in their vehicles, or have in the store or otherwise on the premises, a firearm or other weapon, either when on the premises, while on duty or after duty, if still in uniform." See Defendant's Exhibit 4, page 6, paragraph 12.
As a result of the aforementioned incident, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants for damages. The Plaintiffs argue that the altercation in question involved whether or not Williams could use the discount coupon, a matter that is in direct furtherance of RPM's business; therefore, Talbert's actions were clearly within the course and scope of his employment with RPM. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that RPM's management was negligent in that it failed to instruct Talbert as to its own rules of courtesy.
RPM filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it is not responsible for the alleged intentional torts of Talbert because said torts were committed outside of the course and scope of his employment and were not in the furtherance of RPM's business interests. RPM further contends that it provided Talbert with extensive training and education with respect to its regulations regarding both weapons and dealing with the public in a courteous manner. RPM further argues that Talbert had a long, satisfactory employment history with RPM; therefore, RPM claims that Talbert's actions on the night of June 11, 1999 were simply unforeseeable and clearly outside the ambit of protection contemplated by the imposition of the duty to properly train its employees. Accordingly, RPM argues that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate.
II. Law and Analysis:
A. Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins. Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986).
B. The Course and Scope of Employment:
In Louisiana, courts have applied differing analyses in deciding the "course and scope" issue, depending on whether the employee's actions were negligent or intentional. See Wright v. Skate Country. Inc., 98-0217 (la. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/99), 734 So.2d 874, 879 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1999). Because the instant action involves an intentional tort, this Court will only examine the issue of course and scope of employment as it applies to intentional acts of employees. In Louisiana, the general rule is that intentional harms committed by an employee can fall within the scope of employment, subjecting the employer to liability for the employee's wrongs. See Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So.2d 514, 516 (La.App. 1st. Cir. 1971). However, the employer will be held liable for an employee's intentional acts only if such acts are committed in furtherance of the employer's business. See id. When an employee's intentional acts are motivated by purely personal considerations that are entirely extraneous to the employer's interest, then the acts are not considered to be within the course and scope of the employment relationship, and the employer will not be held liable. See Orrill v. Ram Rod Trucking, 557 So.2d 384, 388 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1991) (citing LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d 216 (1974)).
For example, in Orrill v. Ram Rod Trucking, a truck driver employed by the Defendant collided with another vehicle while driving a vehicle owned by Ram Rod. See Orrill, 557 So.2d at 385. After the collision, the Ram Rod employee retrieved a handgun from the cab of his truck and proceeded to threaten the other driver with the gun. See id. In determining the issue of employer liability, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit found that the truck driver's conduct was motivated by purely personal considerations that were entirely extraneous to Ram Rod's interests. See id. at 388. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that Ram Rod was not liable for its employee's tortious actions.
In making such a determination, the Court of Appeal in Orrill found the following factors important. First, the court found it significant that the "tortious conduct did not occur on the employment premises," nor did it involve a fellow employee. Id. Second, the court determine that while the truck driver was engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the accident, his tortious actions could not "be considered as benefitting his employer's business." Id. Third the court concluded that the assault on the plaintiff could not be "regarded as a `risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer's business.'" Id. Finally, the court determined that the assault in question was motivated purely by the employee's personal considerations. See id., For these reasons, the Court of Appeal declined to hold Ram Rod liable for its employee's assault on the plaintiff. See id.
In Strawder v. Harrall, a service station employee shot a customer with a 20-gauge shotgun as the customer attempted to purchase a package of cigarettes. See Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So.2d 514, 516 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971). The customer sued the service station for damages, attempting to hold the service station liable for its employee's actions. See id. The trial court dismissed the suit against the service station, and the plaintiff appealed. See id.
In examining the issue of whether the service station was liable for the acts of its employee, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit determined that the attendant was undoubtedly acting within the course of his employment at the time of the shooting. See id. The court reasoned that the attendant shot the plaintiff during his employment hours, on his employer's business premises, and during the conduct of a sale. See id. However, the court determined that the shooting did not occur within the scope of the attendant's employment. See id. at 517. The court explained that the attendant was not hired to protect or maintain order on the business premises. See id. He was not the service station manager, nor was he authorized to use a firearm in connection with his employment. See id. Furthermore, the service station did not supply the firearm, nor did it have knowledge of the fact that the employee had the firearm on the its business premises. See id. The court reasoned that:
[a]lthough [the attendant] had been in the process of selling a package of cigarettes, clearly a duty with which he was charged, his act of procuring the shotgun and shooting the [plaintiff] amounted to a departure from the scope of his authority, which was in no way associated with the responsibilities devolving upon [him]. Not only was this a wilful and intentional act outside his authority, but the evidence preponderates to the effect that even his possession of the firearm on the premises was against the specific instruction of his immediate superior.Id.
Accordingly, the court refused to hold the service station liable for the intentional shooting by its employee.
After reviewing the applicable case law, the Court finds the instant action to be strikingly similar to the cases discussed above. First, while Talbert's assault on the Plaintiff occurred while making a delivery for his employer, his tortious conduct was certainly not in furtherance of his employer's business. Talbert's act of threatening a Domino's customer with a firearm certainly cannot be considered as benefitting RPM's business. Rather, Talbert's conduct was motivated by purely personal considerations that were entirely extraneous to RPM's interests. In addition, Talbert's tortious conduct did not occur on his employer's business premises, nor did it involve a fellow employee.
Furthermore, although Talbert was in the process of delivering a pizza, clearly a duty with which he was charged, his act of procuring the handgun and threatening the Plaintiff amounted to a departure from the scope of his authority, which was in no way associated with the responsibilities devolving upon him. Talbert was not authorized to used a handgun in connection with his duties as an employee of RPM. Rather, he was expressly forbidden to carry any weapon and was immediately terminated upon RPM's learning of his possession of a firearm during work. Accordingly, the Court finds that Talbert's tortious conduct on the night of June 11, 1999 was not within the scope of his employment with RPM.
C. Employer Liability for Negligence in Hiring and Training an Employee:
The Plaintiff in this case also claims that RPM was negligent in hiring and training Talbert. Therefore, the Court must apply a duty-risk analysis to such a claim. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032, 1043 (La. 1991). The four-prong duty-risk inquiry is as follows: 1) Did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff? 2) Did the Defendant breach that duty? 3) Was the conduct in question a cause in fact of the harm that occurred? and 4) Was the risk of the harm caused within the scope of protection afforded by the duty that was breached? See id. at 1041.
Louisiana law recognizes an employer's duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and training employees. See id. at 1044. However, the most critical issue in making a determination of whether an employer was or was not negligent in hiring and training his or her employees is the issue of whether there exists an ease of association between the employer's duty and the risk actually posed by the employee in question.See id. at 1044-45. For example, in Roberts v. Benoit, an off-duty police deputy shot the plaintiff accidentally when he was playing with his gun while intoxicated. See id. at 1035. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the ease of association between the risk posed by the deputy's conduct and the Sheriff's duty to exercise reason when hiring and training deputies. See id. at 1045. The supreme court determined that the ease of association in that case was attenuated at best. See id. First, the court explained that the sheriff did not require deputies to carry guns — either on or off duty. See id. Second, the court found that the deputy's act of carrying a gun while drinking alcohol was in direct violation of the sheriffs policies. See id. Third, the court reasoned that the deputy's conduct of "engaging in horseplay with a loaded gun while intoxicated" was in violation of common sense. Id. Therefore, the court found that the foreseeability element was lacking. In finding such, the court explained that:
[it did] not believe that [the sheriff] can be expected to foresee that one of his officers would violate, not only the . . . regulation [regarding the handling of firearms while intoxicated], but also elementary standards of conduct relative to the use of firearms which are within the common knowledge and experience of everyone.Id. (quoting Martin v. Garlotte, 270 So.2d 252, 254-55, (La.App. 1St Cir. 1972)).
In the instant action, RPM had specific regulations in place that forbade employees from carrying weapons while making deliveries. Talbert was aware of these policies, for he underwent extensive training in conjunction with RPM's regulations and attended safety awareness classes. In addition, Talbert readily admitted to being aware of the "no weapons" policy. Accordingly, the Court finds that RPM did not breach its duty to properly hire and train its employees.
See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1, Affidavit of James Talbert, page 1.
With respect to the ease of association inquiry, Talbert had been a long-time driver for Domino's with a clean employment record. He received several wage increases for safe driving hours and scored high on the Safety Awareness Test administered by RPM. Therefore, just as in the case of Roberts v. Benoit, it is not reasonably foreseeable that an employee, such as Talbert, with a good employment record would blatantly violate the company's safety policies. Talbert's actions on the night of June 11, 1999 were so out of character for an employee such as he that it falls clearly outside the ambit of protection contemplated by RPM's duty to properly train and hire employees.
See Defendant's Exhibit 10, Security and Safety Awareness Test of James Talbert.
IV. Conclusion:
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that RPM is not liable for the tortious actions of James Talbert on the night of June 11, 1999. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that RPM's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 11) be, and the same is hereby GRANTED.