Opinion
Case No. 3:06 CV 7005.
February 9, 2007
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the Court on Block Communications, Inc.'s ("Defendant") motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12) is hereby granted.
There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the claimant Vernon Brubaker ("Plaintiff") is entitled to welfare plan benefits discussed in a 1993 letter. Plaintiff fails to properly plead the elements of a promissory estoppel claim. Plaintiff also fails to argue that the plan document is ambiguous, which is necessary to be successful on a promissory estoppel claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001. In demurring, Plaintiff does not argue that the 1993 letter at issue is a plan document or that it contained vested welfare benefits.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a former employee of The Toledo Blade. He retired on September 1, 1993, allegedly in reliance on a conversation he had with a representative of his employer regarding terms of his retirement in July 1993. A letter summarizing Plaintiff's July 1993 conversation followed shortly thereafter dated September 28, 1993 ("the 1993 letter"). This letter was addressed to Jo Kerns, Director of Human Resources, from a Sandy Chavez and copied Plaintiff and a Margie Scotland. It stated:
Effective with Buzz Brubaker's retirement on September 1, 1993, the following would apply:
Hospitalization will be paid for Buzz and his wife during their lifetimes.
Dental coverage will continue until May 1, 1998. At that time, he will have the option of continuing his coverage by paying the premium himself.
Optical coverage will be discontinued on May 1, 1998.
Pl. Ex. A. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to lifetime hospitalization for himself and his wife based on the contents of the 1993 letter.
Plaintiff argues that the 1993 letter entitles him and his wife to lifetime hospitalization because Defendant is bound by the 1993 letter. On March 1, 2005 Plaintiff was notified by his former employer that as a "Toledo Blade Management Retiree," a participant in the Blade Management Retirees' Pension Fund ("the plan"), Plaintiff would have to contribute fifty dollars per month towards his wife's medical coverage effective April 1, 2005. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and damages including a refund of any funds paid as a result of contributions made after April 1, 2005 and for reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation under ERISA.
II. Summary Judgment
This Court will review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Although the Court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, see, e.g., Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)), "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Smith, 129 F.3d at 863.
III. Discussion
A. Vested Welfare Plan Benefits
Plaintiff does not dispute that hospitalization is a welfare benefit. ERISA distinguishes between welfare benefit plans and pension plans. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) with 29 U.S.C § 1002(2)(A). Employers are generally free under ERISA to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans for any reason at any time. Curtiss-Wright v. Shoonejogen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). The reason employers are allowed to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans any time is because welfare plan benefits do not vest on their own. See Bauer v. RBX Industries, Inc., 368 F.3d 569, 584 (6th Cir. 2004) quoting Gregg v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir. 2003). However, welfare plan benefits may become vested if intent to vest is found in the plan documents in clear and express language. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 1993 F.3d 388, 402-403 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the intent to vest exists in a plan document. Id. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support that there is clear and express language in a plan document indicating the welfare plan benefits at issue had become vested. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to lifetime hospitalization because there is not proof that there are vested welfare benefits in the 1993 letter.
B. 1993 Letter is not a Summary Plan Description, ERISA Plan Amendment or an ERISA Plan Document
Plaintiff does not argue that the 1993 letter is a plan document. Examples of a plan document are a Summary Plan Description ("SPD"), ERISA Plan Amendment, or ERISA Plan. ERISA requires that "every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." See 29 USCS § 1102. A contract for vested retiree health care benefits is not enforceable unless the contract itself professes to be an SPD or an independent ERISA plan. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 402-403 (6th Cir. 1998). The 1993 letter is neither.
ERISA establishes what information must be present in a document for it to be considered an SPD. See 29 USCS §§ 1022(a)-(b). Not all of the categories of information must be present. In Hicks v. Fleming Cos., Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the appropriate test for whether a document constitutes a SPD under ERISA is to determine whether it contains "all or substantially all categories of information required under 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) and the Department of Labor's regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3." 961 F. 2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff does not attempt to argue that the 1993 letter is an SPD. After careful review of the information required under 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) and 9 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3, the 1993 letter does not include substantially all categories of information. The 1993 letter is not an SPD.
Plaintiff also does not argue that the 1993 letter is an ERISA plan or an ERISA plan amendment. Establishment of an ERISA plan is set forth in 29 USCS § 1102(b)(1)-(4). The 1993 letter does not meet the criteria necessary to constitute an ERISA plan. The 1993 letter cannot be classified as either a plan document or a plan itself.
C. Promissory Estoppel
Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Motion of Summary Judgment argues only that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies and Defendant must provide lifetime hospitalization benefits as described in the 1993 letter. Plaintiff is correct that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applicable in the context of an ERISA plan, but Plaintiff fails to properly plead and satisfy the requirements necessary to establish a promissory estoppel claim.
In Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that equitable estoppel may be a viable theory in ERISA cases if each of the following elements are satisfied:
(1) conduct or language amounting to a representation of material fact;
(2) awareness of the true facts by the party to be estopped;
(3) an intention on the part of the party to be estopped that the representation be acted on, or conduct toward the party asserting the estoppel such that the latter has a right to believe that the former's conduct is so intended;
(4) unawareness of the true facts by the party asserting the estoppel; and
(5) detrimental and justifiable reliance by the party asserting estoppel on the presentation.944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1991). These elements also can be applied to promissory estoppel claims. Sprague 133 F.3d at 403-404; Flacche v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 958 F.2d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 1992). However, "principles of estoppel cannot be applied to vary the terms of unambiguous plan documents; estoppel can only be invoked in the context of ambiguous plan provisions." Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404; see also Fink v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1996); Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 458 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff does not argue all of the elements of a promissory estoppel claim under ERISA. In his affidavit, plaintiff states he relied on the incentives discussed in the 1993 letter when deciding to retire and argues that this reliance entitles him to certain health benefits. However, Plaintiff does not argue that an ambiguity exists in the underlying ERISA Plan. Plaintiff does not discuss ambiguity in his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. A party's argument that they have reasonably or justifiably relied on a document that is inconsistent with the clear and express terms of a plan document furnished to the party can seldom be true. Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404. It is not reasonable for a party to rely solely on an informal document when there is an opportunity to look at the plan document to determine the terms of an ERISA plan. Moore v. Lafayette Life Insurance Co., 458 F.3d 416, 429 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's judgment for defendants on plaintiff's promissory estoppel theory because plaintiff did not allege that the plan documents were ambiguous); Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, 342 F.3d 444, 456 (6th Cir. 2003); Putney v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 111 Fed. Appx. 803, 807 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff's complaint indicates that he was aware of the plan, but does not argue that the Plan was ambiguous. There is nothing in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or affidavits to indicate that the Blade Management Retirees' Pension Fund contained ambiguous language. Absent ambiguity in the plan or other plan document, Plaintiff cannot successfully argue a promissory estoppel claim under ERISA.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted because there are no genuine issues of material fact. Plaintiff has failed to successfully argue that he is entitled to the health insurance benefits described in the 1993 letter. First, the 1993 letter is not an ERISA plan or a SPD. Second, even if the 1993 letter could be considered a plan document, there is not clear and express language of vested welfare benefits. Lastly, Plaintiff cannot be successful under a promissory estoppel claim since he does not argue each required element nor does Plaintiff argue ambiguity in the plan or other plan documents. Absent ambiguity, plaintiff could not have reasonably or justifiably relied on the 1993 letter without first consulting the plan itself.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons enumerated herein, the Court hereby grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12). Case dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.