Opinion
Case No. 2:06-CV-871.
October 16, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, by plaintiff Ned Cameron, Jr. ("plaintiff"), a former employee of the Ohio Department of Youth Services ("ODYS"), an agency of the State of Ohio. Plaintiff alleges that he has been discriminated against and wrongfully terminated by ODYS as a result of his age and race. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is currently before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (" Motion"), Doc. No. 10.
Defendant has moved to dismiss only Plaintiff's ADEA claim and has recognized that plaintiff intends to pursue his Title VII claim. Plaintiff also originally asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and O.R.C. § 4112, but has indicated to defendant that he does not intend to pursue those claims. Motion, Doc. No. 10, Exhibit A.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, who is African-American and over 50 years of age, began working for defendant in Columbus, Ohio, in approximately 1990. Complaint at ¶ 5. In 2002, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Id. at ¶ 9(f). About three years later, plaintiff was re-instated but was assigned to defendant's Dayton, Ohio, offices. Id. at ¶ 5. In November 2005, Plaintiff's employment was again terminated. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, throughout his employment with defendant and because of his age and race, he was subjected to "stricter scrutiny" than were his colleagues; he also alleges that he was wrongfully reprimanded and suspended. Id. at ¶ 9. As a result of these alleged discriminatory acts, plaintiff claims to have suffered "severe and intense emotional and physical distress, mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment," in addition to loss of income. Id. at ¶ 12. The complaint seeks compensatory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination charge against defendant with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and was issued a notice of the right to sue on September 7, 2006. Id. at ¶ 16-17. On October 17, 2006, plaintiff filed this action. See Doc. No. 2. Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff's ADEA claim on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. Motion, Doc. No. 10, p. 2.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant filed its Motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(c). Because an answer had previously been filed, Doc. No. 4, the Court accepts the Motion as one filed under Rule 12(c). When analyzing Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, reviewing courts use the same standard applied to rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Roth Steel Prod. v. Sharon Steel Co., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1983) (court is limited to evaluation of whether complaint sets forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a cause of action). In determining whether dismissal on this basis is appropriate, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all factual allegations must be accepted as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Bower v. Federal Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. The Cmty. Mutual Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Moreover, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
Thus, this Court will grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint is without merit because of an absence of facts or law to support the claims in it, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See generally, Rauch v. Day Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant takes the position that it enjoys immunity by operation of the Eleventh Amendment. Motion. Plaintiff contends that his claim for injunctive relief, at least, should survive. Plaintiff's Memorandum contra Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [" Memorandum contra"], Doc. No. 11 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Meekison v. Voinovich, 67 Fed. Appx. 900 (6th Cir. 2003)).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment has been extended even to suits filed against a state by one of its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). "[T]he Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). In Kimel, the Supreme Court specifically held that "in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals." Id. at 91.
1. Plaintiff's ADEA Claim for Monetary Damages
Ohio is immune from claims for monetary damages under the ADEA because the state has not waived its immunity and Congress has not properly abrogated that immunity. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d 806, 816 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Kimel, holding that "states cannot be sued for money damages under the ADEA").
2. Plaintiff's ADEA Claim for Injunctive Relief
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the State of Ohio is immune from even a claim for injunctive relief under the ADEA. Lathan v. Office of the Atty. Genl. of the State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935 (2005). Accord Collins v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., ___ F.Supp. 2d ___, 2007 WL 2783661, *6 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
Plaintiff, citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), asserts that his claim under the ADEA for injunctive relief should survive. Plaintiff misinterprets Ex Parte Young.
In Ex Parte Young, the United States Supreme Court carved out an exception to the general proposition that, under the Eleventh Amendment, states are immune to lawsuits by private individuals. Id. at 156-57. In that case, several railroad companies sued the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, Edward T. Young, seeking to enjoin him from enforcing legislation establishing railroad rates. Id. at 129. The injunction was issued and, when it was alleged that he violated the terms of the injunction, Young argued that, as a state official, he enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability on a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 133. The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "individuals who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State . . . may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." Id. at 155-56.
The Supreme Court has affirmed this "state officer" exception language more recently in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999). In that case, the Court held that Ex Parte Young stands for the proposition that "certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must . . . be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land." Id. at 747 (emphasis added). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has clarified the distinction between monetary and injunctive relief: "[U]nder the Ex Parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits against state officials when the relief sought is retrospective or compensatory in nature." MacDonald v. Village of Northport, MI, 164 F.3d 964, 971 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, even equitable relief under the ADEA is foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment "when the practical effect of such an award is indistinguishable in many respects from an award of damages, and when it is `measured in terms of monetary loss resulting from a past breach'." Id. at 971 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)). In determining whether the injunctive relief sought by an ADEA plaintiff is the functional equivalent of a claim for damages, courts should consider the "practical effect" of a plaintiff's claim for equitable restitution. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668. If the claim is "indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against the State," that claim should not be considered under the exception language of Ex Parte Young. Id., at 668-69.
Plaintiff in the instant case has sued the State of Ohio, not a state official. Complaint at ¶ 6 et seq. Accordingly, the reasoning underlying the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable. But see Meekison v. Voinovich, supra, 67 Fed. Appx 900 . Moreover, although plaintiff's complaint generally asserts a claim for injunctive relief, it is not at all clear that, in making this claim, plaintiff actually seeks a remedy different from his claim for monetary damages.
In Meekison, an unpublished decision with limited precedential value, the Court of Appeals remanded "for further proceedings" a case which, inter alia, asserted a claim against the state agency for injunctive relief under the ADEA. The case upon which the Sixth Circuit relied, however, State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass'n. v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2003), involved a claim only against state officials, rather than against the state itself.
For both these reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief under the ADEA must likewise fail.
WHEREUPON, defendant's Motion, Doc. No. 10, is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claim under the ADEA is DISMISSED.