Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1736-BF.
July 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case was tried before United States Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney on July 13, 2004. The Court heard the evidence and found in favor of the Defendants. The Court now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. Findings of Fact
II. Conclusions of Law
1. This civil rights action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was filed by Plaintiff Kevin Bernard Johnson ("Johnson") on August 14, 2002. Johnson is proceeding pro se and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Summons were issued and served upon Defendants, Officers V.C. Nwankwo and James Shiderly ("the Officers").
2. An original answer to the complaint was timely filed by the Officers on September 20, 2002. In that answer they asserted their right to qualified immunity from trial and liability.
3. At trial, all parties announced their readiness to proceed.
4. At all times material to this action the Officers were employed by the Dallas County Sheriff's Department at the rank of Detention Service Officer. Both were assigned to duty in the Detentions Bureau, the entity that is responsible for the housing of inmates in the custody of the Dallas County Sheriff.
5. The Officers worked the shift that began on February 4, 2002 at 10:30 p.m. and ended on February 5, 2002 at 6:30 a.m. On that shift they were assigned to duty in the North Tower Jail of the Lew Sterrett Justice Center.
6. Part of their duties on that date included feeding the inmates in the Dallas County Jail. In that capacity they escorted the trusty inmates who actually delivered food trays to individual inmates. The procedure for delivering food trays required that each inmate show his identification armband before getting a tray. At approximately 4:35 a.m. on February 5, 2002 inmates in tank 6E02 were receiving their food trays. Johnson, who had already received a food tray, refused to show his armband, in an attempt to get a second food tray. Johnson was told he could not get another tray and to step to the side so other inmates could get their trays from the trusty. Johnson then snatched a tray from the trusty.
7. The Officer stopped the feeding while the tank was racked off, meaning that inmates were ordered to return to their individual cells. The Officers, along with Gonzalez and E. Jones, entered the tank. When Johnson was ordered to put on his jumper and step out of the tank, he became verbally aggressive and combative and had to be escorted from the tank. He did not put on his jumper until he was ordered to do so three or four times. After he had exited the tank, the Officers ordered Johnson to keep walking to the station area. Johnson refused to comply with the orders. Johnson was verbally abusive as well as uncooperative about walking. In a hallway near the visitation rooms and elevators, Johnson swung at Officer Shiderly and scratched him on the forehead. Johnson was subdued and restrained with a wrist-lock, which was the minimum amount of force necessary to ensure Johnson's compliance and to prevent any further attack on any Officer. Johnson was then handcuffed and escorted to the sixth floor holdover cell, where the handcuffs were removed.
8. No force was used against Johnson except that force necessary to stop him from assaulting Officer Shiderly and the other Officers. No Officers used any other force against Johnson.
9. The Officers observed that Johnson had a bruise over his right eye, but no other injuries. Johnson made no complaint of any other injuries, visible or otherwise. Johnson was taken to the nurse's station where he was treated for a bruise on his right eye. Johnson bruised his own eye while he was trying to free himself from the wrist-lock when the Officers were trying to put the handcuffs on him.
10. At all times material to this action, the conduct of the Officers with respect to Johnson was within the course and scope of their discretionary duties as Officers of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and at all time was in good faith compliance with the United States Constitution.
1. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct does not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). The qualified immunity defense balances the need to stem abuses of office with the expense of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and deterrence from government service. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). It protects these competing interests while allowing trial courts to resolve "insubstantial claims" before discovery and trial. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. See also Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting Harlow recognized officials are entitled to be free from "overwhelming preliminaries of modern litigation" until the court considers the right to immunity). In this case, disputed facts regarding the Officers' entitlement to qualified immunity required that the case proceed to trial.
2. At trial, the Court applies the same standards for determining qualified immunity. The Court must first determine whether a plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established federal statutory or constitutional right. Then, the Court must determine whether the officials' conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
3. Plaintiff attempted to prove that the Officers used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment during his incarceration. Excessive force may be in violation of the Constitution if Plaintiff proves: (1) an injury; (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable. Span v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Heitschmitdt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). Objective reasonableness of the Officers' conduct must be gauged by the totality of the circumstances. Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1994).
4. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an inmate may not be subjected to any use of physical force that is maliciously and sadistically done for the very purpose of causing harm to him. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993). However, Officers have the right to use physical force if it is necessary in the performance of their duties. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992); Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1446 (5th Cir. 1993).
5. Some of the factors the Court must consider in determining whether any use of physical force was malicious and sadistic are (1) the extent of the injury suffered, (2) the need for the application of force, (3) the relationship between the need for and the amount of force used, (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the Officers in question and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998).
6. Although the amount of injury required to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment action depends on the context in which the injury occurs, a claimant has to establish that he sustained some physical injury. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999); Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999). Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates an inmate's constitutional rights. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. A constitutional violation does not occur with every malevolent touch by a detention officer. Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839. The Constitution does not protect against de minimis uses of physical force, where the use of force is not of a sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Gomez, 163 F.3d at 923; Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839.
7. Johnson failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Officers used excessive force against him on or about February 5, 2002.
8. Johnson failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Officers engaged in conduct that constitutes an use of excessive force against the Plaintiff which can be also characterized as objectively unreasonable as a matter of law, as of February 5, 2002. This Court concludes that the Officers are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity from liability.
9. Johnson failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the bruised eye he suffered because of any use of force against him by the Officers on or about February 5, 2002, was more than a de minimis injury.
10. The Court finds that none of the credible evidence at trial established that any force used against Johnson was maliciously and sadistically done with the intent to harm him. At no time was force used against Johnson that was malicious and sadistic or that exceeded the degree of force that a reasonable officer would have used under the same or similar circumstances. The force the Officers used against Johnson occurred solely in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1446.
11. Even if this Court had concluded that either Officer engaged in conduct that violated a constitutional right (which the Court did not find from the evidence), the Officer would be entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable. Kipps v. Callier, 197 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff had the burden of proof on this issue and had to establish each Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff did not meet this burden. The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, given the absence of credible evidence of conduct that could be characterized, as a matter of law, as plainly incompetent or done in knowing violation of the Constitution. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 918-19 (5th Cir. 2000). Even if the Officers were mistaken in their judgment or incorrect in their assessments about the need for a use of force, they needed only to be reasonable in making their decision. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002); Dudley v. Angel, 209 F.3d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). This Court finds that the Officers' conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
12. Johnson failed to prove that no reasonable officer in the place of each of the Officers would have believed that the conduct at issue was appropriate. In fact, Johnson failed to present any evidence on this issue. The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
After considering the evidence and hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that judgment shall be entered in favor of the Officers and against Johnson on all of Johnson's claims.